Civil War Termination Term Paper

Excerpt from Term Paper :

consequences of the interventions by the UN in Somalia and Mozambique demonstrates a better scope of identifying situations to predict that the conditionality under which the interference might or might not entail the coveted consequences. A successful intervention is considered to be one where the conflict between adversaries concluded with the effectuation of a formal peace pact. A failure activity on the other hand refers to one where the adversities persistently go on intermittently during the process of interference. The demarcation of an effective act of interference having been instituted makes it easier to probe into the reasons behind the failed intervention in Somalia and the effective intervention in Mozambique. (UN intervention in Somalia and Mozambique: Why Success is not always cast in Stone)

Let us first consider the successful UN intervention in Mozambique, the causes for the success and the reasons which had made the successful intervention to become a less successful intervention. The factors entailing the UN intervention in Mozambique a success was regarded as an unanticipated blend of strong leadership, donor coordination, and aggressive diplomacy that provided the crucial reinforcement for persistent forward movement throughout the strategy. Viewing from all the angles the donor coordination is regarded as unique, and the coordination was assisted by the sacrifice of the Ajello so as to combine all the donors into the process and by the multi-layered commissions instituted to visualize it. Specifically, the international observers on the Supervisory and Monitoring Commission -- CSC -- the ambassadors of the U.S., France, Britain, Portugal, Germany, Italy, and the OAU -- come together every week with Ajello to assess their expectations with regard to the political situations those were the same and to coordinate a reaction to it. The military commission such as CCF and CCFADM liable for supervising the ceasefire and generation of new military entailed a forum for daily evaluation and problem resolving. Donor coordination was also established on the inheritance and skills of a secular donor and NGO presence in country. There existed little requirement to renovate the wheel. (Lessons Unlearned - or why Mozambique's successful Peacekeeping Operation might not be replicated elsewhere)

Donors also could devise new methods to deal with the undermining and the reintegration of the prior soldiers into their communities. The UN technical staff concerned with the electoral preparations had much assisting experience. Irrespective of the wastage of money those were definitely wasted in places, it was at least accessible whenever, required to finance the process. Such sympathy of donor was to a portion are the result of enduring reputation with some donors, specifically the Nordic nations, who safeguarded it as a portion of their anti-apartheid attempts; however, it won't sometimes be the case otherwise. Finally, the dominance of the two Mozambican parties to the Rome confers -- RENAMO and the administration continued to be assured to the end game of the strategy irrespective of the fact that they generated many of the chokepoints. They were assisted along by a population fatigued by war and drought. In the next year of the expiry of ONUMOZ, peace still persists. While the organizations that strengthen the democracy are weak, they are at least in place and growing in experience. (Lessons Unlearned - or why Mozambique's successful Peacekeeping Operation might not be replicated elsewhere)

However, the relative success of UN peacekeeping missions in Mozambique in the early part of the 1990s was eclipsed by the ineffectiveness of the mid-1990s in Somalia, Bosnia and Rwanda. The UN was required to address these new hostilities sometimes with quite insufficient resources and as time went by, without the whole hearted support of the Security Council. (21st Century Trust. Ending Anarchy: International Rule and Reconstruction after Conflict) The UN depended upon the prevailing administrative and political institutions to execute each of the peace strategy. The UN adopted this process for clearly spelled out reasons. Generating new organizations necessitates time and money, and sometimes results in much resentment. Additionally, in the poorest countries with the least educated population, substituting personnel on a large scale is practically impossible. But this warning has a cost: such state structuring assignments function within the impediments of old power dynamics, particularly the regulation of security forces and civilian power structures, and therefore entail confined change. Irrespective of the prevalence of a UN mission, dominant functions preserve their hold on both the military and the administrative tools in Cambodia and Mozambique. (International Interventions and Imperialism: Lessons from the 1990s)

Several ad hoc coalitions that prevailed represented the lesser importance of the comparative efficacy of the Namibian peacekeeping and peace implementation preparations. (Limitations of African Peacekeeping Efforts) The civilian power organizations also entail a determinant role in post-conflict results, particularly during election when regulation over the state ministries and media outlets becomes an elementary bone of contention. In Mozambique, international efforts to generate a level electoral playing ground were harassed by the different magnitude to which the rival parties had reach to the state organizations and informal patronage networks. The UN delegations had no perceived success in the fundamentally altering existing power structures when they have instituted an intermediary government instead of depending on the incumbent one. (International Interventions and Imperialism: Lessons from the 1990s) Most of the things those have gone wrong in other UN operations also have faults in Mozambique. The schedules could not be adhered to, the local parties could not made compliance in time, budgets enhanced, parent UN agencies are involved in hindrances and UN resources allocated remain underutilized and so on. However, irrespective of all such facts the UN intervention was effective. (Lessons Unlearned - or why Mozambique's successful Peacekeeping Operation might not be replicated elsewhere)

Now we shall consider the international intervention in Somalia where it was not a success, but an absolute failure. The international community tried to interfere in the civil war and foster peace in Somalia by means of formation of the UN Operation in Somali or UNOSOM2. The mission UNOSOM2 was universally considered as a grand failure. The consequence was that the UNOSOM2 forces simply are another armed factor in the Somalian hostility. From the very beginning the UNOSOM2 forces were obstructed in their performance of duties by the shortage of staff and equipment. Ironically the activities in Somalia towards the end of UNOSOM2 could hardly be neutral with about 37,000 well armed troops that made it increasingly hard to remain neutral in the Somalian civil war. The prime reason for the inability of UNOSOM2 to remain unbiased was their conclusion to accumulate a rigorous manhunt for Mohammed Farah Aideed. Another factor constituting the failure of UNOSOM2 to remain neutral had to deal with the emotions of the Somalian population that the troops of the UNOSOM2 seen to be an armed force trying to invade Somalia. (UN intervention in Somalia and Mozambique: Why Success is not always cast in Stone)

Such conception made the still difficult mission for national reconciliation and reconstruction quite impracticable to accomplish. The failure of the UNOSOM2 can further be made liable to the deficiency of any attainable and firm objectives. UNOSOM2 was indicted with the complete reorganization of a degenerated state, something which was comprehensively beyond any rational anticipation of what it could accomplish in Somalia. Irrespective of the fact that the command of the UNOSOM 2 was to rest with UN a specific amount of rivalry prevailed between the UN and the U.S. over UNOSOM2. To further complicate matters even further, the Italian government asserted on taking a significant part in the continuance of UNOSOM2. The mission in Somalia could have been a success if there was a transparent and practical mandate, a temporary timeframe for concluding the mission, less but sufficient force, proper orientation of the personnel and application of the equipment, the confidence of the Somalian people and the collaboration and coordination of the international community. (UN intervention in Somalia and Mozambique: Why Success is not always cast in Stone)

It is worthwhile to evaluate the divergent consequences in two interventions. Irrespective of the fact that UNOSOM2 forces constitute a part of the hostility in Somalia it also meant that they were no longer seen as neutral peacekeeping forces. This made them genuine objects for the both the parties of the hostility and also largely not accepted by the local people. This made their mission difficult to accomplish. Contrary to this the ONUMOZ troops in Mozambique continued to be neutral and received the support from both FRELIMO and RENAMO in performance of their peacekeeping missions. Another factor as to why the UNOSOM2 interference was unsuccessful and the ONUMOZ intervention become effective can be seen in the very goals fixed for each of the two interferences. The UNOSOM2 interference was the prey of what can be labeled massive mission creep. The mission initiated with a transparent and practical goals those were confined in terms of the mandate, time schedule and geographical position. But, while the mission persisted on, the goals set were varied to incorporate complete restructuring of the Somalian state.…

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