Thomas Hobbes on law, justice, and the state

Hobbes and the Intercession of Justice, Law, And State

A cursory definition of power might quickly pose the argument that such is founded upon the strength of leadership. To view a king or a president or a company CEO as an exemplar of empowerment is traditional as it adheres to a socially constructed view of authority as being hierarchical and being constituted upon the relationship between law, justice and the state. Subject to chance and forged upon infinite human interactions which are given oversight by no omnipresent mortal force, the decisions we make and the actions we assume, traditional views of government have argued, should be accounted for as appendages of a larger power structure. In his consideration on the balance between the presence of central leadership and the will of the individual, Thomas Hobbes denotes that the capacity of rogue individuals to behave in such a fashion as might undermine the ethical justice available to others might tend to threaten the security of assumptions presumed by this hierarchy. In Leviathan, Thomas Hobbes offers a prescient comprehension of the dangers in unrestrained individuality, writing in 1651 on the structural integrity of society, morality and authoritarianism through what he identifies as a 'social contract.' This, in the view of Hobbes, is the all-encompassing force which demands powerful central leadership and popular acquiescence to the wisdom, will and entitlement assumed by said leadership.

Indeed, Hobbes warned most primarily in his text of the dangers in provoking the free will of every man. Thomas Hobbes saw no such natural governing force as reason to benefit the unattended inter-relations of man, and instead saw a reality in which the divergent will of the individual would be an impediment to order. In his framework it can be suggested that one interactant may negatively effect another to the end of might-makes-right in an endless and boundary-absent state of intra-societal and inter-societal warring. It is for this reason that Hobbes had adopted his decisively authoritarian bent on understanding power. Even to the extent that he does not speak of the individual when he describes the reality of human power dynamics, Hobbes concedes that in referencing 'power', he speaks "not of the men, but (in the Abstract) of the Seat of Power, (like to those simple and unpartial creatures in the Roman Capitol." (Hobbes, Intro.) in his version of the true nature of power, Hobbes sees the frailty of human self-interest as an obstruction to social good, and thus imposes the suggestion of a power-concentration which revolves around the virtue of selfless rule.

If some of his ideological opponents may be accused of idealism for necessitating the presence of 'reason' in every individual as he attributes power to each, so too may one suggest that Hobbes' view, albeit a far more negative conception of man's nature, is nonetheless naive in its total deference to leadership. A notorious opponent of democracy, Hobbes actually helps give way to the logic most essentially present in Locke's work. For it is not the victory of reason which necessarily determines the power of free will. Instead, it is the 'choice' which one exercises -- and which any 'one' can exercise at his volition -- to pursue reason. According to such intellectual opponents of Hobbes as John Locke, "this is the perfect condition of slavery" (Locke, Section 24) a man chooses to be a slave insofar as, ultimately, he controls his own fate. No man can own another, Locke notes, assessing that no one man can deprive another of his ability end his own life. To a slaveholder, this suicide is a demonstration that a man, contrary to an object, is given the rational choice to be actively or passively free.

While certainly suicide is an objectionable path to resolution, the example is helpful in bringing a focus to the discussion. Locke is a long distance from Hobbes' on the nature of free will, with the latter asserting that society may function only through subjugation of individual will to a real and materialist-based power of authoritarianism. (Note: Briefly, it should be qualified that materialism in this case refers to a power derived of wealth, ownership, gatekeeping of resources/property and the capacity to levy armed authority over a population). To this extent, Hobbes endorses a social hierarchy which is also very much concerned with the relevance of materialist-derived power in a way that slants his view of democracy toward economic imperatives, such as the defense of one's property against the irrational oppression of theft.

This is compelling because it casts Hobbes in an unusual position of balance, or of hypocrisy, depending upon one's moral disposition.

Though Hobbes is a clear and strong advocate for the imperative provided by the Church and the moral inherency of an empowered central government, he also speaks on all affairs of justice and state law without the restrain of presumed moral absolutes. This does distinguish him from many thinkers before and successive to Hobbes, many of whom, especially in their commitment to the rational authoritarianism of the Church, might tend to argue with explicitness that man can behave in ways which are both good and evil. Hobbes seeks in a manner to remove this prejudices from a discussion on how law and justice tend instead to be allotted to the people.

Hobbes makes the argument that good is something which will inherently produce positive ends, thus assessing that there will be nothing short of a necessity for man to exact a will concurring with notions of 'good.' As he tells in the primary text, "THE POWER of a man, to take it universally, is his present means to obtain some future apparent good, and is either original or instrumental. Natural power is the eminence of the faculties of body, or mind; as extraordinary strength, form, prudence, arts, eloquence, liberality, nobility. Instrumental are those powers which, acquired by these, or by fortune, are means and instruments to acquire more; as riches, reputation, friends, and the secret working of God, which men call good luck." (Hobbes, X)

This is indeed a revealing particular of the Hobbesian perspective, which ties wealth, authority and faith into a singular absolute, denoting that it is by the grace of divinity, rather than by some more pedestrian force such as inheritance or industry, that one has both arisen to a state of great possession and, consequently, to a state of great influence.

Hobbes produces an understanding for us of the social contract, which by its declaration of intent promotes a sense of order and respect for the sovereignty of a powerful central leader. The implications of God and affluence with respect to this contract help us to place Hobbes distinctly in line with the ideology of the British hegemonic order of his time, which produced a long of sturdy affinity between monarchy and Church.

To the rationality of this relationship, however, Hobbes attributes a certain entrustment that the social contract will bind the behaviors of those who provide laws, governance and authority. It is a core presumption of his framework for governance that leadership will inherently be accorded a degree of necessary integrity, with his belief being that this integrity is that which has elevated him to the deferred status. To the point, he tells that "affability of men already in power is increase of power; because it gaineth love. Reputation of prudence in the conduct of peace or war is power; because to prudent men we commit the government of ourselves more willingly than to others." (Hobbes, X) the argument here is that power and authority have been granted to those who have done justly and ethically in their lives, and have conducted themselves with nobility and restraint in the face of conflict, marking such figures as admired and obeyed by fellow man.

In this regard, Hobbes does abide what he sees as certain inherencies delineated by predecessors like Plato. The revered Greek thinker offered a text which, longer than perhaps any other doctrine on the subject, has remained constantly relevant to the discussion on effective and just governances. Plato's the Republic composes a canon for proper government by channeling Plato's mentor, Socrates, in a host of discourse-based anecdotes and plumbing the depths of such questions as the appropriate relational nature of man and woman in a civilized society and the most suitable identity for one who might be a ruler. The crucial ideological building block to the composition of modern governorship, Plato indicates, is the intercession of that which is best for the people as a whole and that which qualifies a legitimate model for proper leadership. As Hobbes will eventually conclude, this means that the individuals and forces which have come to occupy this singular authority of state and law are there by logical ascendancy relating to their suitability to conduct affairs in the interests of the greater majority of men and women. As we understand through his own explication, this does imply a preeminence of such moralizing forces as the Church, which Hobbes would argue constituted a central part of the social, economic and political authority structure because of its ethical and practical interests in the greater good.

The second part of this book introduces the more central aspect of his argument's epistemological motive, with the prescription for proper leadership extending from a view that is ethically, intellectually and socially instructed. We can easily detect here the strands of ideology which would be invested into Hobbes view many centuries hence. This is to say that at the crux of his argument, Plato writes that "until philosophers are kings, or the kings and princes of this world have the spirit and power of philosophy, and political greatness and wisdom meet in one, and those commoner natures who pursue either to the exclusion of the other are compelled to stand aside, cities will never have rest from their evils." (Plato, Book V) in subsequent explanation, he determines that a virtuous ruler will ultimately find the right to rule his people as a consequence of his worthiness to lead the greater whole toward a light of truth.

This is a view which is echoed but cast with greater optimism -- or might we say naivete -- in Hobbes' construction of leadership. Namely, where Plato denotes that the world will receive great benefit from the ascendancy of the thinker to the place of the throne, Hobbes argues that he has descended to the throne must logically conform to the characteristics which Plato presumed necessary for the persistence of good. This removes the Hobbesian thinker from the dubious preoccupation of having to define that which should be seen as good or evil, instead creating something of an internally circular logic producing the idea that leadership comes from a place of qualification. Plato does not hold this consistently like Hobbes does, however.

This idealism is countered by a more cynical regard for the base propensities of the public. As the great thinker indicates of the civilized settlements of his time, "not one of them is worthy of the philosophic nature, and hence that nature is warped and estranged." (Plato, Book VI) Through Socrates, Plato laments that there does not exist a state in which the appropriate values for suitable governance are fostered in the selection of leadership. He crafts an argument that revolves on the pretense of critical disregard for the current state of city power structures, pointing to an absence of such probing discourse in the composition of laws and the discretion of authority. Still, there are two ways of interpreting this sentiment, just as there are with Hobbes. While it may at first be attractive to view this as an impugning judgment against unrestrained central power -- perhaps a refreshing departure from the authoritarian implications of the Hobbesian view -- instead it comes to reveal itself as a sentiment connecting the flaws in individual man's moral behavior to the rightness of unchecked central leadership.

In describing that which might be considered the ideal range of characteristics for a truth-seeking philosopher, the avatar of Socrates also appears to endorse the qualities befitting a proper ruler as well. Outlining the qualities of faith, perception, reason and understanding that are said to make up the soul of a philosopher, Plato essentially describes a requisite capacity for moral turpitude and an interest in the pursuit of a closer proximity to truth in a suitable leader. This is a perfect construction upon which to suspect that Hobbes based his encompassing perspective that one who had achieved this post must necessarily be of such as mettle.

In his discussion on this topic, Plato makes the case that the cause for bad leadership is the public itself, which in its ignorance rejects the exotic impulses of the philosopher for the artless authority of the king. Maybe it is so then that Hobbes withdraws from the value of democratic interest altogether, adopting Plato's ideals as a weapon against the veracity of popular will or the opportunity for resistance to leadership.

And as we proceed to the famous allegory of the cave in Book VII of the Republic, it becomes apparent what Socrates means when he focuses his disdainful argument on the desires of the masses. In spite of the socialist proclivities which appear to underscore his ideological thrust in the above discussion, it is evident here that Plato's work centers on a somewhat realistic conception of the collective as being largely incapable of pursuing truth. More to the point, he describes a populace that is incognizant that there even perpetuates some greater truth than that which is directly visible to the naked perception. The construct for his argument here concerns the conveyance of truth between philosopher and public, with the light of this new and bright reality demanding gradual orientation and concerted acceptance. For this to occur, Socrates indicates, bringing the discussion full circle, philosophically inclined leadership is essential and public restraint inevitable.

All of this stated at a precedent and a warranting for Hobbes' opinions, there is another aspect of his argument which sets him apart from such thinkers as Plato and his character in Socrates. Particularly, the implication of the social contract denoted in the Leviathan promotes something of a natural order in the Hobbesian view which is demonstrably different from those aspects of philosophical discourse which employ start moralism as a way to justify social controls. This is not so in the case of Hobbes, though a cursory glance might seem to imply this.

As Hobbes views social order as a route to the institutionalization of moral imperatives as well, he is not inclined to characterize man as evil in nature. Due to the liberty which such thinkers as Plato take in establishing absolute moral principles -- particularly in light of Hobbes' relative composure with regards to the semantical foundation of his argument -- it seems more practical to adopt the Hobbesian perspective that man is at a constant state of chaos with the exploitation of socially-forged moral imperatives often serving to intensify that end and, by contrast, with the powerful mores of society as a whole often serving to restrain the radical and amoral behaviors of men. There is a tendency on the part of both Plato and Hobbes to attribute an inherent greed to man's nature, characterizing him as a creature driven for the gain of power, victory in competition and a wealth of physical comforts. And indeed, both view social order as a means to checking these impulses with a structure that may inhibit the manifestation of malice amongst men on the basis of such desires and the attempt to quench them. But for reasons which are well-pronounced in his argument, Hobbes balks at the notion of applying the labels of 'good' or 'evil' to these inborn predispositions of man. Indeed, he depicts leadership as a path to conforming our practices of morality, eschewing the idea that man's supposed 'nature' is directly responsible for any manner of behavior. He tacitly reduces the idea of free will to a mere aberration of a functional society, underscored most particularly by the firm and defined hand of a rationally appointed leader amongst men. Therefore, of such a strong-seated ruler, Hobbes indicates that "by this authority, given him by every particular man in the commonwealth, he hath the use of so much power and strength conferred on him, that by terror thereof, he is enabled to form the wills of them all, to peace at home, and mutual aid against their enemies abroad." (Hobbes, XIV)

Where later thinkers such as Locke would view this is a means through which to incline the people to assimilate conscious acts of good in order to subvert the chaotic appeal to emotions, Hobbes instead recognizes that the execution of the will of one state will inevitably contribute to the subjugation of the will of another. This is particularly evident in Hobbes argument regarding man's inborn nature. Hobbes describes man as prone to certain qualities, absent of moral connotation, contending that "in the nature of man we find three principal causes of quarrel. First, competition: secondly, diffidence: thirdly, glory. The first maketh men invade for gain: the second, for safety: and the third for reputation."(Hobbes, XIII) These principles, he elaborates, are the precipice for man being at a constant state of war. Thus, the nature of man is to be at war, with his offense or defense, whether represented independently or by the will of the state, existing as behaviors of necessity and, therefore, ineligible for moral categorization. Hobbes perceives that no notion of good or evil, just or unjust, can be applied to affairs so constant and given over to the benefit of one and the detriment of another in a single stroke. It is in this line of thinking that Hobbes defines a justification for the focus on material validation, promoting the notion that the will to acquire that which is materially in possession of somebody else is to be seen amorally as the function of one state vs. another.

The core nationalism which flows as an undercurrent to Hobbes' ideas suggests that in the intercession of law and justice, the state is to be seen as the preeminent entity, overriding the individual or sectarian differences which might promote rebellion against the social contract. Essentially, he uses this construct as a way to justify the rationality in adhering to principles requisite to the social contract, denoting that the state to which one adheres will be a protectorate against those forces which are naturally postured to undermine said state and its claimed entitlements. As he argues, "from that law of nature by which we are obliged to transfer to another such rights as, being retained, hinder the peace of mankind, there followeth a third; which is this: that men perform their covenants made; without which covenants are in vain, and but empty words; and the right of all men to all things remaining, we are still in the condition of war." (Hobbes, XV) this is an idea which carries with it the greatest of rational merits in a perspective which might otherwise be seen as pointedly archaic in the eyes of liberal progressive or socialist philosophers. Namely, the value of the Hobbesian viewed is preserved only be the illustrative proof that a constant state of war does seem to persist in the relationship betwixt states. Thus, the laws and forms of justice promoted domestically, he argues, are of a central necessity to ensuring that one's state has a strong position in such relationships. Of course, with our understanding today of the premise of liberal progressivism, there may well be deduced a close correlation between the biases of materialist authoritarianism and the persistence of war.