Madison's role in the Constitutional Convention

¶ … Madison's Role in Trying to Balance Civil Liberties with Government Power through the Drafting of the Bill of Rights?

The Founding Fathers were faced with a number of important issues as they debated the form and content of the Constitution then under consideration, not the least of which was ensuring that their own individual interests would be addressed in the new country. The Constitution that emerged from this debate was not entirely satisfactory to all of the convention delegates as it related to individual liberties, though, and a series of amendments was proposed for this purpose that has become known as the Bill of Rights today. Although it represented the work of many minds, the primary author of the first ten Amendments to the Constitution was James Madison, but his reasons for advocating these civil liberties was substantially different than many modern observers might believe. Therefore, a critical review of the primary sources that were written during these debates and their interpretation in the scholarly secondary literature can provide modern researchers with a better understanding of what rationales were advanced and who the stakeholders were in this debate. To this end, this paper provides a review the relevant literature to show that Madison played a critical role in drafting the bill of rights due to his concern for balancing civil liberties and central government power. A summary of the research and important findings are provided in the conclusion.

Review and Discussion

Background and Overview.

In the autumn of 1786, George Washington wrote in a letter to James Madison that, "No morn ever dawned more favorably than ours did; and no day was ever more clouded than the present." Indeed, Madison would prove to be a leading figure in the Constitutional Convention scheduled for May of the next year, and this letter reflected his anguish at the divisive political and economic disputes that, along with an inadequate political framework, seemed to threaten the potential future of the new nation. At the Constitutional Convention in 1787, James Madison played a key role in the planning and ratification of the U.S. Constitution; he also collaborated with John Jay and Alexander Hamilton in the publication of the Federalist Papers, and was the sponsor of the first ten amendments to the Constitution, commonly called the Bill of Rights.

In fact, the fading words on the most famous copy of the U.S. Constitution in the National Archives do in fact represent the work of many minds, but the primary author of most of the first ten Amendments to the Constitution, otherwise known as "the Bill of Rights," was James Madison. Given its monumental importance to the survival and future of the country, it is little wonder that so much debate went into the Constitution, but the draft that emerged from the Constitutional Convention was not complete in the minds of some of the delegates: "The Framers saw the Constitution as a social contract that delegated power from the people to advance the goals cited in the Preamble. That delegation was both limited to the powers enumerated in the Constitution and constrained by the Bill of Rights."

The political (and personal) battles that resulted from the debate over the inclusion of the Bill of Rights have been the topic of much scholarly debate ever since, but some consistencies emerge from the research. For example, while many of the convention delegates were agreed on certain points that were amenable for inclusion in the Constitution itself, the divisiveness the emerged over the need for a bill of rights clearly shows that there were a number of significant issues that remained unresolved, the debate over any of which could spell disaster for hopes of constitutional ratification. According to Burns (1990), "For me one of the minor mysteries in United States history, but one that had great importance historically, was why James Madison, who had been categorically resistant to adding a bill of rights to the Constitution in 1787, by 1789 not only favored adding rights to the Constitution but performed one of the greatest feats of legislative leadership in American history in shepherding through Congress what became the Bill of Rights."

This author also makes the point that while the historians continue to disagree on precisely what prompted Madison to change his mind ("Some suggest that it was the influence of Thomas Jefferson, others simply that Madison 'saw the light'"), it is Burns's opinion that Madison's change of heart - and thinking - was purely politically motivated. "Madison discovered a great deal of support for the Bill of Rights when he vied with James Monroe for a seat in Congress and made commitments in the election contest that as a person of integrity he honored in the first session of Congress." This author, like many of Madison's other biographers, adds that, "The question of Madison's motivation is still a matter of dispute among historians, as lately as the last convention of the Organization of American Historians."

Clearly, then, the historians are divided on Madison's precise motivation as time progressed, but the historical record suggests that at least some of the convention delegates were motivated more by personal political and pecuniary interests than they were the ultimate fate of the new country. The historical record also shows that while he may also have done so for some personal reasons at different times, "James Madison advanced the cause of liberty before, during, and after the Constitutional Convention of 1789."

It should be noted, though, notwithstanding any evidentiary material to the contrary, Madison did not in fact have much opportunity at the Constitutional Convention to support a bill of rights in a conventional form because that was not the purpose of the Convention (and it was hot): "The Convention's charge was to enlarge, not to restrict, the powers of the federal government. Apparently, the Framers thought that the ninth section of the first article provided the only restrictions which were indispensable aside from the prohibition against religious tests for holding office under the Constitution" (emphasis added). The propositions introduced by Charles Pinckney on August 20 for consideration by the Convention's "Committee of Detail" included two of the provisions that were later placed in article one, section nine, as well as a guarantee of free press; however, the latter failed to make it out of committee. In addition, Morgan notes that there was no debate concerning Pinckney's motion to refer and the proposition passed without opposition. It was not until September 12 that George Mason proposed a contemporary cut-and-pasted version of a bill of rights that everyone could agree upon.

According to Morgan, Mason "voiced his desire for a bill of rights and said that he would second a motion to refer to a committee the task of composing one in 'a few hours' by cribbing from state bills of rights." In spite of a motion supporting his position, Mason's proposal was unanimously rejected by the states and Madison did not speak on either of these two occasions. More importantly perhaps from an administrative perspective, there was a need for haste, at least subconsciously, among many of the Convention delegates. After all, the attendees were likely dressed in several layers of woolen garments, it was brutally hot that summer, and there was, of course, no air conditioning during a period in history characterized by a paucity of bathing facilities in general and a lack of the practice as a prevailing social custom in particular. According to Banning, "Meeting at the Pennsylvania State House (Independence Hall), the Constitutional Convention found a quorum on May 25 and sat until September 17. Fifty-five delegates participated in its work, though there were seldom more than forty in the room for any single session."

Indeed, even 40 people in this enclosure will generate a lot of body heat, and in this heady atmosphere, any reasonable comprise may have appeared as a breath of fresh air and an opportunity to wrap things up so they could all go swimming. In this regard, Morgan points out that this was just such the case after all was said and done: "After four months of sharp debate over the augmentation and allocation of power among the branches of the reformed government, the delegates were apparently in no mood to wrangle further in the heat of Philadelphia over the wording of a bill of rights." While the delegates did in fact succeed in hammering out a Constitution in time, the different points-of-view that emerged during the debate provide some insights into the prevailing political thought of the day, and these issues are discussed further below.

Perspectives Articulated at the Constitutional Convention.

A discussion of the specific issues involved in the debate between those who supported ratification of the Constitution, referred to loosely as "Federalists," and those who opposed ratification or sought further revisions, or "Anti-Federalists," is provided below.

A. Federalist Perspectives. Support for the ratification of the Constitution at the Convention was gained by a series of compromises that resulted in what the Federalists perceived as a viable framework that required little or no medication before it could be ratified. In fact, during the 1787 Constitutional Convention, Slonim notes that the need for a bill of rights was not even a topic of discussion until Virginian delegate George Mason raised the issue just several days before the Convention was scheduled to rise on September 17; Mason suggested that a bill of rights "would give great quiet to the people." Following this assertion, Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts moved that the Convention add a bill of rights to the Constitution and Mason seconded his motion to no avail: "The Convention unanimously rejected the proposal by a vote of 10 to 0, with one state absent. Failure to heed Mason's counsel was to plague the Federalists throughout the ratification campaign" (emphasis added).

The first major confrontation concerning the ratification of the Constitution involving the need for a bill of rights occurred in Pennsylvania several weeks after the close of the Constitutional Convention; at that time, the Seceders from the state Assembly called upon their electorate to consider whether the rights of citizens could be regarded as safe under a constitution that did not contain a bill of rights; also in Pennsylvania, Samuel Bryan argued in 1787 that the absence of a bill of rights made it essential for a second constitutional convention to be held to address the errors and omissions of the first.

In response to these charges, James Wilson, who contributed significantly to the drafting of the Constitution as a member of the Pennsylvania delegation to the Constitutional Convention, and who was a prominent legal scholar who would subsequently serve as a Justice on the original U.S. Supreme Court, articulated the basis for distinguishing between a government of unlimited powers and one of enumerated and defined powers. In this regard, Wilson believed that because the Constitution already delineated the powers available to the national government, there was little need to amendment them for the people's protection because the national government was without power to interfere in these domains. For example, Wilson wrote that: "The former, as illustrated by the state governments, were sovereign in their authority and had free rein to exercise any and all powers, but the latter, as illustrated by the federal government, could only exercise those powers which it disposed of under the Constitution. There was, therefore no fear that the federal government could threaten the rights of citizens in such matters as freedom of the press, freedom of religion etc., since it was powerless to operate in such spheres." Unable to foresee the consequences of judicial activism ironically beginning with Marbury vs. Madison, Wilson and his like-minded peers argued that a bill of rights was redundant to the protections that already existed in the Constitution, or such rights were rendered superfluous by the manner in which the government was intended to operate. For instance, Wilson suggested that:

There are two kinds of government; that where general power is intended to be given to the legislature and that where the powers are particularly enumerated. In the last case, the implied result is, that nothing more is intended to be given, than what is so enumerated, unless it results from the nature of the government itself.... [I]n a government like the proposed one, there can be no necessity for a bill of rights. for... The people never part with their power.... [W]e are told, that there is no security for the rights of conscience. I ask... what part of this system puts it in the power of Congress to attack those rights? When there is no power to attack, it is idle to prepare the means of defense (emphasis added).

In fact, by enumerating such rights in the Constitution, the Federalists were concerned that if they failed to include some or others, these would not be protected. In this regard, Croddy reports that:

The Federalist promoters of the Constitution of 1787 believed that a bill of rights was unnecessary and even potentially dangerous. They reasoned that the carefully crafted structure of the new scheme of government outlined in the Constitution, with its separate branches of government, checks and balances, and enumerated powers, protected the states and, by implication, the individual from the tyranny of central authority. They feared that by taking the additional step of enumerating rights, those not enumerated might fail to be protected.

Because resources are by definition scarce, and it was very hot after all that year, these appeared to be important and urgent points to be considered by the Federalists. Indeed, at this point, Madison believed that there were already sufficient guarantees in the Constitution that precluded the immediate inclusion of a bill of rights just to achieve ratification. In fact, a consistent philosophy was reflected in the Federalist Papers and more than one of the speakers at the Constitutional Convention as well that maintained that the primary guarantors of the quality of public officeholders were the people themselves. "The nature of republican government requires that it be so. Publius saw the Constitution as establishing government by popular majorities that would rule on principles of justice and the general good."

Madison and his like-minded colleagues clearly believed that moral and religious traditions would provide citizens with the ability to make judicious decisions concerning the electorate and these officials would ensure their protection from the potential evils of a national government. In 1788, Madison emphasized this point during the Virginia Ratifying Convention: "I go on this great republican principle, that the people will have virtue and intelligence to select men of virtue and wisdom. Is there no virtue among us? If there be not, we are in a wretched situation. No theoretical checks -- nor form of government can render us secure." As the events of September 11 and others have so clearly demonstrated, checks and balances are not all that is required to "render us secure," but the need for a strong national government that could provide for the common defense, ensure a source of revenue and so forth, was deemed sufficiently compelling to the Federalists to argue against a bill of rights, at least at that point in time, because that was not their mandate.

In this regard, in a speech before the Convention delegates on June 8, 1789, Madison made the point that if they had been given the opportunity the first time around, a bill of rights would have been a do-able exercise, but the process could have potentially ruined all of the hard work they (and especially Madison!) had invested thus far by introducing so many modifications and the debate that would ensure that nothing would be accomplishing at the Convention. "Indeed I think it would have been of advantage to the government, if it had been practicable to have made some propositions for amendments the first business we entered upon; it would stifle the voice of complaint, and make friends of many who doubted its merits." In sum, Madison believed that a "reservation of rights was unnecessary and improper in a constitution of limited and specified powers; the government had not authority in the area of individual rights. Any attempt to define such rights also rank the risk of omitting rights unnamed."

B. Anti-Federalist Perspectives. In an Age of Information, the reasons cited by the Anti-Federalists to support their opposition to the proposed Constitution, particularly absent a bill of rights, may appear spurious. In fact, though, geography was an important consideration in their line of thinking, especially given that Washington, D.C. was so far away from many of the affected states and they believed that it would not be possible for a centralized national government to adequately represent their unique interests. According to one historian, "The Antifederalists argued that the Constitution rearranged the physical environment of America. They accused the Federalists of tying together the entire country and its various geographic and climatic conditions under one government. This government would not reflect the climatic or geographic features of a specific area, as it had under the confederation. All Americans would, instead, be governed from a central source without regard for the shaping influences of local forces."

Likewise, according to Ketcham, "As the debates over the new Constitution progressed, anti-federalist objections to the powers granted the federal government began to crystallize in specific proposals for amendments that would limit those powers. In some state conventions, especially where sentiment was closely divided, proposals were made for amendments to be insisted upon prior to ratification, while others were offered in hopes that a second convention might consider them for inclusion in a revision constitution." These proposals ranged from the modest (for instance, the Massachusetts Convention offered a relatively short list), some were similar to the final versions used in the Bill of Rights, while still other amendments "would have greatly altered the powers of the new government." According to Bernhard and her colleagues, "Anti-Federalists wished to protect the people against government, but that does not mean that they trusted the individuals who collectively make up the people. Individuals who gain power, they believed, are too weak to wield it justly: they will succumb to the temptation to be tyrannical. but, as James Madison pointed out in the Federalist, the same human weakness that makes government dangerous also makes it necessary."

C. What Others Thought about Civil Liberties and Government Power. Not surprisingly, the range of emotions concerning the need for a strong central government as the Constitutional Convention approached and progressed ranged the entire spectrum of political thought. Some observers believed the draft constitution was essentially intact and needed no further refinement, particularly even before the ink was dry and the document ratified. According to Smith, Jefferson's first reaction to the Constitution, even without a bill of rights, was highly favorable, with Jefferson calling it "the wisest ever yet presented to man." Some foreign observers, though, believed the entire argument over a bill of rights was misguided, with the United States being sufficiently blessed with natural resources and an enlightened government that no such document was needed. By any measure, though, revolution was certainly in the air both at home and abroad during the latter part of the 18th century, and the issue of civil liberties and the need for additional protections for the average citizen in America and Europe remained at the forefront of these social movements.

The Changing Views of James Madison.

In his book, the Sacred Fire of Liberty: James Madison and the Founding of the Federal Republic, Banning reports that, "James Madison did more to shape the early nation's comprehension of its governmental institutions than any other member of his generation. A reinterpretation of his contribution to the Founding, concentrating on the fundamental constancies suggested by the evolution of his thought, has much to say about this fascinating era." In his chapter, "Architect of the Bill of Rights," Morgan characterizes Madison's change from one view to another as being "slow and reluctant," from his original position as an opponent to a bill of rights in 1788 to its chief author and advocate in 1789:

The first of Madison's reasons for opposing a bill of rights during this period was that its addition would complicate the process of ratification of the Constitution which he, himself, regarded as seriously flawed. If the freshly framed plan were to be opened to amendments, as it must be to add a bill of rights, then no one could predict what the final result of such tampering would be. Even before the Constitution was signed on 17 September 1787 Madison reported to Jefferson that it was basically flawed. Should the plan be ratified it would not serve the 'national object' of the project, nor prevent the "local mischiefs which every where excite disgust against the state governments.'

An analysis of Madison's "evolution of thought" shows that although he did not experience a cut-and-dried epiphany of thought at any given point in time, but that there are some clear reflections in the primary sources and their interpolation and interpretation in secondary sources concerning how his thinking changed over the months and years before, during and after the Constitutional Convention of 1787 and these issues are discussed further below.

A. Before the Constitutional Convention. According to Morgan (1988), "[James] Madison is commonly thought of as the author of the Bill of Rights, and with good reason. Most of the first ten amendments came substantially from his hand. Nevertheless, there is more than enough irony in this reputation. He made no known effort to incorporate any specific guarantees of individual rights into the Constitution at the Convention of 1787 beyond the few scattered through the text." Furthermore, Morgan points out that Madison apparently did not attempt to support the few initiatives advanced by others at the time to incorporate such provisions work on the Constitution approached completion. "Until 1789, he defended this omission and was only slowly convinced that the movement for amendments would have to be satisfied after ratification of the original document, if public confidence in the new government were to be established." In addition, Madison's recommendations for the amendments were not completely consistent with their final form that was placed in the Constitution. In fact, Morgan points out that the two rights that Madison thought were most widely believed to be in need of protection from the new government ("the freedom of the press and the rights of conscience, those choicest privileges of the people") were not construed as precisely as he wished. "Nevertheless," Morgan adds, "it is important to distinguish between Madison the reluctant architect of the Bill of Rights and the ardent advocate of the fundamental freedoms embodied in the First Amendment."

An early example of the need for comprise (especially in the Federalists' best interests) at the Constitutional Convention can be found in Madison's letter to George Washington dated April 16, 1787 wherein he writes: "I have sought for some middle ground, which may at once support a due supremacy of the national authority, and not exclude the local authorities wherever they can be subordinately useful." The specific subject of the proposed bill of rights was brought up on January 4, 1789, in another letter to Washington, where Madison writes:.".. [T[he subject of amendments ended in the loss of them. The House of Delegates got over the objections to the 11th and 12th, but the Senate revised them with an addition of the 3d and 8th Articles, and by a vote of adherence prevented a ratification."

According to Morgan, Madison first addressed the issue of including a bill of rights in the Constitution at Virginia's ratifying convention, but only when absolutely compelled to do so by Patrick Henry. At the time, Henry vigorously maintained that the Constitution contained no bill of rights to secure religious liberty, a charge that was leveled directly at Madison; Madison responded to what he perceived as Henry's ill-conceived argument by suggesting that such documents were generally ineffective and there was no need for one in the proposed constitution. "The Constitution, he said, does not grant the federal government so much as a shadow of authority to 'intermeddle with religion.' The slightest move in this direction would be a 'most flagrant usurpation,' he insisted. It was true, he admitted, that under the Constitution a state might undertake some 'religious project,' but Congress would not be likely to do so because the United States abounds with such 'a variety of sects' that they constitute a 'a strong security against religious persecution.'"

Furthermore, there were some personal issues involved in this debate that motivated these respective positions. According to Morgan, Madison response was clearly meant to discredit Henry in the eyes of all who recalled that he had led the legislative battle in favor of religious assessments in 1784-85 and that Madison had been his successful opponent. In fact, this author reports that, "In 1788 Madison regarded Henry as the most dangerous of all the Anti-Federalists in Virginia who were calling for a bill of rights as an artful dodge calculated to prevent ratification of the Constitution." This state was well situated to assume a leadership role in this regard as well: "As the most powerful of the American colonies, Virginia willingly had taken a leading role in guiding the passive resistance to England until the abandonment of that strategy for an active rebellion. Virginia then had given her foremost citizens to the army and to the Continental Congress. Fully cognizant of the example expected of them by sister states, her leaders moved forward with vigor and boldness." As a result, Virginia was the first state to adopt a declaration of rights and a permanent constitution; following his lengthy career in public service there, Edmund Randolph reviewed the events of 1776 and observed: "In the formation of this bill of rights two objects were contemplated: one, that the legislature should not in their acts violate any of those cannons; the other, that in all the revolutions of time, of human opinion, and of government, a perpetual standard should be erected, around which the people might rally, and by a notorious record be forever admonished to be watchful, firm and virtuous." It was in this environment that Madison's was compelled to forge an alliance between sometimes widely disparate points-of-view, as well as avoiding the unforeseeable administrative consequences of delaying ratification of the Constitution to accomplish more than its already extra-legal (at least according the Articles of Confederation) mandate provided.

According to Morgan, "Virginia's own experience with its Declaration of Rights demonstrated that the variety of sects needed to constitute a legislative majority, not a paper barrier of words, is the only real security which can be relied on to guard such rights." The leadership position assumed by Virginia provided both the impetus as well as a model for the Constitutional Convention delegates - if they wanted to use it, that is. In fact, the Federalists argued that there was no need for a bill of rights, because there was nothing in the Constitution that provided for a violation of these respective rights anyway. For example, in his essay, "The Federalist Papers and the Bill of Rights," Slonim points out that, "Of all the complaints lodged by the Anti-Federalists in their campaign to defeat ratification of the Constitution, the failure to attach a bill of rights to the Constitution emerged as the leading and most formidable one. This omission represented an Achilles' heel that might very well have doomed the process of ratification." Without Madison's skillful maneuvering, this and a number of other historians agree that the Convention would have failed to have ratified the Constitution at this critical juncture in the country's history.

In reality, and much to his credit though, Madison was also trying to accomplish a great deal during the Constitutional Convention and it quickly becomes clear from his writings that he believed that more time was needed to craft careful amendments to ensure individual liberties in such an important document - if they were in fact needed at all. Notwithstanding the fact that the Convention was assembled in violation of the Articles of Confederation, Madison makes it clear that there was a pressing need to "wrap things up" before any more dissent could be introduced from the competing regional factions that had developed as the Convention progressed. For example, in Worthington's (1884) compilation of the "Letters and Other Writings of James Madison," a letter from Madison to General George Washington dated July 21, 1788 indicates that the sooner the Constitution was completed the better, because any delay might allow opponents of the Constitution the opportunity to consolidate their forces and prevail in their efforts in the future and he believed that more time was needed to craft any amendments: "This is particularly the case in Maryland," Madison writes, "where the anti-federal temper of the Executive would render an intermediate and extraordinary meeting of the Assembly of that State the more likely to be called. On my way thro Maryland, I found such an event to be much feared by the friends, and wished by the adversaries, of the Constitution." letter from Madison to Thomas Jefferson dated August 10, 1788 is even more to the point on who Madison considered to be the influential members of the new social order and how any delay in completing the Constitution might adversely affect the federal government: "I inclose a circular address to the other States on the subject of amendments, from which mischiefs are apprehended. The great danger in the present crisis is, that if another Convention should be soon assembled it would terminate in discord, or in alternations of the federal system, which would throw back essential powers into the State Legislatures" (emphasis author's). Furthermore, from Madison's perspective, anyone who disagreed with his position was clearly not up to the task of understanding the intricacies of government and the need for a Constitution before trying to address any amendments. In fact, Madison suggests that several more years would be required, and would be preferable, to satisfactorily craft the Bill of Rights, but that perhaps the John Q. Public of the late 18th century was not in a position to appreciate this need: "The delay of a few years will assuage the jealousies which have been artificially created by designing men, and will at the same time point out the faults which really call for amendment. At present, the public mind is neither sufficiently cool nor sufficiently informed for so delicate an operation" (emphasis added).

A letter to General George Washington from Madison dated August 15, 1788 serves to codify the issues that Madison believed most concerned the American public at the time:

The questions which divide the public at present relate - 1. To the extent of the amendments that ought to be made to the Constitution, 2. To the mode in which they ought to be made. The friends of the Constitution... are generally agreed that the system should be revised. But they wish the revisal to be carried no further than to supply additional guards for liberty, without abridging the sum of power transferred from the States to the general Government.

Further, Madison adds in this same letter to Washington that any delay in completing the work on the Constitution would provide his opponents with the opportunity they needed to call for another convention and destroy all of the hard work that had been accomplished in crafting the Constitution, especially the parts that Madison liked. The ability to modify the Constitution in the future was deemed sufficient answer to his opponents, Madison notes, and characterizes his opposition as being serious threats to the new federal system that did not recognize the importance of enlisting popular opinion to help the country solidify support of the new Constitution and federal form of government. "If the first Congress embrace the policy which circumstances mark out, they will not fail to propose, of themselves, every desirable safeguard for popular rights; and by this separating the well-meaning from the designing opponents, fix on the latter their true character, and give to the Government its due popularity and stability."

B. During and After the Constitutional Convention. By and large, Madison truly appears to have been motivated by a personal philosophical viewpoint that provided him with the wherewithal to accomplish what he set out to do at the Constitution Convention - ensure the ratification of the proposed Constitution with as few comprises as possible, and with those being in favor of the Federalists' various positions. Above and beyond these mere political expediencies, though, Madison exhibited a consistent pattern of behavior and correspondence that indicated he sincerely believed what he was doing was in the nation's best interest. For example, according to Banning:

At the Constitutional Convention and throughout the struggle over the adoption of the Constitution, Madison had been distinctive for his effort to assure himself, as well as others, that the great reform would be consistent with the nation's revolutionary values. From the outset of the first new Congress, the same determination guided his distinctive strategies and conduct. The Bill of Rights, from this perspective, was undoubtedly intended to defuse demands for substantive reductions in the powers of the new regime.

Notwithstanding these more altruistic goals, Madison also came to recognize that the Bill of Rights was a fundamental component in the attempt to: (a) give weight to the charges that the Federalists were less republican than their opponents (b), to firmly establish the Constitution in the hearts and minds of a whole political nation; and - to encourage and exemplify a style of leadership that would ensure that all of the specific measures of the new regime would foster national conciliation. According to this author, Madison's initiatives were characterized by sincere calls for the delegates to be good stewards of the heavy responsibilities to which they had been assigned: "Beginning with his first remarks in Congress, Madison deliberately set out to inculcate 'a conscious responsibility for the destiny of republican liberty' and to persuade his colleagues to adopt 'a system of legislation founded on the principles of an honest policy and directed by the spirit of diffusive patriotism.'" This need for popular public support was also evinced in Madison's letter to Edmund Pendleton dated June 21, 1789, wherein Madison writes: "I am fully in the opinion that the numerous and immediate representatives of the people composing the other House will decidedly predominate in the Government."

The need for additional time - or at least an absence of urgency -- in crafting the amendments for the Bill of Rights can be found in Madison's letter to George Eve dated January 2, 1989, wherein he writes: "The Constitution is established on the ratifications of eleven States and a very great majority of the people of America; and amendments, if pursued with a proper moderation and in a proper mode, will be note only safe, but may serve the double purpose of satisfying the minds of well meaning opponents, and of providing additional guards in favour of liberty." In this writing, Madison also emphasizes that this approach would help to ensure that these amendments would be approved because even those states that might be reluctant to participate in a second convention were amenable to such changes to obviate the need for one. In his letter to Thomas Jefferson dated May 27, 1789, Madison reports that the end result of all of this debate culminated in yet another compromise on the long road to ratification: "The subject of amendments was to have been introduced on Monday last, but is postponed in order that more urgent business may not be delayed. A Bill of Rights," Madison writes, "incorporated, perhaps, into the Constitution, will be proposed, with a few alterations most called for by the opponents of the Government and least objectionable to its friends."

Finally, it appears that Madison's thinking about the qualities of his fellow citizens changed in substantive ways after the Constitutional Convention. After he had gained some more experience with real world situations in which powerful interests would attempt to gain advantage at the expense of the common man, Madison accepted the fact that Americans did in fact need some protections against certain kinds of intrusions on their civil liberties and these needed to be formally incorporated into the Constitution in an enlightened but better-late-than-never fashion.

According to Matthews, Madison's worldview shifted in the years following the Convention to one that was not influenced by the "pressing concerns of ratifying the Constitution or reigning in the power of the Federalist-controlled executive branch, apprehensions that clearly lurk in the background of Madison's contributions to the Federalist and the National Gazette essays." This author suggests that Madison's more mature worldview was characterized by five key characteristics:

Humans were both rational and lazy. If free to choose between the two, they would prefer a life of ease without civilization.

The inevitability of surplus population and the finiteness of nature's bounty required humans to plan for the future in order to provide for themselves as rationally as possible.

The automatic checks and balances of nature, what Madison termed her beautiful "economy," would reinstitute the order and sense of proportion in the system.

Despite nature's inherent cosmos, humanity's tendency toward degeneration, whether in terms of economic evolution or urban decay, never disappears and always threatens a society's best efforts.

Tension and conflict were the final characteristic of Madison's later worldview wherein his political acumen is truly highlighted; here, Madison "created social stability in the face of relatively sure knowledge that, as in the past, all human constructs were doomed."

These characteristics are in sharp contrast to Madison's earlier views about his fellow citizenry on the one hand as being sufficiently knowledgeable, moral and responsible to address constitutional inequities if they occurred and to hold those responsible accountable for the infringement on their rights. Madison's later position, though, seems to be in line with his earlier sincere belief that those who failed to recognize the logic of his position were either ill informed or ill advised, even if they were well intentioned.

Analysis and Discussion.

Was there a Perfect Balance of Individual Rights and Government Power Achieved? It is hard to argue with success, and with the benefit of historical hindsight, Madison appears to have accomplished a great deal in creating a good balance between national and state interests and security and liberty, particularly during a period in history where all the Founders really had to rely on were various dusty historical documents with little or no relevance to the more egalitarian social experiment upon which they were about to embark.

Also much to his credit, Madison diligently and thoughtfully consulted what relevant research was available for this purpose. For example, Read points out that, "Of all the Framers, James Madison arguably was closest to being a political scientist in the contemporary sense of the term. In preparing for the Philadelphia Convention, for instance, he made a thorough comparative study of ancient and modern confederacies. In the Federalist and elsewhere, he carefully addressed the question of how an institutional feature would lead a politician, a citizen, or a faction to act in a particular way."