¶ … Lecturer: I have two observations- one small but interesting and one for which I would like a response.

The first- you have transposed the authors names as Ingram and Schneider- in deed this is small but important - you will want to cite them as Schneider and Ingram going forward- as I said - small but important

Next I think you can develop your response to item 3 regarding your research interest.(my research interest is African-American women in the gas and oil field and how minority set aside programs fail them)

You have made a few claims that public policy is weak and that public policy fails- What is the weakness you have identified? How are you understanding failure? What kind of policies are you including in these statements and what is the connection to your research? I ask that you spend a bit more time on this section and submit a revision or addendum no later than April 7th.

Breath and think and write a bit more - you already know what you want to say- take this time to say it as clearly as you typically do

Critically Assessing the Debates and Critiques of Rationality and Public Policy

In spite of facing great disapproval, the theory of rational choice has attained exceptional importance among the general theories that account for human action. Its importance ranges across the whole continuum of social scientific subdomains (Chai, 2001). Similar to economists, proponents of the theory of rational choice maintain the premise that humanity is rational, and that it has preferences regarding outcomes. Successively, a person opts for preferable options above those that are less preferable. Furthermore, proponents of this theory typically assume such preferences stem from and simply reflect the self-interests of different individuals (Hampsher-Monk & Hindmoor, 2009). Normally, at the foundation of the theory of rational choice is a consideration of at least one discrete decision-making entity's choice behavior. Rational choice theoreticians usually assume the entity above is characteristic of (i.e., represents) a bigger group. After the establishment of individual behavior, the analysis commonly progresses to determine the interaction of individual choices for generating results (Green, 2002).

Espeland (2000) believes rational decision theories are formulated by a single group of an agency with the aim of resolving a couple of pressing issues: offering a structure to facilitate broad and effective individual participation in decisions impacting them, and coming up with a way to integrate incongruent facts. Decision-making under rational choice necessitates integration of diverse elements of value, via a succession of tradeoffs, into one common measure (e.g., utility or price) (Espeland, 2001). Typically, rational choice examinations commence on the basis that an individual agent or some agents maximize utility (in other words, selecting the preferable option). The existence of limitations is a second key facet of this choice process. Limitations necessitate making choices. An advantage of the theory is its clear tradeoffs between alternatives.

Through knowledge and tools of rational decision-making, a transformation has been witnessed in when, how, and which individuals could take part in bureaucratic decision-making. One means this was accomplished by making people a key extrajudicial instrument to diffuse the administrative "interest group" theory. Citizens' aforementioned expanded scope of participation in agency decisions is an extension of democratic practices apparently challenging entities that place emphasis on the irresoluble strains between democratic and bureaucratic governance. Nevertheless, despite a greater number of individuals taking part in decisions, terms of involvement continued to be stringently regulated by technical agency experts as well as the notions of rationality informing agency models. In the case of certain groups, decision-making access was limited by a kind of stringent instrumental rationality considered to be misrepresenting their decision-making interests (Espeland, 2000).

Meanwhile, Elinor Ostrom's take on the theory of rational choice involves a criticism of a few suppositions posited by it. One critiqued postulation is that of zero contribution: this theory claims self-regarding conduct is required even when cooperating assures remunerations exceeding non-cooperative options in value. Some exceptions are instances of disproportionately high private utility, with a single player or a tiny special cluster having the inducement to deliver public goods. However, frequently, independent contribution to providing a public good is improbable, because sensible, self-interested people won't take steps to accomplish group (i.e., shared) interests. The idea that people are unable to rise above issues about joint action, and require externally imposed directions for accomplishing personal long-run self-interests, is the structure logically and painstakingly picked apart by Ostrom in the former half of her article. Largely utilizing lab evidence of the theory of rational choice, within scenarios of joint action (Auer, 2014).

In Ostrom's article, an attempt has been made to prove the human personality's flexibility...

But results which prove good for all happen on account of the unique experiences and expectations of participants. The author discovered consistent proof of the working of a collection of design doctrines for long-lasting resource management systems; this includes contexts that involve conveniently available, expensive-to-safeguard, easily "deplete-able" natural resources (i.e., CPRs or "common pool resources"). Further, the author knows of no empirical research which has challenged design doctrines' validity. Still, the main finding of her research was: there are several kinds of people in our world, some of whom show greater readiness, as compared to other people when it comes to initiating exchange and enjoying the advantages of joint action. Therefore, a key question revolves around how prospective collaborators identify and communicate with each other, creating institutions which strengthen, and not damage, conditional cooperation. Although there is still no complete collective action model, evolutionary models seem most capable of explaining different field and laboratory findings and bearing an all-encompassing model's nucleus (Ostrom, 2000).
Schneider and Ingram discuss the notion of rationality in their work titled, "Policy Design for Democracy." They state that within public choice or rationality theories, the self-interest-governed rule of utility maximization has been integrated with utilitarian justice tenets for developing a deductive model of what governments ought to and ought not to do as well as a theory on kinds of institutions required for delivering public policy. Pluralist democracy, public choice, critical, and policy science theories are the four major theories accounting for public policy (Schneider & Ingram, 1997, p.8).

Schneider and Ingram (1997) indicate that a majority of the proponents of public choice theory ascribe the present policy related crisis to public institution design issues and governmental attempts at doing things other organizations, particularly economic markets, are better capable of doing. The self-interest focused rule of utility maximization has been integrated with utilitarian justice tenets for developing a deductive model of what governments ought to and ought not to do as well as a theory on kinds of institutions required for public policy delivery (p. 40).

The public choice or rational theory is based on the following assumptions:

1) The market represents a central societal institution which may be better depended on when compared with other institutions to offer a fair, free and just society; and

2) Markets have a focal position since they incorporate voluntary exchange between entities, with each entity ending up gaining an advantage from the exchange. Hence, the sole just public policy role is rectifying market malfunctions and offering goods the market cannot access. The above conclusions stem from the argument of public choice that individual rational action (or self-interested maximization of utility) results in joint unreasonable outcomes unless there are institutions in place for changing incentive systems for ensuring self-interested decisions yield jointly ideal outcomes (Schneider & Ingram, 1997, p.40).

Nevertheless, it is suggested by Schneider and Ingram (1997) that if non-specialists were questioned regarding their public policy expectations, they would almost surely accept the fact that policy ought to resolve issues effectively and efficiently. That it be receptive to public wishes, represent their interests, and settle any conflicts of interest; and foster democracy and justice in every domain of life through the provision of equality of opportunity, decreased subjugation, supporting disadvantaged population groups, and community empowerment for gaining increased control over their environment and lives. Additionally, most individuals would argue that, usually, the policy doesn't successfully achieve any of the above goals (p. 8).

Social Justice Impacts of Public Policy

Espeland's "Bureaucratizing Democracy, Democratizing Bureaucracy" article fails to address public policy's social justice effects on marginalized and excluded groups. But the article does state that untangling the links between democratic practice and bureaucratic rationality is a difficult challenge. Democracy's extension has driven bureaucratic authority variants, as mass democracy necessitates bureaucracy. It is not possible to achieve legal equity and political representation in the absence of complex judicial systems, intricate, sturdy kinds of administration, and sound regulation. Balancing social gaps has been counted among bureaucratic authority's most salient consequences, in addition to forming an antecedent of it. Bureaucracy-promoted "formalistic impersonality" and its employment depending on knowledge and technical know-how instead of property or social status challenged past privilege forms (Espeland, 2000).

Additionally, Espeland (2000) claims such social leveling resulted in novel societal divisions privileging bureaucrats, whose power has been assigned to tenure and technical training, demonstrated by certificates, credentials, diplomas and examinations.…