Power-Conflict Theory Analysis of Power

Power-Conflict Theory Analysis of Power and Conflict Theory Coleman (2006) has done a great service to the community of scholarship by bringing together a number of views of power. He provides summaries of these views in an attempt to formulate a helpful rubric for understanding power-conflict dynamics. Almost two thirds of his important article is taken up with a presentation of power, while the last third tackles conflict dynamics and resolution. The emphasis is clear: Coleman wants to insert power into the conflict equation.

He is driven by the following concern: "Because of its ubiquity, it is paramount that when we address conflict, we consider power" (2006, p. 121). He addresses this issue by reviewing existing notions of power, first at the level of definition, and next at the level of components (personal and environmental). Then he elaborates six principles for power-conflict dynamics before moving into some implications for training in conflict resolution. While appreciating the many valid arguments in Coleman's article, this essay will take issue with it on a number of points.

It will attempt fairly to assess the definition of power used. It will work toward a critical assessment of the dynamic principles Coleman's discussion engenders. Finally, by proposing a hypothetical situation at the end, it will attempt to show the limitations of current interactionist perspective when its fail to provide a comprehensive understanding of the role of language or silence in conflict dynamics and the role of non-power-based situations on the part of one of the participants.

Power in Coleman's Position The significance of power for grasping conflict is not a new perspective. Coleman is not claiming that it is, although at the end he says that perhaps "the time is ripe for a new approach to power" (p. 140). He views power as important enough to warrant renewed emphasis. His article aims to fill that gap. Yet he recognizes that the construct of power is abstract and ambiguous (p. 121). Therefore, he tries to find a working definition that will be analytically comprehensive and practically useful.

His initial definition follows Follet's work: "I begin by defining power generally as the ability to make things happen or to bring about desired outcomes" (p. 121). This definition gives him a clear and functional concept, while not escaping the generality that is essential to any comprehensive definition of a force. A couple of things are crucial about this definition. For one, it gives power a causal ability. One cannot have passive power by this definition (which is not the same as the potential or resources for power).

If one cannot "make things happen," one has no power. For another thing, this initial definition is goal-oriented. Coleman sees power in terms of outcomes. Thus it is inescapably teleological. The advantages of this definition of power are several. In Coleman's view, it "avoids the common misconception that power is fundamentally competitive and coercive" (p. 121). Here one encounters one of his primary assertions. Part of his article's point is to combat this limited view of power with a more expansive understanding.

He wants to broaden the notion of power, hitherto limited, to encompass a larger scope for its construct. This definition views power not as a scarce resource, he says, but as an inextinguishable one (p. 122). It is not a finite quantity, like land or oil. Power cannot be captured and owned to the exclusion of others. It is a vast, changing, and infinite. The importance of this is large. It means that there is no monopoly on power. Power can be held and wielded by everyone.

Another advantage of this definition of power is that it is not pinned down to a specific location, nor is it conceived of as a one-way flow (p. 122). Coleman conceives of power as decentralized and interchangeable within mutual interaction. As one will see, his definition undergoes refinement as he wades easily through other ways of approaching power and incorporates them into his final concept. Not content simply to rest on his own definition of power, Coleman introduces several other approaches.

Here it becomes more difficult to separate his line of argument from that of others. One can assume that the research summaries he presents fall within the bounds of his own acceptance. From this one can detect several strands of argument regarding power that are his. For one, he writes, "Power, therefore, is determined not only by the characteristics of the person or persons involved in any given situation, nor solely by the characteristics of the situation, but by the interaction of these two sets of factors" (p. 122).

Clearly, then, Coleman supports an interactionist view (following Deutsch). Power is not strictly an individual quality but is also a situational quality. Power is dependent on how interaction unfolds between participants in conflict. It does not substantially exist outside of that interactive web of relations. Two other strands of argument are discernible. One is that power shifts occur within the three interrelated realms of the personal, the relational, and the environmental (p. 123).

In the dynamics of power, a gain in one area may mean a gain or a loss in another area. This paradigm is important for his conceptualization of power. The second is that Coleman clearly adopts the distinction between primary and secondary power developed by Deutsch. Primary power refers to "the ability to affect those activities (the law, the media, policies, and so on) that define the domain" (p. 123). Here is where real power lies. Primary power sets up the field rules by which the game (secondary power) is played.

It defines the ideology and supporting myths of a culture or situation. It constrains the possible moves that are available for secondary power to make. Secondary power is the exercise of power within the structure of those rules. It must take into account the way the field is established, organized, and legitimized before it can have an influence. Coleman writes, "Only once the domain has been defined does it become possible for power as conceived of in a conventional sense to be exercised" (p. 124). Yet primary power is not immutable.

Secondary power can overtake it through revolutions. This points to something important in Coleman's view: primary power is not concrete but is socially constructed. It rests on consensus, not objectivity. Its source is cultural, social, and contextual. As he begins reflecting on the components of power, he adjusts his definition toward more specificity.

He writes, "It [power] can be usefully conceptualized as the ability (or the perception of the ability) to leverage relevant resources in a specific situation in order to effectively achieve personal, relational, or environmental goals, often through using various strategies and channels of influence of both a primary and secondary nature" (p. 125).

Clearly the teleological focus is still present, but he has assimilated the distinct notion of situation (context), expanded on the notion of goals (personal, relational, and environmental), refined the levels of power (primary and secondary), and included the key practical methods by which power comes into actual being (influence channels). One sees that his discussion of power was intended to fill out from abstraction a more concrete definition of power. Coleman then attempts to clarify the factors that orient a person to power in situations of conflict.

These are personal and environmental. Their influence is great since they determine a person's behavioral patterns in social situations. For example, using McClelland's framework, a person can approach power through support, autonomy, assertion, or togetherness (p. 126). A person could maintain an authoritarian framework, or one in which they need power (p. 127). They could approach power relations through various ideological frames, electing a unitary, a radical, or a pluralistic frame (p. 128). Coleman's discussion of these and other various power registers is incisive and relevant.

His conclusion is that these different factors, as well as the environmental factors such as culture, social roles, and hierarchical structures (to list just a few), must be considered when thinking about conflict dynamics and conflict resolution. The personal factors operate in dynamic pulse with the situational environment. This gives rise to the actual situation of conflict within which these factors must be considered. Dynamic Conflict in Coleman's Position In Coleman, conflict seems like the vessel within which the liquids of power swirl.

Conflict is the situational framework that gives rise to dynamic interaction between forces. He expresses this in different ways. He states, "Power is commonly used in conflict as leverage for achieving one's goals" (p. 120, italics added). He says that power influences the types of conflicts available to wage (p. 120, italics added). Or, "Conflict is often a means of seeking or maintaining the balance or imbalance of power in relationships" (p. 120). In other words, the motion of power is what makes conflict dynamic.

One power can move against or away from another power. One power can merge with another power. While the total amount of power in conflict stays constant, its density and weight can sway one way or another. One party may take power away from the other. One party may lose power. This interaction or exchange leads either to equilibrium between the wielders of power, or to disequilibrium and imbalance. One can take Coleman to be saying that power is an element of exchange (or retraction) within the field of conflict.

It is like the goal struggled for between two opponents on a sports pitch. It includes also the devices and mechanisms by which that goal-oriented struggle progresses. How do the dynamics actually play out then? From the beginning, Coleman speaks of "strategies and tactics employed" (p. 121). Power is no static element. It is a force that can be manipulated and wielded as if in contest. The situation of conflict manifests itself as the place where power is used.

Those in conflict maneuver their power, whatever it may be, into positions of leverage. These maneuverings of power can be defensive or offensive. They can be cooperative or coercive. A lot is dependent on the availability of power given the social situation. Here Coleman's description of potential power, or availability of power, is useful. He places the dynamics of power use in the context of resources.

He writes frequently of "potential power," "resources for power," "tools available to influence one's environment," or "sources of influence." This calls attention to the situational factors surrounding the use of power. Power can only be used if there are available resources for its exertion. One cannot use a depleted resource. It is the situation, as Coleman sees it, that determines to a large extent what kind of and how many resources are available. For example, wealth is a resource.

In a situation, one party may have wealth while the other does not. This may mean that the wealthy party has more resources at hand to influence the power dynamics. Wealth would be the potential pool that only one of the parties can use in conflict in this case. Coleman's presentation aims at aiding the conceptualization of those who wish for a "constructive resolution" to conflict (p. 121).

To this end, he designates a series of "principles of power-conflict dynamics" that are "grounded in the assumption that power differences affect conflict processes, which in turn can affect power differences" (p. 133). That is to say, in the exchange between various powers, changes occur. Yet the interaction itself is fraught with encouragements and constraints on the responses of participants.

These encouragements and constraints come from all the factors -- the nature of power, the constituents of power, the personal and environmental influences on orientations toward power -- that he has outlined. His attempt is to synthesize all this information into effective principles. This is the point at which he turns his attention directly onto conflict. This essay will now present an understanding of his six principles through a critical interpretation of their validity.

Critical Analysis of Coleman's Principles A first scruple has to do with the coherence of his essay, not his actual position, but it is important because it shows how he may not have achieved the aim of integrating power into conflict dynamics. There is what I perceive to be a disconnect between the sections on power and the section on power-conflict dynamics. When he switches to the latter section, some of his principles seem independent of the sections on power and not derived directly from the research he has cited.

Take, for instance, his first principle. It is unclear how the relative deprivation theory is linked to the whole previous discussion. He begins the principle by citing a new model (relative deprivation theory) that had not been included in his summary of power views. In fact, the word "power" is not used at all in this section except in the title of the principle.

One is left wondering if the principle is connected at all with the formulation of power given previously, and whether that formulation was even necessary for the statement of this principle. In other words, there is discrepancy immediately between the sections on power and the section on conflict. This is surprising given Coleman's insistence that the dynamics of power, which he takes so long to go through, are crucial for understanding the dynamics of conflict. Several other principles fall under the same criticism. Coleman's first principle appears borne out historically.

One can take it to assert that as soon as one underprivileged group gains more power, others will follow suit. The first group's power play ushers in a play by other groups to gain more power (based on the earlier group's lead). For instance, in the U.S., the success of the Civil Rights movement was followed quickly by a push from gay rights activists to achieve the same levels of political recognition and protection.

One can add that it is possible to see these dynamics playing out interpersonally as well, although Coleman does not mention anything to this effect. For example, a younger brother who witnesses his older sister winning a more powerful position with respect to a domineering father might follow a similar path. He might study the sister's influence patterns and repeat them in his own efforts to win power with the father.

The brother's experience of deprivation in comparison with his sister's (who is seen as similar in group membership, attitude, and values) is heightened, and that new awareness may issue in conflict. However, a main criticism is that the principle leaves it up to the reader to decide how the environmental factors are related to the personal power orientations of the individual. Coleman does not clarify the complexity of the situation, which is unexpected since this is one of his primary goals.

He does not show how the elements of power are related to deprivation theory. As a result, the principle loses explanatory credibility in his model. What would be necessary to elevate its status is a deeper discussion of how his new insertion of power components influences the environmental situation of conflict as described by relative deprivation theory. The second principle is even less obviously accurate. The principle says: "obvious power asymmetries contain conflict escalation while power ambiguities foster escalation" (p. 134).

The evidence for this view is taken from a historical analysis of European wars in the industrial era between powers of almost equal strength. What that research failed to look at were the many instances of populist conflict (e.g., Marxist revolutions) in which power asymmetries did not contain conflict but rather fomented it. This principle does not fit situations in which lower power groups rise up against higher power groups. On the contrary, it expects such uprisings not to occur. Therefore, it is not historically accurate.

As a further counter-example, the Cold War between Russia and the U.S. (power ambiguities) led principally to propaganda wars and political posturing (as the principle suggests) but to very little actual conflict. The escalation was in large measure imaginary, not real. Another troublesome aspect of the second principle is the conclusion drawn by Sidanius and Pratto that asymmetrical group status hierarchies are useful. This would border on masochistic if applied to situations of real oppression.

It would seem another way of saying that conflict can and should be alleviated by keeping power differences in place. Based on this view, there should be no impetus for change in the status quo, no matter how oppressive the determining power structure is. For example, during colonialism in Africa, this view might have encouraged the colonized nations to maintain their status as dominated in the hierarchy rather than push for conflict.

In fact, that happened among many of the upper class Africans in governing positions who resisted revolt prior to the 1970s, but who ultimately lost out to more revolutionary social elements. The imbalance of power was thought ultimately to be better dealt with through conflict rather than containment. Therefore, the principle fails to reflect historical reality in those conditions, and in fact demonstrates a potential Western bias. Contradicting this principle, many colonized people rose up in armed conflict against their imperial rulers despite the fact of power imbalance.

The hierarchy did not act to mitigate conflict. The third principle -- "sustainable resolutions to conflict require progression from unbalanced power relations between the parties to relatively balanced relations" (p. 134) -- appears to contradict the second. Like the first principle, it has little relation to Coleman's previous discussions of power and presents entirely new research in its support. More importantly, it presents a four-stage progression of conflict relations (conscientization, confrontation, negotiation, sustainable peace) that relies on the presupposition of the imbalance (asymmetry) of power.

Conflict stems from this injustice, which the second principle would not predict. Further, it incorporates the notion of relative deprivation. Where the principle falters is in Coleman's failure to link it to his previous discussion of power. He does not make clear how, for example, personal orientations to power influence the outcome of these sorts of conflicts. In other words, his discussion fails to show the relevance of the theoretical portion of his paper to the actual dynamics of a conflict situation.

The principle unexpectedly remains at the level of abstraction. While it incorporates its own view of conflict dynamics, this view is not positioned within the concrete framework of resources and personal and environmental factors on whose inclusion Coleman wants to insist. By far the most substantiated principle is Coleman's fourth. Here he succeeds in tying the principle back to the previous presentation. He does what a view of power-conflict dynamics would have to do to be coherent and persuasive.

The reason he succeeds is that he integrates McClelland's four power orientations into his discussion of influence strategies. He clarifies the effect the orientations (dependent, autonomous, assertive, togetherness) have on actual conflict tactics. He uses a consistent example (daughter in conflict with parents over curfew) to elucidate the role of personal factors as they interact with the power situation. He modulates the daughter's strategies given different orientations. The dynamics of the principle become clear. Coleman is not arguing that only one orientation is the correct one.

He is simply showing how orientations influence preferred strategies. One has a hard time arguing that the principle is invalid, since it encompasses multiple possible perspectives (that are either predetermined or chosen). Whichever perspective is used for interaction effects the way in which the conflict is played out. The value of his presentation is to make clear the different strategies and outcomes that are possible. Coleman goes a step further though.

He writes, "Once again, what is important is that individuals (and groups and nations) avoid becoming chronically committed to any one strategy, instead remaining skilled at each one of them, particularly when trying to achieve enhanced environmental or personal power" (p. 135). Why does he insist on this openness and flexibility? The reason is that he propounds an "expansive" view of power-conflict dynamics. He recognizes that some strategies for influencing outcomes may not work.

Thus, a switch to a different, more effective strategy could be beneficial for those wishing to achieve power. Coleman is trying to conceptualize multiple ways in which conflict can be moved forward toward resolution. In itself, this view has merit. However, it fails to consider situations in which all of the strategies for power-conflict interaction may be blocked from use by the more powerful party. This is less a criticism than a limitation.

One can conceive of a situation (e.g., slavery) in which power inequality prevents every successful strategy from working. It would do no good, then, to consider using other strategies. Anyone who would try would be subject to crippling punishment. Any reference to the resolution of the slavery conflict cannot speak of successful strategies (cooperation, assertion) without remembering the loss of power experienced by those unable to engage in conflict with a reasonable chance for a successful outcome.

The ultimate thrust of Coleman's presentation seems to be the validation of the cooperative model of conflict dynamics. This is his fifth principle: "cooperative interdependence in conflict leads to an orientation of gaining 'power with' others" (p. 136). This principle flows directly out of Coleman's social interactionist view, but is not dependent on it.

The principle says that in situations where outcomes are interdependent, there is "an increased tendency to minimize power differences between the disputants and to mutually enhance each other's power in order to work together effectively to achieve their shared goals" (p. 136). It can be illustrated by a villain and a hero (antagonists) who join forces temporarily to overcome a larger adversary that threatens them both.

Alternatively, it can be envisioned as a single powerful person who joins mutually with a less powerful group to achieve a shared aim (a software baron spreads her wealth around to her subordinate designers in order to compete more effectively and to the benefit of all parties). The effectiveness of this principle relies on raising the awareness of the participants in conflict. If awareness is not achieved -- especially the awareness of the higher powered participant -- then the principle fails.

The principle is wisely restricted only to situations in which outcomes are interdependent. Coleman betrays himself an advocate of this model in his discussion of high-power groups (HPGs) and low-power groups (LPGs) (his sixth principle). He mentions how difficult the HPGs can be in negotiations, as well as how ignorant, repressive, dominatory, and ambivalent are their proclivities. They resist implementing actual change. By contrast, the LPGs are short-sighted, discontent, dependent, and prone to blaming. Their power hinges on group solidarity.

Where Coleman shows favoritism for LPGs, and thus for a more cooperative conflict process, is in suggesting tactics that can enhance their power. He does not give similar suggestions to HPGs. It is further interesting that he places this principal last, and thus in a position of emphasis. In service of promoting a cooperative view of power, Coleman spends considerable space and energy criticizing the assertive and competitive models of power, particularly when they are chronic.

People who operate from these models adhere to a restrictive view of power scarcity that he wants to eliminate. Further, they are guided by anti-sharing notions which see an increase in others' power as a threat to their own goal-achievement. They tend to devalue those of weaker status and to hold an inflated opinion of themselves. Coleman interprets these models as costly since they preempt the use of other more participatory forms of power (p. 136). While theoretically this is meaningful, in practical terms it rarely plays out.

In a different view, power is often scarce, just like natural resources. It is not an illimitable quantity to which all people have equal access. Under ideal conditions of social harmony, perhaps the cooperative model of conflict dynamics works. However, the real world rarely conforms to ideal conditions. Even in extreme cases, there are not often situations where the end goal is interdependent. When power is taken from the wealthy and given to the poor, for example, it means that the wealthy lose power and the poor gain power.

There is not a net rise in power in this case. When one faction assumes control of a government through a military coup, the power is transferred to the new rulers and the old rulers lose out. Coleman might say that the loss of environmental power is compensated for by gains in personal or social power, thus creating a net balancing. Does this typically happen? Usually the old regime is eliminated, losing all power. If they survive, all realms of their power suffer, including potential resources.

They may lose wealth, lose political voice, lose friends, and lose self-esteem. Both parties would be incapable of participatory interaction. Only one achieves their aims. In such common scenarios, power is scarce. Conflict resolves when one party wins. This is how most political wars finish. This example is not given as universal or even typical, but it serves as a counterpoint to the view that mutually beneficial conflict processes are always possible. Thus, from this perspective Coleman's view that power is not a scarce resource is suspect.

The cooperative view suffers from idealism that is rarely, if ever, attained. Non-Power-Based Conflict: A Further Critique Having reviewed his summary of power and discussed his six principles, we can turn to a more basic weakness of Coleman's viewpoint. While wishing to be more expansive and comprehensive, it ignores conflict in which power may not be primary. What is striking is Coleman's view that "virtually" all conflicts "directly or indirectly" concern power (p. 120). These additional qualifiers point notably to the possible existence of conflict that does not concern power relations.

What conceivable examples are there of non-power-based conflicts? Would they still fit the interactionist paradigm that Coleman presents? One thinks not of inner psychological conflicts here, which would fall outside the scope of Coleman's endeavor and for which he could not be held accountable. Rather, one thinks of conflicts that arise from situations in which a person is not trying primarily to "make something happen." This goes ultimately to his definition of power.

Imagine that someone is trying to avoid conflict and free himself or herself of holding any sort of power.