Vulnerability of the Chicago water supply and other Great Lakes cities

Terrorism

As a result of the terrorist attacks that occurred in September 2001 and subsequent attacks that have occurred in regions throughout the world, an emphasis has been placed on the types of terror attacks that could occur in the future. A major point of vulnerability is the nation's public water supply. This vulnerability is most evident as it relates to the public water supply in large metropolitan cities. The purpose of this literature review is to investigate why the water systems of large cities are vulnerable to terrorists' attacks. More specifically the research will evaluate why the water system in the city of Chicago is vulnerable to terrorist attacks.

Literature Review report entitled "Terrorism and Security Issues Facing the Water Infrastructure Sector" asserts that water systems are inclusive of infrastructures such as surface and ground waters sources of untreated water for household, municipal, agricultural, and industrial needs (Copeland & Cody 2003). In addition these water systems include reservoirs, aqueducts, pipes and dams that maintain and transport raw water as well as treatment facilities that eliminate raw water contaminants (Copeland & Cody 2003). The water system infrastructure also consist of finished water reservoirs where are systems that dispense water to users including wastewater collection and treatment facilities. (Copeland & Cody 2003). Across the country that are nearly 75,000 reservoirs and dams. There are also thousands of miles that are composed of aqueducts, sewer lines, water distribution and pipes (Copeland & Cody 2003). According to Coleman (2005) there are an estimated 50,000 community and nearly 200,000 public and private waters systems functioning in the United States. Copeland & Cody (2003) further assert that "the federal government has ownership responsibility for hundreds of dams and diversion structures, but the vast majority of the nation's water infrastructure is either privately owned or owned by non-federal units of government (Copeland & Cody 2003)."

The authors further explain that the federal government has hundreds of water projects the most common projects are dams and reservoirs which provide irrigation and flood control (Copeland & Cody 2003). A great majority of these projects are critically intertwined with the America's entire water supply in addition to certain components associated with the nation's infrastructure including transportation, and electricity (Copeland & Cody 2003). The largest federal facilities were built and are managed by the Bureau of Reclamation of the Department of the Interior and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Copeland & Cody 2003).

The authors further assert that reservoirs managed by the Bureau of reclamation, especially those that are located around the Colorado River, actually supply water to a large percentage of the U.S. population including residents of Arizona, southern California and Nevada (Copeland & Cody 2003). This water is provided through both bureau and non-bureau aqueducts (Copeland & Cody 2003). In addition other facilities managed by the bureau provide water to an estimated 9 million acres of farmland in addition to industrial and municipal users in 17 states in the western portion of the United States (Copeland & Cody 2003).

In addition to the Bureau of reclamation the Army Corps of Engineers provides water to thousands of municipalities and industries (Copeland & Cody 2003). This water is supplied via the nearly 10 million feet of water that is found in 116 freshwater lakes and reservoirs all around America (Copeland & Cody 2003). This is inclusive of providing service to roughly one million people living in the District of Columbia, Arlington County, VA, and Falls Church, VA (Copeland & Cody 2003). The authors further explain that The largest federal facilities also produce enormous amounts of power. For example, Hoover and Glen Canyon dams on the Colorado River represent 23% of the installed electrical capacity of the Bureau of Reclamation's 58 power plants in the West and 7% of the total installed capacity in the Western United States. Similarly, Corps facilities and the Bureau's Grand Coulee Dam on the Columbia River provide 43% of the total installed capacity in the West (25% nationwide) (Copeland & Cody 2003)."

Water facilities in large metropolitan areas

The danger associated with terrorist attack on the water facilities of a large metropolitan area is significant because according to Copeland & Cody (2003) 75% of the population of the United States gets its drinking water from 15% of the nation's water system. As a result of this terrorists would only have to target a few facilities to have devastating effects on the population. On the other hand there are a significant number of small systems that serve less that 10,000 people and therefore there would be less of an impact if they were targeted by terrorists. However, there is still a possibility that the smaller systems will be targeted because they are not protected as well as the larger systems, that serve the metropolitan areas.

The article goes on to explain that there are several characteristics that make America's water systems vulnerable to terrorists attacks (Coleman 2005). The first of which is the fact that water systems are both publicly and privately owned (Coleman 2005). In other words some water utilities are owned by local or state governments while others are owned by various private companies and organizations (Coleman 2005). With this being understood water systems can be difficult to regulate and secure (Coleman 2005).

Another issue that makes water systems in the United States vulnerable is the vast distribution of these systems (Coleman 2005). The author asserts that such distribution is necessary in case a system fails or requires some type of maintenance (Coleman 2005). However, this vast distribution also creates a problem as it relates to securing these systems. The article further asserts that The nation's water system is comprised of interlocking components that include:

the water supply system (dams, reservoirs, natural lakes, wells, etc.); water treatment and filtration system; the water distribution system (pipes, pumps, valves storage tanks, etc.); and of course control systems often run by computers. These systems are mostly aging and in urgent need of upgrading, not simply to protect them from terrorist attack but to keep them handling the growing water needs of the nation (Coleman 2005)."

As you can see American's get their drinking water from a substantial number of sources, that are both publicly and privately owned. The number of water facilities that exists make it whether difficult to protect them all and to enforce such protections. In addition there is a large percentage of Americans that get water from a small percentage of the facilities that exists. In some ways this makes those water supplies easier to protect but it also makes them more vulnerable to attack. Now that we understand why these systems are vulnerable to attack, let us focus on what might occur if an attack takes place.

What will happen if Terror attacks do occur?

The authors further explain that if a terrorists attack on the water systems does occur there would be a loss in confidence in public drinking water, a great deal of panic and would have a negative impact on the economy (Copeland & Cody 2003).

In addition Coleman (2005) asserts that even if a terrorist attack on the water supply does occur it may not be successful because of the effects of dilution. This is particularly true of large reservoirs which would be difficult to contaminate with small amounts of a biological or chemical agent (Coleman 2005).

Such dilution occurs because many reservoirs contain millions of gallons of water (Coleman 2005). As such there would have to be a significant amount of the contaminant placed in the water for the public to be exposed to the agent (Coleman 2005). In addition, most municipalities have detection systems that asses the water and as such most agents would not be viable past the chlorination process (Coleman 2005).

With all these things being understood both the filtration and disinfection of the water can also take place downstream, making the contamination irrelevant (Coleman 2005). On the other hand, if the contamination takes place after the chlorination and filtration process the contamination could be successful (Coleman 2005). However even if the contamination does occur after the aforementioned processes, the contaminant would still be subject to the dilution process and as such the attack would be less significant (Coleman 2005). However the author also reports that there are cases in which the likelihood of a successful attack is significant (Coleman 2005).

In addition to adding chemicals or biological agents to the water, terrorists could also choose other ways to disrupt the supply of water to the public which could have devastating effects. Terrorist could accomplish such an attack by disturbing the operating or distribution system components or the power or telecommunications systems. Terrorist may also be able to disrupt the electronic control systems, or damage reservoirs and pumping stations (Copeland & Cody 2003). It is possible that terrorist would then set fires because there would be a loss of water flow and pressure which would severely hamper any fire fighting efforts (Copeland & Cody 2003).

Copeland & Cody (2003) also assert that the terrorist could destroy a dam. The authors report that such an event would cause flooding and could kill many people (Copeland & Cody 2003).

The authors further assert that Bioterrorism or chemical threats could deliver massive contamination by small amounts of microbiological agents or toxic chemicals, and could endanger the public health of thousands. While some experts believe that risks to water systems actually are small, because it would be difficult to introduce sufficient quantities of agents to cause widespread harm, concern and heightened awareness of potential problems are apparent. Characteristics that are relevant to a biological agent's potential as a weapon include its stability in a drinking water system, virulence, culturability in the quantity required, and resistance to detection and treatment. Cyber attacks on computer operations can affect an entire infrastructure network, and hacking in water utility systems could result in theft or corruption of information or denial and disruption of service (Copeland & Cody 2003)."

Indeed an article found in Harvard Journal of Law and Publuc Policy asserts that the use of biological weapons could easily occur in America (Kellman, 2001). However, the author also explains that food sources may be more vulnerable to contamination and less likely to be the method used by terrorists (Kellman, 2001). The author explains that even though it would be easy to add a contaminating agent to the food supply, the results of such an attack would not be catastrophic and may only affect a few dozen people (Kellman, 2001).

In addition the author asserts that the contamination of the water supply in the United States and other countries with water purification systems would be extremely difficult (Kellman, 2001). As it relate particularly to Chicago, there were neo-Nazis that were arrested in 1972 possessing thirty to forty kilograms of typhoid bacteria (Kellman, 2001). The group was planning to introduce the typhoid bacteria into the water supply (Kellman, 2001).

The group arrested was composed of students that actually cultivated the disease at their school's laboratory (Kellman, 2001). However, even if they had succeeded in their endeavor the bacteria would have been killed by the chlorination process (Kellman, 2001). Here in lies the issue with most terror attacks involving the nation's water supply.

Protecting these systems

The sheer number of water systems that exist make them very difficult to protect from the threat of terrorism (Coleman 2005).

As a result of the threat that exists the author explains that following the terrorists attacks of 2001 the Environmental Protection Agency begin to work in collaboration with water suppliers to guarantee a safe water supply for the country (Coleman 2005). This collaboration allows the EPA to provide water supplies with technical training, scientific information and assessments of vulnerability (Coleman 2005). In addition water suppliers are provided with emergency response strategies in a terrorist attack does take place. The EPA has also established a special task force to improve the efforts that have already been made to secure water systems throughout the country (Coleman 2005).

In addition to the aforementioned steps that have been taken by the EPA (Foran and Brosnan 2000) report that early warning systems may also be beneficial as it relates to protecting water systems throughout the country. These warning systems are useful in identifying high and low impact contamination which is inclusive of chemical radiation and microbial contaminants (Foran and Brosnan 2000). Such warning systems can detect thee contaminants in distribution systems and source water and allow local officials to respond and avoid customer exposure to such contaminants (Foran and Brosnan 2000).

The authors further explain that although many water systems do have surveillance in place associated with infectious diseases and various other health effects, such surveillance is not a substitute for an early warning system because the surveillance systems can only detect such things once they have already been in the water for quite some time (Foran and Brosnan 2000). On the contrary a warning system gives authorities enough time to "warn" the public of a problem before they are exposed to a biological or chemical agent, so that a negative situation can be avoided (Foran and Brosnan 2000).

The authors further asserts that the creation and implementation of warning systems can be expensive and require a great deal of planning and labor (Foran and Brosnan 2000). In most cases there is a great deal of support of warning systems as it relates to the local public. The authors assert that this support is more likely when "the cost and frequency of false positives is less than the benefits of averting true positives. When, on the other hand, the cost of monitoring exceeds any benefit from the use of an EWS, it is unlikely that there will be support for the system (Foran and Brosnan 2000)."

The authors further assert that the difference associated with the benefits and costs that is necessary to create an emergency warning system has to be identifies at the local level and it is likely to differe from place to place (Foran and Brosnan 2000). In addition the local support for such a system increases as the risk of a terrorist attack against the water supply increases (Foran and Brosnan 2000). For instance water systems that supply a large number of people are more likely to have a great deal of local support because residents are more likely to believe that the water systems are vulnerable to attack and that such an emergency warning system is necessary (Foran and Brosnan 2000). The authors also explain that the "Risk or the perception of risk will also increase as the presence or effectiveness of existing barriers (e.g., chlorination for pathogens) decreases, as the seriousness (perceived or real) of the potential illness increases, and as the size of the affected population increases (among others) (Foran and Brosnan 2000)."

The article further asserts that apart from the aforemention cost benefit ratio, an emergency warning system has to be effective (Foran and Brosnan 2000). This effectiveness is dependent upon sensitivity, specificity, reproducibility, and verifiability (Foran and Brosnan 2000). In addition such a system must be maintained by appropriate quality assurance/quality control procedures (Foran and Brosnan 2000). In addition this type of a system should be instrumental in reducing the likelihood for high numbers of false negative and false positive outcomes (Foran and Brosnan 2000).

In addition, openness for an Emergancy Warning System and their associated costs will increase as the additional benefits of the system arise (Foran and Brosnan

2000).

For instance emergency systems that have the ability to detect and warn the city of contaminants, or that supply substantial coverage of through various parameters, will be more attractive than emergency warning systems that supply only limited coverage or detect few contaminants (Foran and Brosnan 2000). With this being understood it is probable that Emergency warning systems that supply extensive coverage will be more expensive to develop and manage than emergency warning systems that have only limited coverage (Foran and Brosnan 2000). As a result of this scenario, the cost-benefit ratio for each system and the conclusions drawn regarding desirability must be evaluated by local municipalities (Foran and Brosnan 2000).

The author finally explains that when these systems are simple to implement and operate and provide continuous monitoring, using standardized analytical equipment, and improve source identification desirability is usually increased (Foran and Brosnan 2000). Additionally, constant monitoring decreases the likelihood that contamination events will be overlooked; however it increases the expense associated with functions such as equipment maintenance and data interpretation (Foran and Brosnan 2000). On the other hand standardized equipment can easily be distributed among users and restores and/or replaced than can custom equipment (Foran and Brosnan 2000).

Chicago Water Systems Vulnerability

As we have already discussed water systems in large metropolitan areas are subject to certain vulnerabilities, the city of Chicago is no exception. Chicago system is particularly vulnerable because the water systems in Chicago involve the great lakes which is a freshwater supply for a significant number of people. In addition, Chicago is vulnerable to terrorist attacks because it is an area with a large population that also has landmarks that are significant aspects of American history and society. Although a terrorist attack has not yet occurred in Chicago, there is a significant possibility that terrorists may target this city.

Just as with other systems in large metropolitan areas Chicago's water supply system is vast which can make security complicated and difficult to accomplish. According to the Environmental Protection Agency, the water supply for the city of Chicago comes from the Metropolitan Water Reclamation District of Greater Chicago (District) (Project XL). This facility is a Publicly Owned Treatment Works. The facility is responsible for treating wastewaters from commercial, domestic, and industrial sources within Chicago its surrounding areas (Project XL). In addition via the Industrial Pretreatment Program, the District manages process wastewater discharges from 535 Significant Industrial Users (SIU), which is inclusive of 362 Categorical Industrial Users (CIU) (Project XL).

In addition to the contamination of reservoirs and the destruction of dams, there is also some fear that the water supply in Chicago and other places could be accomplished through back flow (Dreazen, 2001). According to an article published in The Wall Street Journal terrorists could contaminate Chicago's water supply by reversing the flow of water into a residence and using the black flow to put chemical or biological agents into the water distribution system (Dreazen, 2001). Such an attack would actually spread the contaminants directly into homes and businesses and cause many deaths (Dreazen, 2001). As was discussed previously, contamination of a reservoir would probably be unsuccessful.

However, if a terrorist were to use a blackflow method the contaminants would be spread to many nearby homes and businesses (Dreazen, 2001). In addition this type of attack is particularly dangerous because it cannot be easily prevented or detected once it has occurred (Dreazen, 2001). This difficulty exists because the backflowing of water results in decreased pressure that although they can be monitored, can be nearly impossible to detect (Dreazen, 2001).

According to a report from the Conference of Mayors' Urban Water Council held in 2003 the mayor of Chicago Richard Daley discussed Chicago's water agenda (Anderson 2003). According to the report Daley explained that 95% of the nation's supply of fresh water is contained within the great lakes (Anderson 2003). As such he claimed that Americans should not assume that their drinking water is safe (Anderson 2003).

He asserted that there are many things that the city of Chicago does to ensure that the water supply is safe (Anderson 2003). These things include diverting oil salt, and gasoline from city streets into sewer collectors as opposed to diverting them to the Chicago River (Anderson 2003). In addition Chicago assists industry and commercial businesses in inspecting their water usage in addition to developing conservation efforts to limit the use of water (Anderson 2003). There also exist in Chicago a Great Lakes Cities Initiative that involves getting surrounding cities concerned with water resource stewardship (Anderson 2003).