Review of the Strategies of Containment

Strategies of Containment

During the Cold War, the United States employed a geopolitical strategic foreign policy known as containment. This policy was adopted as part of the country’s efforts to prevent the spread of communism in the aftermath of the Second World War. This geopolitical strategic foreign policy was essentially geared towards the containment of the Soviet Union during this period. Strategies of containment adopted by the U.S. during the Cold War have been the subject of numerous publications and studies throughout history. Existing publications and articles on this issue present different perspectives relating to history, national security, and international relations. John Lewis Gaddis wrote a book named Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy During the Cold War. The book provides a critical assessment of the strategies employed by the U.S. during the Cold War and their effectiveness in national security. Through the critical appraisal, Lewis sought to reinterpret U.S. national security policy during this period based on recent research and new evidence. This paper examines some sections of their book in relation to the geopolitical strategic foreign policy employed by the U.S. since World War II.

Flexible Response

Flexible response was a new military strategy that changed post-war U.S. foreign relations. This strategy dramatically changed the country’s national security policy. Flexible response emerged as part of John F. Kennedy’s administration to replace the massive retaliation strategy adopted by his predecessor Dwight D. Eisenhower. Eisenhower’s administration focused on portraying international communism as an efficient and ruthless monument (Lewis, 2005). President Kennedy’s incoming administration sought to replace Eisenhower’s strategy on grounds that the National Security Council had become bloated and unwieldy. John F. Kennedy believed that President Eisenhower’s administration spent more time creating policy papers on almost everything, taking them through appropriate bureaucracies, and discussing them in lengthy meetings. As a result, the entire National Security Council had become an obstacle rather than a catalyst to coordinate relevant and appropriate action as desired. The bureaucracies in Eisenhower’s administration forced him to make actual decisions on major issues independently in consultation with a few key advisers in his office. The bureaucracies in policymaking were seemingly at the core of the massive retaliation strategy adopted by the Eisenhower administration. The adoption of flexible response by Kennedy’s administration involved cutting back the National Security Council staff and relying more on direct contacts across different agencies for decision-making. Through these measures, he sought to downgrade the National Security Council as the major decision-making organization on national security matters. Kennedy seemingly believed that downgrading this body would help in the adoption and implementation of the new flexible response strategy.

The new flexible response strategy was a critical part of America’s foreign relations policy as it remained in place after Lyndon B. Johnson became president. While President Johnson had a significantly different personal style, he continued with the new strategy. This implies that both Kennedy and Johnson viewed the new strategy as an effective measure of containment during the Cold War. Johnson’s continuity of the new strategy involved retaining most of President Kennedy’s key advisers including Rusk, McNamara, Taylor, Bundy, and later Rostow. However, President Johnson had some disagreements with the approach adopted by his predecessor in the implementation of the new strategy. The administration of both President Kennedy and President Johnson adopted flexible response out of fear of embarrassment, humiliation, or appearing to be weak. While the strategy largely sought to address Soviet Union’s threat to Western Europe, it was adopted by both administrations due to the fear or threat of humiliation/embarrassment. Both administrations did not fear communism as much since it was too fragmented. In addition, they neither feared China as much because it was largely impotent nor the Soviet Union because it was more devoted to détente (Lewis, 2005).

Lewis (2005) notes that by the time flexible response strategy was adopted, U.S. strategies of containment had fluctuated between symmetrical and asymmetrical concepts. Prior to the adoption of this strategy, containment strategies like Eisenhower’s massive retaliation initiative was largely asymmetrical. However, asymmetrical concepts received criticisms on grounds that they were offered inadequate measures of responding to various challenges. This implies that flexible response was fueled by dissatisfaction with symmetrical concepts/approaches due to their inefficiencies. President Kennedy’s administration created symmetrical approach known as flexible response. Symmetrical approach was the desired way of addressing the challenges facing the U.S. during the Cold War. When formulating this strategy, President Kennedy was aware of the perception of interests and threats facing the country.

As one of the strategies of containment, flexible response largely focused on addressing the threat of the Soviet Union to Western Europe. Even though Lewis (2005) states that it was formulated as a result of fear of being humiliated, flexible response essentially focused on dealing with the threat posed by the Soviet Union to Western Europe (Gavin, 2001). Consequently, this strategy not only had significant impacts on U.S. national security but also brought dramatic changes to the country’s foreign policy and relations. As a symmetrical approach, flexible response was a radical change that seemingly improved deterrence. It enhances deterrence by giving the president flexible nuclear alternative and increasing traditional capabilities to deal with several military crises. In essence, this strategy derives its name from the fact that it offers the president flexible nuclear options for dealing with military crises.

The provision of flexible nuclear options to the president and improving traditional capabilities are seen in how Kennedy’s administration introduced this strategy to the public. When addressing the public in March 1961, President Kennedy stated that the goal of flexible response was to insure the sufficiency of U.S. bargaining power as a means of halting the arms race. In addition, he stated that the strategy sought to deter general and limited wars regardless of whether they were nuclear or conventional. His administration sought to achieve this by persuading all potential attackers that any war would not solve disputes compared to diplomacy. This strategy placed emphasis on lessening the dependence on nuclear weapons in order to deter limited aggression. Secondly, President Kennedy’s administration focused on enhancing the conventional capabilities of NATO. This implies that a controlled nuclear war was one of the core assumptions underlying flexible response. This strategy was based on an assumption that a controlled nuclear war, which was relatively unrealistic, and improved conventional capabilities would help to settle any disputes. However, the strategy was inherently incongruous since it provided the president flexible nuclear options.

Implementing Flexible Response

On one hand, flexible response gave the president flexible nuclear options and focused on improving traditional capabilities. On the other hand, it sought to promote deterrence on grounds that any potential attacks would be futile. The inconsistencies in this approach to addressing U.S. challenges during the Cold War are evident in its application in Vietnam War. The war in Vietnam is a suitable case to determine the effectiveness of flexible response for two major reasons as stated by Lewis (2005). First, U.S. foreign policy in Southeast Asia practically demonstrates all components of this strategy. Secondly, President Kennedy and President Johnson as well as their advisers viewed Vietnam as a fair test of this approach. Therefore, the implementation of this strategy in Vietnam’s case would have serious implications for its application elsewhere. Given the significance of the implementation of the strategy in the Vietnam War, American leaders were fully aware of probable difficulties. In addition, these leaders were fully confident of their ability to overcome the potential challenges. For them, the successful implementation of the strategy would be an indictment of President Eisenhower’s inability to deal with similar problems. However, any failures would be an indicator of the ineffectiveness of flexible response.

The inherent inconsistencies of flexible response came into play during the Vietnam War. This is primarily because of the varied accomplishments in this war with differing intended objectives. Lewis (2005) notes some of the failures of flexible response strategy including its inability to deter future aggression and the fact that it did not save South Vietnam. In addition, the failure of flexible response is evident in the fact that it neither improved the credibility of America’s global commitments nor prevent domestic recriminations. The failures of flexible response strategy were evident despite the instance by both Kennedy and Johnson’s administrations that it was in line with the overall direction of the nation’s foreign policy.

Lewis (2005) discusses the different features of flexible response that were applied in the war in Vietnam. These features include calibration or fine-tuning through which the U.S. sought to deter aggression without embarrassment/humiliation by implementing a series of precisely calculated actions. Under this feature, the implementation of flexible response would involve moving U.S. military forces in a limited, measured, deliberate, and controlled manner in efforts to implement U.S. foreign policy. There are various reasons that contributed to the failure of flexible response in the Vietnam War including lack of clarity regarding who or what was being deterred, inability to control risks posed by potential attackers, and failure to ensure that the applied force would be a precise and discriminating policy tool.

Lewis (2005) concludes his assessment of flexible response as one of the strategies of containment by stating that it was a strategic vacuum. The failures in Vietnam War demonstrated the inconsistencies within the policy and highlighted how its underlying assumptions were erroneous. According to Witteried (n.d.), the basic concepts of flexible response strategy were inconsistent and should be rejected. Flexible response was largely a failure during the Vietnam War because of its emphasis on promoting deterrence. The implementation of this strategy was essentially an inept overreaction that was characterized by a lack of coordination. Based on the outcomes of the Vietnam case, flexible response was doomed to fail regardless of whether it was applied under a fully conventional war or a defense-based use of tactical nuclear weapons. A fully conventional war, which was the core of building traditional capabilities under this strategy, was doomed to fail because it would not be feasible during the war. On the other hand, a tactical nuclear was would also fail because it was unacceptable to Europeans since it would contribute to the use of Soviet nuclear weapons. In addition, the cost of establishing an adequate, tactical nuclear defense would be wasted because the probability of a tactical nuclear war was significantly low. Therefore, flexible response was essentially a strategy that was doomed to fail during the Cold War though it represented a change in U.S. foreign policy and relations.

Détente

The failure of flexible response to end the Vietnam War contributed to a change in U.S. foreign policy, which was promoted by the president. However, unlike previously when John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson campaigned about what they were going do upon assuming office, Richard Nixon gave little indication of what he would do to end the Vietnam War. While Richard Nixon wanted to adopt a new U.S. foreign policy, he did not specify components of the new policy as noted by Lewis (2005). During his campaigns, Nixon avoided giving any indications of what his foreign policy would be. At this point, he was seemingly faced with four options including withdrawing all U.S. forces from the Vietnam War immediately, continuing with the military policies of his predecessors, increasing attacks on North Vietnam, or letting the Vietnamese fight using U.S. equipment. These four options were seemingly under his consideration and influenced his eventual foreign and national security policy.

Upon assumption of office, President Nixon together with his national security adviser, Dr. Henry Kissinger, formulated a new strategy. The new strategy was based on President Nixon’s staunch anti-communist stance. Détente was a new U.S. foreign security policy that involved a combination of the Kennedy-Johnson tactical flexibility approach with Eisenhower’s structure and coherence. This means that détente was initially a combination of massive retaliation approach and flexible response approach. The new strategy was an indication that containment, which was common in the earliest days of the Cold War, was coming back. This new strategy was formulated at a time when America’s political will and foreign relations had suffered because of the failures of the Vietnam War. Actually, the failures of flexible response strategy in the Vietnam War were the catalyst of the new strategy promoted by President Nixon and Kissinger. The formulation of the new strategy involved re-evaluating existing assumptions, means and ends, potential adversaries, and the nation’s foreign policy goals (Burn, 2010).

As evident in Lewis’s book, Nixon’s foreign policy was essentially a balance of power diplomacy whose main architect was Kissinger. At the core of this power diplomacy was the focus on creating a stable world based on shared interests among the key powers. This entailed recognizing the multi-dimensional nature of power across the globe. This idea was influenced by the fact that efforts to make Vietnam a symbol of U.S. power and commitment across the globe failed. As a result, it would be critical for the U.S. to shift from a fixed to a flexible perception of global interests and power. However, such recognition would be maintained for as long as an overall balance of power existed throughout the world. The short-term goal of the new balance of power diplomacy was finding a satisfactory resolution to the Vietnam War. On the other hand, the long-term goal would be a feasible alternative to containment to ensure the preservation of America’s interests in the world.

Even though a balance of power was the core component of the new foreign policy by President Nixon and Kissinger, the formulation of this new strategy was seemingly influenced by what influenced the development of flexible response. Similar to the creation of flexible response strategy, President Nixon and Kissinger were seemingly motivated by the fear/threat of humiliation when creating the new foreign policy. They feared that developments throughout the world, especially among key powers, could embarrass or humiliate the U.S. in the absence of a balance of power. Therefore, for President Nixon and Kissinger, it was more important for the U.S. not to be embarrassed or humiliated. President Nixon and Kissinger believed that if America allowed itself to be embarrassed in Southeast Asia, the country would suffer irreparable harm that would affect its international relations and global reputation (Lewis, 2005).

Given the significance of a balance of power under the détente strategy, the success and effectiveness of détente was dependent on diplomacy. Diplomacy was seemingly the underlying approach through which a balance of power would be achieved throughout the world. For instance, the U.S. sought to engage in serious negotiations on major issues with the Soviet Union. Since 1950, negotiations or diplomacy has always been viewed as the eventual objective of containment. In the diplomacy efforts, the U.S. sought to create linkages by demonstrating how substantive issues were inter-related. This foreign policy approach was similar to containment strategies of the 1940s as they complied with the multi-dimensional conception of power worldwide and promoted making distinctions between peripheral and critical interests. They sought to maintain the balance of power, respond to threats asymmetrically, and viewed the Soviet Union as the key threat rather than international communism.

Implementing Détente

As evident in this book, the implementation of détente involved centralizing policymaking and policy execution processes. Burn (2010) contends that President Nixon and Kissinger disliked the bureaucratic side of government. As a result, they focused on centralizing decision-making in their own hands. This implies that President Nixon and Kissinger were the key players in the implementation of the new foreign policy. In this case, centralizing decision-making, policymaking, and policy execution processes was the first step in the implementation of détente. Efforts to centralize decision-making in the U.S. resulted in the redesign of the whole national security apparatus.

While centralization of decision-making and policymaking generated numerous concerns, it played a critical role in the successful execution of détente as a foreign policy strategy. Lewis (2005) states that during the first years of the Nixon administration, the U.S. successfully emerged from self-destructive entanglement to the pivot in the triangular balance of power. Through détente, the U.S. emerged as a key power across the globe as it shaped the course of international affairs. In essence, détente represented a significant and successful shift in U.S. foreign policy. The country emerged from defeat during the Vietnam War to dominance in international affairs.

Despite criticisms regarding the centralization of policymaking by President Nixon and Kissinger, the new foreign policy was largely successful in comparison to previous efforts by the preceding administrations. The success of this policy is evident in three major events during President Nixon’s era. These three events marked President Nixon’s major foreign policy achievements.

The first major achievement of the implementation of détente was the 1969 Nixon Doctrine, which was essentially President Nixon’s enunciation of the Guam Doctrine in 1969. The Nixon Doctrine was characterized by various events that reflected the implementation of the new strategy. One of the major events that signified the effect of this doctrine as a new foreign policy was the gradual withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Vietnam. U.S. troops were removed from South Vietnam in a steady process that even surprised the administration and critics of the doctrine (Lewis, 2005). The removal of American troops from the war was an indicator of Nixon administration’s focus on disengaging from conflict as part of the new U.S. foreign policy.

As evident in this book, the second key achievement or event that characterized the implementation of détente as a new foreign policy and strategy was the opening of relations with the People’s Republic of China. The withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Vietnam acted as a catalyst for America to open relations with China. This is primarily because proclamations and events that characterized the removal of American troops from South Vietnam demonstrated that the U.S. was ready to fight the war on more favorable terms unlike before. Following the withdrawal of these troops, it was easy for the People’s Republic of China to engage with the U.S. The new and friendlier relationship between the U.S. and China was fueled by America’s change of foreign policy and the decision to remove its troops from Vietnam. However, as the U.S. geared up for a new and friendlier relationship with China, Nixon’s administration feared that the withdrawal of troops from Vietnam would convey a sign of America’s weakness. President Nixon and Kissinger were concerned by the fact that this could be exploited to humiliate the U.S. Despite these concerns, the new relationship with China was a reflection of the implementation of détente by the Nixon Administration.

Third, Burn (2010) contends that the détente with the Soviet Union also reflected how the U.S. implemented the new foreign policy. In comparison to repairing relations with the People’s Republic of China, implementing détente with the Soviet Union was easier but more complex. The easy part of this process was the already existing diplomatic tradition of dialogue between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. This tradition had existed in all previous administrations in the U.S. since Truman had made some advances toward the Soviet Union as noted by Burn (2010). However, the complexity was due to the significantly complicated strategic relations between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. These strategic relations were complicated by the fact that each of these two superpowers had its nuclear weapons and capabilities. For the U.S., détente with the Soviet Union was part of its efforts to lessen military expenditure and narrow strategic supremacy without compromising its national security policy and strategy. Moreover, it reflected America’s new foreign policy and strategy. By achieving détente with the Soviet Union, the U.S. would make it difficult for Russians to adopt future actions that would harm Western interests.