Arab League and the War on Terror

¶ … Arab League and the War on Terror

CONCRETE REFORMS OR LIP SERVICE?

The Arab League's Contributions to the War on Terror

The League of Arab States, also called Arab League, is a voluntary group of Arab-speaking countries, aiming at strengthening shared ties, coordinate common policies and direct these countries towards a common good (BBC NEWS 2007). It has 22 members, including Palestine, regarded by the League as an independent state. These 22 member-states have a combined population of 300 million, occupying 5.25 million square miles.. The concept of the League was originated by the British in 1942 when they intended to use Arab countries against the Axis powers during World War II. But the intent did not materialize until March 1945 after the War. The preoccupation of the League at the time was to liberate colonized Arab countries and to prevent the Jewish minority in Palestine from turning it into a Jewish state. The Council is the highest body, which is composed of representatives from the members or member-states, who are usually foreign ministers or their delegates. The League's headquarters are in Cairo, Egypt. Its general secretariat runs the activities of the League under a secretary-general. The present Secretary-General is Amr Moussa. The most active members are Egypt and Saudi Arabia (BBC News).

Divisiveness among the members has dented the effectiveness of the League (BBC News 2007). During the Cold War, some sided with the Soviets and the others, with the Western side. They, especially Egypt and Iraq, have competed for leadership. Conflicts between traditional monarchies have also characterized the League. Examples of these monarchies are Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Morocco on the one hand and new republics or "revolutionary" states on the other. Examples of new republics or "revolutionary" states are Egypt under Gamal Abdel Nasser, Baathist Syria and Libya under Muammar. The solidarity and effectiveness of the League were most severely tried by the U.S.-led campaign against Iraq. Some members favored it, some opposed and the rest just watched without a stand. The decisions made by the League bound only those members who voted for those decisions. This rift, thus, rendered the League ineffective in the field of "high politics." It has been unable to coordinate Arab foreign, defense and economic policies. This inability was specifically illustrated in the case of the Treaty of Joint Defense and Economic Cooperation document and the Joint Defense Council, which were both rendered ineffective. So far, agreements among members have not achieved anything beyond issuing declarations, as in the case of expressing support for the Palestinians under Israeli occupation. A lone exception was the economic boycott of Israel from 1948 to 1993, which was almost total. It has demonstrated effectiveness on a lower level, such as in developing school curricula, preserving manuscripts and translating modern technical terminology and establishing a regional telecommunications union (BBC News).

The proposal of Crown Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia, which was supported by the Arab League, indicated the Arab world's growing recognition of the right of Israel to exist (Bush 2002). It hinted at a forthcoming and just settlement between the two states now in conflict, Israel and Palestine, but eventually living in peace and security. The evolving situation required leadership rather than terror, and a choice to be made by those in the Middle East. They make a choice between the civilized world and the terrorists. From there, they must oppose terrorist acts. The proposal of the Crown Prince lifted the hope for sustained, constructive Arab involvement in the quest for peace. It derived from a tradition of visionary leadership from President Sadat and King Hussein and brought forward by President Mubarak and King Abdullah. The view was for other Arab countries to rise to the challenge and accept Israel as a nation and as a neighbor (Bush).

Arab Vision of Peace

The Palestinian Authority, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and the Arab League formulated an Arab vision of advancing the peace process in the region and submitted the document to the United Nations Security Council (Nahmias 2006). The formulation or plan included a scheduled revival of the peace process and renewal of the Arab-Israeli negotiations. Critics anticipated that the Palestinians would move to serve their diplomatic motives to pressure Israel before the meeting of the Security Council at the time. Critics felt that, despite diplomatic pressure, the plan was unlikely to work at that time (Nahmia).

Proposed Reform

US President George W. Bush emphasized that democratic change could help win the war on terror (Gwertzman 2004). In response to the urgent call and the pressure by the Arab world, the Arab League developed a generalized formula for reform. Its goals would deepen the foundation of democracy, increase political participation, advance women's role and rights and improve standards of living. Critics, however, found the plan too broad and generalized to appropriately respond to the need for political reform. It also addressed the problems concerning Iraq, Palestine and Syria only vaguely. The only accomplishment critics attributed to it was that it finally brought the Arab states together at a meeting and came up with something concrete. The members, at first, could not agree on a schedule and on what to contribute on the subject of reform.

A that, in the face of that very public argument, The document they finally came up with did not include mechanics for the implementation of the plan. The ministers and officials who attended the meeting rationalized that their key effort would not be in the document itself but in its implementation. Observers and critics felt that, instead, the lack of substance in the document was the absence of democracy in the Arab world and its lack of regard for human rights (Gwertzman).

Two factors compelled the League members to come up with the document (Gwertzman 2004). One was the reality of a bulging and young population, who needed educational skills and jobs the governments could not provide. The other was the declaration by the United States and Western countries that political and economic stagnation rendered the Arab world vulnerable to Muslim extremists, like the Al-Qaeda. President Bush and his allies argued that part of the war on terrorism was the establishment or advancement of freedom in the Arab world. The lack or absence of an effective means of expressing grievances peacefully and the chance to improve their lives would incline the people towards extreme violence. External and internal pressures from these two factors brought the League members to agree on an interpretation of reform but not on its implementation. Shades of opinion varied between Arabs and Westerners and even among Arab states themselves. They viewed reform as one of four types, namely political, economic, educational and social. It was political if it would increase citizen participation in governance. It was economic if it would privatize state-owned industries, motivate or enhance foreign investment, fuel foreign trade, and similar developments, which would spur economic growth the employment. It was educational if it would involve the education of the young by religious leaders and this would also be controversial. It was social if it dealt with issues within society, such as the status of women, divorce and child custody, and women's ownership of property. These issues were also considered controversial. There were widely divergent views and opinions among the League members on each of the four types. The Jordanians, for example, were most interested on the economic type as they were on foreign investment, restructuring regulatory mechanisms, banking systems and ways to encourage people to invest or spend in Jordan. Other Arab countries, like Qatar, would view reform more as pertinent to education and their perception of Qatar as an education city where they would want American and Western universities to set up branches (Gertzman).

As before, implementation was the problem (Gertzman 2004). The Arab League and most Arab governments were quite averse to externally-dictated reform agendas. They were also particularly sensitive about dealing with Western states in matters of trade aid and diplomatic relationships. They were accustomed to reforms only in their states. Arab intellectuals, Arab liberals and pro-reform activists had their own ideas of the changes their society needed. Security or emergency courts in Arab countries, for example, are not part of the regular court system but are run by the military. The function of these courts is to ward off dissent or punish critics of the regime. Reform advocates have surfaced recently, who openly challenge Arab governments, to make modifications. The U.S. And other Western states, which urge them to adopt reform, could use these advocates' rallying point as a kind of leverage or justification for the reform they too pressure the Arab governments to undertake. The Arab League emphasized that internal political reform could be possible only after major regional conflicts and basic security in the region were addressed and resolved. As it was, the governments used the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and Iraq crisis as an excuse to evade internal problems and pressures. Their divergent opinions shared only a common ground and it related to American policy.

The United States' promotion of democracy in the Arab region did not have much credibility with these governments. They were aware of American support of Arab autocrats, like Saddam Hussein up to 1991, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak and the royal Saudi family. One inconsistency had to do with the Palestinian Authority's proposal for new elections for its parliament and president for which American assistance was sought. The United States was unusually reluctant in supporting the proposal, considering its urge for elected governments and the need for Palestinian reform as necessary for the peace process (Gwertzman).

National Reconciliation Conference

After a five-day visit to Iraq, Arab League Secretary-General Amr Moussa claimed that he had succeeded in convincing the Kurds and Shi'ite and Sunni Arabs to convene at a national reconciliation conference in Cairo (Ridolfo 2005). But critics again viewed the League's effort as backed by the United Nations and the United States. Furthermore, critics did not expect very much from the League, which they viewed as ineffective in its avowed role of producing genuine change.. It was seen more as supporting the stability of authoritarian regimes in the region. Most Iraqis viewed the intervention work by the League as coming in too late. From its traditional role of supporter for Sunni Arabs, the League abandoned Iraq after the fall of Saddam Hussein out of fear of the U.S.-led occupation and the portent of getting into the U.S. democratization agenda. Sadly, no Arab head visited Iraq after the fall of Saddam Hussein. Yet the League arrogated upon itself the honor of being the voice of Iraq's disenfranchised Sunni Arabs with or without their approval or agreement (Ridolfo).

Most Kurdish and Shi'ite Arabs did not have much respect or faith in the League, which did little to support either group (Ridolfo 2005). Shi'ite Arabs were a minority group, dominated by the Sunni Arabs. Sunni Arabs traditionally regarded the Shi'ites as closer to Iran than to the Arab world. The Syrian regime was often blamed for the ingress of Islamic insurgents into Iraq in support of Abu Mus'ah al-Zarqawi's movement. As a consequence, the movement targeted the Shi'ite Arabs. On the other hand, Kurds had little value to Arab states because they were not Arabs. The Syrian government thus persecuted the Kurdish minority. Contention between Iraq's Shi'ite and Kurdish leaders and the Arab League reached a high when the League's Secretary-General bewailed the Iraqi draft constitution's failure in recognizing Iraq's "Arab identity." Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jafari reacted by accusing the League of interfering in purely Iraqi affairs. Eventually, those who drafted the constitution agreed to amend the text to stte that Iraq's "Arab people are part of the Arab nation (Ridolfo)."

Peace Plan

The United States, Russia, the European Union and the United Nations shared a common vision of a second Arab State evolving from the former Palestine (Singer 2007). For four years, they struggled at the negotiating table. It took four years before they realized that their negotiation skills were so inept and powerless that they became a laughing stock in the Arab world. Their common vision shattered. But instead of reconsidering their vision and coming up with a new policy, which would deviate from the creation of another Arab State, the visionaries joined forces with the Arab League in pursuing its 2000 Peace Initiative. This Peace Initiative had the same goal of creating a second Arab State out of the former Palestine and failed to the smallest detail. The vision and the 2000 Peace Plan Initiative by the League both demanded the return of all Arabs to Israel with their descendants who had not lived there for 60 years. Both the vision and the Peace Initiative demanded the right to expel 400,000 Jews living in the West Bank for the last 40 years. The act constituted ethnic cleansing in its most inhuman form. It also demanded the unconditional return of the entire West Bank to Arab rule. This demand violated the United Nations Security Council Resolution 242 and 338, which provided that more than a few inches of the West Bank should belong to Israel. The Arab League Peace Initiative was not amenable to bargaining but was an "all-or-nothing proposal." All indications showed that the League's demand for the creation of a second Arab State in the former Palestine had vanished and died. The only and ultimate option was to divide the West Bank between Jordan and Israel. Who would take that option would be the other question (Singer).

The Arab League and Its Fate

Arab League Secretary-General Amr Moussa announced the fate of the Middle East peace process as dead (CNN 2006). He made the announcement after a heated meeting among the League's foreign ministers in Cairo. He said that only the Security Council had the power to deal with the crisis. It could evaluate all the aspects of the failure of all efforts exerted to make the peace process work, he added. These foreign ministers who represented 18 Arab League nations met to address Israel's attacks on Lebanon and the Palestinian territory of Gaza. Israel's attacks were triggered by the abduction of two Israeli soldiers and the murders of three others by Hezbollah militants during a raid. Israel vowed to free the soldiers and retaliate for the kidnapping. Lebanese Prime Minister Fouad Siniora said that the attacks had razed and turned his country into a "disaster zone." He urged for an immediate ceasefire and sought international intervention and help to stop the attacks by Israel's war machines. He deplored Israel's punishing all Lebanese as a nation and that this action lacked moral and legal legitimacy. For his part, U.S. President George W. Bush met with Russian President Vladimir Putin. He called on Syria to influence the Shi'ite group to stop the attacks (CNN).

What the Arabs Must Reconsider

Up to the last minute, the League did not believe that the U.S. would invade Iraq (Taheri 2003). Secretary-General Amr Moussa was "absolutely sure" there would be no war. The Arabs had no policy to prevent it or influence an invasion if it occurred. They did not take steps to analyze the war or its consequences. They simply reverted to their traditional methods of negation and dissimulation. They did not recognize the newly-created Governing Council and thought of suspending Iraq's members at the League. They used the United Nation to cover up for their lack of policy concerning Iraq. They were not unified when the U.S. asked them to allocate peace-keeping troops to Iraq. Some agreed, some disagreed and others only made noises to agree or disagree. Their general attitude was "rejectionism" or saying no because Arabs like to say no. Their policy on Palestine was founded on "rejectionism." It was an attitude, which produced no benefits for the Palestinians who had to give their lives up in exchange for an Arab League:"heroism." Iraq would not lose very much if the League suspended or excluded it. The League's own members did not think very highly about it, in the first place. What the Arabs needed to contend with was what it could mean to it not to recognize the Governing Council in Baghdad. It could not assume that Iraq would cease to exist as a State. The rejectionist attitude or view on Palestine divided and then weakened the Arabs and it was recurring in Iraq. It was dividing the Arabs and giving hints that it could lead to further loss of influence. What appeared to be the most realistic and workable policy on Iraw was to accept the occupation as a temporary but necessary evil and rejecting it as a long-term option. The Arabs could then seek out support from the international community and work for the transfer of power to a freed and elected Iraqi government. Many countries already managed to understand the realities surrounding Iraq. Iran and Turkey gave official recognition to the Governing Council and thus gained the right or option to seek a role in that country. Russia followed suit. The Arabs should make the same choice (Taheri).

The Arab summit in Tunis gave a lot for the members to ponder over. Their disunity, contradictions and discord spelled out the reasons for their failures since the League's beginnings in 1944 (Bhadui 2004). With unfulfilled promises of reform, concern for bloodshed and an overall mood of powerlessness, the League's 22 members still claimed having made history through their calls for human rights and modernization. But they did not say how and when these reforms would take place. Contradictions among them first occurred during the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq in 1990. This was the first time an Arab country occupied another and it led to the first Gulf War, which the Arabs were not able to prevent. During the Madrid Conference, the Oslo peace process between Israel and the Palestinians was undertaken, which appeased the Arab world. But the Arab-Palestinian conflict blew up in 2000 and the New York bombings the following year. The Arab world was thrust into its worst crisis. All 19 hijackers were Arabs and 15 of them were Saudis. Saudi Arabia has been the closest ally of the United States in the region. Then the War on Terror began (Bhadui).