United States and Nigeria Prior

United States and Nigeria

Prior to the 1990s, there was very little "relationship" between the U.S. And Nigeria. This is mainly because of the lack of democracy, human right violations, and Nigeria's military backed dictatorship type of government. It obtained its independence from Great Britain in 1960, and for the first 30 years of its existence as an independent nation has suffered through political corruption and uncountable military coups.

Governor Nelson Rockefeller's presence, representing President Eisenhower, at the Nigerian independence ceremonies on October 1, 1960, was the first time the U.S. had official representation with that country. With the beginning of the Cold War, soon after, our policy regarding Nigeria revolved around two points: providing aid and strengthening economic ties including purchase of Nigerian oil; and containing the communist threat in Africa as we began also to in Southeast Asia (Ayam, p. 118).

In January, 1966, a few army officers overthrew the existing Nigerian government and killed the prime minister and the leaders of two of the major regions of the country.

Within seven months another coup took place along with the massacre of thousands of the population. Then in May 1967, the military head of one of the regions declared that his regions would now be the independent Republic of Biafra. A violent and bloody civil war followed and Biafra was defeated in 1970.

President Johnson's reaction to the Nigerian Civil War in the late 1960s was hands-off. Though independent for ten years, he considered it an affair for the Brits to be concerned with. The Vietnam War was a far more serious concern, and Israel had attacked the Arab capital cities launching the Mid-East Six-Day War. Since the U.S. was an ally of Israel, Johnson supported their efforts against the Arabs.

There were no tangible American assets in Nigeria either, so the president thought it better to stay away from the conflict, and he was probably correct in doing so. He did put in place an embargo on arms sales to both sides of the Nigerian conflict, and made no attempt to give any recognition to the newly proclaimed state of Biafra. When the Nigerian Government requested arms from the British and the U.S., they were refused. This forced Nigeria to ask the U.S.S.R. For weaponry (Ayam, p. 119).

The U.S. stance in remaining "neutral" throughout the Nigerian Civil War did not seem to affect relations once it was over. As a matter of fact, despite the diplomatic problems, embargo, and refusal of arms sales, the relationship remained on a friendly basis. Besides, the U.S. wanted Nigerian oil and its purchases from that country on an annual basis, by 1974, were approximately $1.5 billion.

In 1975, a military general and some of his officers staged a bloodless coup accusing the military government of delaying a much-promised return to a civilian government. The general and new leader of the country pledged a resumption of civilian rule by late 1979. Unfortunately, by 1976 the good general was killed in a coup that ultimately failed. His chief of staff became the head of the government and held to the schedule of late 1979 for the return to civilian rule. He also created seven new states in the country.

Finally, in 1977, a citizen assembly was formed to write a constitution for Nigeria, which was finalized in 1978, and the old military ban on political activity was removed. Political parties formed, and candidates were nominated for president, vice-president, national assembly, state governorships, etc. In 1979, the elections were held and Alhaji Shehu Shagari of the National Party of Nigeria was elected president (Bureau of African Affairs).

Under President Nixon, matters in Nigeria, and the rest of Africa for that matter, took little precedence. In a March, 1970 memorandum to his chief advisors describing issues he wished to be brought to his attention, Africa was at the bottom of the list, and only, he said, if it required Presidential-level attention. This was, again, at the time of the Nigerian Civil War and he was basically continuing LBJ's hands-off approach.

President Carter believed that our relations with countries like Nigeria should improve. Though the substance of the U.S. approach towards that country did not change, perhaps our attitude did. Carter stated that he believed in general that foreign relations would be strengthened by the U.S.'s moral stance on issues such as majority rule and racial justice. He thought that the "promise" inherent in that type of position would be the basis for improved relations with countries including Nigeria.

Carter consulted with Nigeria and coordinated policy with the Nigerian government. Henry Kissinger's approach under Nixon had been to play the Cold War rivalry political gamesmanship since Nigeria had turned toward the Soviet Union after being rebuffed on arms purchases. Carter's approach, of course, improved relations between the U.S. And Nigeria.

Zbignew Brzezinski, Carter's National Security Advisor, once said that one of the main points of his boss's theory of diplomacy and international politics was to attempt to "weave a worldwide web of bilateral, political, and where appropriate, economic relations with new emerging regional 'influentials.'" Carter considered Nigeria one of those influential countries.

(Ayam, p. 121).

Andrew Young's visit to Nigeria in February 1977 completely changed the tone of relations from an adversarial to a cordial one. Although the Reagan administration reverted U.S. policy to one of viewing Nigeria within the context of East-West rivalry during the Cold War, relations remained fairly stable until the end of his administration. Discordant political relations between Nigeria and the United States are explainable by a variety of policy trends pursued by governments of both countries. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, Nigeria-U.S. relations were shaped by three basic undercurrents, namely: (1) the pursuit of the policy of containment by the United States; (2) commitment to the policy of nonalignment by Nigeria; and (3) the negative legacy which militated against the capacity of the African-American lobby to compel their government to adopt a more positive policy towards Nigeria (Ayam, p. 121).

Though Shagari was again returned to power in 1983, by January, 1984, the military overthrew him. The new general/president charged Shagari's government with mismanagement, corruption, and fraud, most of which was true. He promised to restore civilian rule but the country's economic problems were too severe. Despite his popularity the new general/president was himself overthrown peacefully in August 1985.

The newest new guy, Army Chief of Staff Maj. Gen. Ibrahim Babangida, restored press freedom and gave political detainees a pardon. He also tried to correct the horrid economic situation with severe pay cuts for civil servants, military and police as well as private business. He banned the import of rice, wheat, and corn and began a national conversation on reform of the economy and recovery. A coup in April, 1990 failed to overthrow Babangida and he had 69 accused coup plotters executed. By June 1993, after delays caused by what Babangida referred to as "fraud," the Nigerian government held its presidential election.

President Reagan's policy of dealing constructively with a South Africa that believed in segregating the Europeans from the blacks and granting privileges to those of European descent severely tested U.S./Nigerian relations during that period. In fairness, to Reagan, he dealt with South Africa in the hopes that his engagement with them would bring them closer to politically reforming its segregationist beliefs. However, Nigeria opposed this policy because they thought Reagan would essentially neutralize a black majority in South Africa that was overwhelming in numbers.

Sensing a return to democracy in Nigeria, the United States attempted to be supportive of Babangida's government, mostly financially through U.S. support of World Bank loans, as well as politically through an active program of diplomacy (Moose).

In August, 1993, Babangida was forced out of office because he annulled the results of the election he had finally achieved because he didn't like the results. An interim government took over the country temporarily, followed by the repressive government of Sani Abacha. He managed to retain control of the country until his own death in June 1998. By May 1999, under

Abdulsami Abubakar, the government of the country was finally given over to the civilians.

Despite tensions in political and diplomatic relations there was considerable economic cooperation between Nigeria and the United States. The oil dominant character of the Nigerian economy is the very basis on which economic ties with the United States are hinged. American oil companies are engaged in mining and sale of crude oil from Nigeria (Ayam, p. 122).

These four key issues have dominated Nigeria-U.S. relations since 1985 when General Ibrahim Babangida overthrew General M. Buhari's administration (Ayam, p. 124):

Ensuring that there is a continued and uninterrupted supply of Nigerian oil to the U.S.

The increasing wave of narcotics activities (mainly heroin, but also other lethal drugs, such as cocaine and marijuana), which is specifically targeted at U.S. markets: While the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) recognizes that Nigeria is not a producer of these drugs, it nonetheless, has a substantial number of couriers who ferry these dangerous drugs into the United States from the Far East and Latin America. The U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency has stated that up to 50% of the heroin coming into the United States passes through Nigeria.

Concern over progress towards democracy -- that Nigeria is backsliding towards military dictatorship, and human rights violations.

In specific terms, the strategic importance of Nigeria from U.S. perspectives lies in the country's economic, political and military power (which) has provided some anchor of stability for the region. If the Nigerian state degenerates, so will regional stability.

(Ayam, p.124)

U.S. Relationship with Nigeria Vital for West Africa and Valuable for Both Countries

"A strong Nigeria is critical for a strong Africa and a strong Africa is vital for global peace, not only in the area of conflict resolution as Africa has 70 per cent of conflicts in the world. We are fighting poverty, under development and trying to bring human and physical infrastructure up to 21st century standards. A strong Africa without a strong Nigeria is not possible. And this is central to our foreign policy."

Nigerian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Chief Ojo Maduekwe, 23 March 2009 (Ikokwu)

Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, at the same meeting responded that:

"the deepening of democratic principles are critical to the survival of Nigeria, a country that is the strongest U.S. ally in Africa. In that regard the willingness of the U.S. To collaborate with Nigeria on several fronts, particularly in the area of capacity building" (Ikokwu).

However, Transparency International (TI), in its recent release of the Corruption Perception Index report for 2009, points out that Nigeria has now slipped from 112th to 130th of the most corrupt nations out of 180 that it surveys. What this tells the U.S. is that, despite its words, Nigeria is becoming more corrupt, not less. And it also says that, despite any efforts by the Nigerian administrations to correct itself, they are not succeeding, so far.

The impact of that is that their leadership position in West Africa can slip with each succeeding problem. And it certainly does not stabilize either the country or the other countries of West Africa that may tend to follow its leadership.