The UAE and Israel

Introduction

Israel has been, for most of its existence, involved in some form of conflict with the Arab world. However, the Arab world itself is largely conflicted between the Sunni and Shia states. Israels recent pivot toward forming greater relations with the Sunni states has indicated an improvement in relations between Israel and at least part of the Arab world. Yet, making matters more complicated is the fact that Palestine remains largely Sunni, and Palestine has viewed the Sunni states relations with Israel as a betrayal of the Palestinian peoples fight for independence and autonomy. For that reason, Palestine has disapproved the new relations between Israel and the UAE. As a Sunni majority state, the UAE has long sided with the rest of the Sunni Arab world in support of Palestine (Soriano, 2014). But now that has changed to some extent. This paper will discuss why the UAE chose now to start relations with Israel, what the positives and negatives of the alliance are, and what new challenges will emerge in the Middle East as a result of this new relation.

Why the UAE Chose Now to Start Relations with Israel

One reason the UAE has chosen now to start relations with Israel has to do with the various proxy wars going on in the Middle East between Sunni and Shia powers. The wars in Syria and Yemen are examples of exactly this type of proxy conflict. The rise of ISIS (ISIL), a Sunni extremist group supported by the Sunni states (Saudi Arabia, UAE) in an attempt to overthrow Assad and the Shia population of Syria, is one part of the complex dynamic in the Middle East (Bahi, 2018). On top of this is the growing threat of power represented by Qatar and Iran. While Qatar is a mainly Sunni state, like Palestine, Egypt, KSA and UAE, Qatar has been identified by the KSA, UAE and Egypt as supporting Hammas, Hezbollah and the Muslim Brotherhood (BBC, 2017). Likewise, the war in Yemen between Houthis (backed by Iran) and the Sunni-Wahabi alliance of KSA, UAE (Sunni Gulf Arab countries plus Egypt, Pakistan and Turkey) is a case of further tension. These various frays have made it important for nations in the Middle East to clarify where they stand and to align intelligence communities so as to establish a powerful network. This is what the UAE has done recently in its pact with Israel signed in 2020.

The proxy war in Yemen has been ongoing for years. Saudi Arabia deployed about 100 aircraft in the Yemen intervention, in what has been called the Storm of Resolve, and planes from Egypt, Morocco, Jordan, Sudan, UAE, Kuwait, Qatar, and Bahrain also took part in the initiative to crush the Houthis and defeat the Iranian backed group (Scollon, 2015). The Houthis have focused largely on self-determination, as they opposed the US-allied president of Yemen, Abd Rabbu Mansour Hadi. Hadi, meanwhile, fled to the KSA, while a Southern Transitional Council has been created in Aden and is supported by the UAE (Alshuwaiter, 2020). Backed by the KSA and the UAE as well as the US, Hadis government still exerts some influence in parts of Yemen. Houthis do not want Hadi as their leader, as they view him as a puppet of an alliance between the West and the KSA. Houthis have thus found support from Iran.

In these examples, one sees the complexity of affairs in the Middle East and why an alliance between the UAE and Israel at this time now makes some sense. The UAE and Israel have been collaborating for some years on intelligence matters, and the formalization of this relationship is simply the next step in creating a new alliance to counter the Russia-Iran-Hezbollah-Syria axis. Essentially, it is all an extension of the Sunni-Shia conflict in the Arab world, with Israel siding with the Sunni states to counter what it views as the Shia threat emanating from Syria, Iraq and Iran.

The Sunni states view Iran as a threat if it is permitted to grow in energy dominance. That is why the sanctions on Iran under the Trump Administration were viewed favorably by the Sunni states and Israel. Israel also sees Iran as a threat, as their conflict goes back many decades and the rhetoric aimed at each other has always been hostile.

Under the Trump Administration there was a push to resolve some of these tensions, with Jared Kushner acting as a mediator between Netanyahu and the UAE with regard to signing the 2020 pact between the two states (Alterman, 2020). The idea was to lock in and normalize relations between the two states before Trump potentially left office. One condition of the pact, however, was that Israel not move forward with plans to annex the West Bank. The West Bank has long been occupied by Israel but it is legally the possession of Palestine. Palestine is majority Sunni, like the UAE; thus, in order to formalize diplomatic relations with Israel, UAE wanted to ensure that no annexation of the Sunni land would take

Israel agreed not to move forward with annexation plans and the agreement was struck. The only problem here is that the Palestinian people have viewed this as a betrayal by UAE ((Baker et al., 2020).

The significance of the deal between the UAE and Israel is that it represents a collapse in Arab solidarity (Alterman, 2020). For the better part of a century, the Arab world has resisted normalizing relations with Israel over the Palestinian conflict. The deal with UAE marks a shift from that policy on the part of the Arab world. The UAE has essentially declared that it is an independently-minded state in the Arab world and that it does not wish to blindly align itself with all other Sunni states on all matters, according to Alterman (2020). From this perspective, the deal suggests that regional stability is a goal of the two states. However, the facts remain that the Sunni states and the Shia states are still opposed to one another through the various proxy wars and the entry of Russia into the Middle East has clearly nudged the Sunni states closer together. Since Israel is a major player in the Middle East with especially close ties to the US, the deal between the UAE and Israel could be seen as a way for the UAE to form closer ties with the US as well in the face of a Russia-Iran-Syria axis. The role of the US in the situation should not be understated, as the US is essentially engaged in proxy wars with Russia and Chia as well.

Positives and Negatives of the Alliance

The positives of the new alliance are that it opens the door to greater partnership between Israel, UAE and even the US. Prior to the normalization of relations, the UAE was accused by the US of supporting terrorism (Sly, 2018). In an effort to peal the UAE away from a potential collaboration with Russia, the US helped to broker this deal between the UAE and Israel. It is similar to the way the US was trying to sway Egypt away from the Soviet Union under Nasser and Sadat.

As Khakhar & Rammal (2013) point out, the Arab world is an important economic region due to its natural resources, geographiclocation and political influence (p. 578). The UAE plays a particularly important geopolitical role as well. It lies between the Gulf of Oman and the Persian Gulf, and sits between Iran to the north and the KSA to the south. It separates Iraq, Kuwait and Qatar from the Arabian Sea. It thus serves an important role in terms of facilitating trade, and should a new global war break out, it is better to have the UAE on ones side than not. As an oil rich state that is culturally Sunni yet not opposed to Western overtures, it has an important bearing on Middle East events (Weir, 2003).

Collaboration with the UAE also offers some better protection in terms of combating international money laundering, as the UAE is poised to enforce money laundering laws that will help cut down on the funding of terrorism and other criminal activities on the global stage (Arnone & Padoan, 2007). From an international perspective, a working alliance with the UAE is important in terms of controlling illegal money flow. Thus, the deal with the UAE facilitates anti-money laundering initiatives in a positive way as well.

Furthermore, as Alterman (2020) notes, the Emiratis have created a large number of opportunities for themselves. Not only will the Israelis be eager to make deals on Emirati terms, but the Emiratis also have enhanced their relations with both Democrats and Republicans in the United States at a time of very polarized politics. As Israel is an important link between the Middle East and the US, the UAE stands to benefit from working with Israel as a door into American negotiations. The UAE could possibly receive upgraded weapons systems that it desires. Indeed, as Bowen (2020) reports, Americans helped seal the deal with the promise of advanced weapons that in the past the UAE has barely been able to window-shop. They include the F-35 stealth fighter and the EA-18G Growler electronic warfare aircraft. Likewise, Israel is bound to feel more secure in the Middle East as result of this deal since now it will no longer be as isolated by the Sunni Arab world.

The potential negatives of this deal, however, are that it increases tension in the Middle East. Israel may feel more secure with an ally among the Gulf Statesbut Iran is like to feel increasingly threatened and surrounding. This in turn could lead to an increased commitment on the part of Iran to work more closely with Russia and China, both of whom have been targeted by the US in recent years. China and Russia are often touted in the West as enemies number one and number two (Neuman, 2021). If Iran, Russia and China form a formal alliance in the face of increased cooperation between Israel, the UAE and the West, it could mean that the current Cold War 2.0 seen in geopolitics will become a veritable hot war.

The other negative of this deal can be seen from the Palestinian perspective. Palestine has counted on the support of the Sunni Arab world against Israeli occupation and aggression. With the UAE now working with Israel, the Palestinian people have felt betrayed. While the UAE did insist that Israel abandon plans to annex the West Bank, this is cold comfort to Palestinians who have felt oppressed by the Israeli state for decades.

The deal also does not necessarily mean that other Gulf States will follow…