Political Science Japanese Internment

¶ … internment camps for the Japanese that were set up and implemented by president Franklin D. Roosevelt. The writer explores the history leading up to the decision and the decision itself. There were six sources used to complete this paper.

When Japan attacked Pearl Harbor the American public was outraged and stunned. American citizens had lived with a false sense of security for many years that the soil of the United States was off limits. The Civil War and the American Revolution were long in the past and residents believed that the world at large would be to afraid to attack a nation as strong and powerful as the United States. The attack came without warning, killing thousands who were within its grasp. When the smoke had cleared and the bombs had stopped, the nation turned a fearful eye to the white house for guidance. At the time the president was Franklin D. Roosevelt. His administration made a decision that rocked the nation and has been debated since that time. The internment of Japanese-Americans was drastic and shocking, but supported by the majority of non-Japanese-Americans. It was a decision that left a bruise on the psyche of the nation ever since. At the time the administration did not feel that it had any other choice but to intern residents who lived in certain geographic areas of the country. Today, looking back on what must have been mass exodus and terror for thousands of innocent Japanese-Americans, it is difficult to imagine how such a plan garnered support. To understand how it happened one must look at the events prior to the plan's inception.

THE ORDER

The order itself was strong and created an image of foreboding. Signed into law by then President FDR it allowed for the rounding up and encamping many thousand people who had committed no crime other than to have Japanese ancestry (9066 http://history1900s.about.com/gi/dynamic/offsite.htm?site=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.pbs.org%2Fchildofcamp%2Fhistory%2Feo9066.html).

The Secretary of War is hereby authorized to provide for residents of any such area who are excluded there from, such transportation, food, shelter, and other accommodations as may be necessary, in the judgment of the Secretary of War or the said Military Commander, and until other arrangements are made, to accomplish the purpose of this order (9066 http://history1900s.about.com/gi/dynamic/offsite.htm?site=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.pbs.org%2Fchildofcamp%2Fhistory%2Feo9066.html)."

The order allowed 110,000 Japanese-Americans to be forcibly removed form their homes and schools and transported to camps that were set up by the United States government. The American government had already gathered evidence that the residents being interned did not pose an actual threat to the U.S.(Japanese camps (http://history1900s.about.com/gi/dynamic/offsite.htm?site=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.jainternment.org).The question since then has been, why was it done? There are heated debates in the issue in many circles. FDR's decision came on the heels of American panic and military pressure. To fully understand why he signed such an order one must first understand what happened immediately prior to the order being drafted (Japanese camps (http://history1900s.about.com/gi/dynamic/offsite.htm?site=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.jainternment.org).

Despite the government's own evidence that Japanese-Americans posed no military threat, President Roosevelt signed Executive Order 9066, authorizing the removal and incarceration of over 110,000 Japanese-Americans. Two-thirds were American citizens. Over half were children (Japanese camps (http://history1900s.about.com/gi/dynamic/offsite.htm?site=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.jainternment.org)."

The Japanese had not been well received in America to begin with. Laws were passed in the early 1900's to deny them the right to marry outside of their race, become citizens or buy land in certain areas. In 1924 the country stopped all migration from Japan to the United States (Japanese camps (http://history1900s.about.com/gi/dynamic/offsite.htm?site=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.jainternment.org).

By September 1939, Europe was embroiled in World War II. The U.S. remained nominally neutral, although sympathetic to the Allies led by England and France (Japanese camps (http://history1900s.about.com/gi/dynamic/offsite.htm?site=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.jainternment.org)."

When the attack on Pearl Harbor by Japan occurred Americans were shocked. The president was turned to for answers and as many presidents have done he turned to cabinet and military advisors for answers.

The initial fear came from rumors that Japanese residents of Hawaii and the West coast had been committing sabotage and espionage. The FBI investigated this immediately and found that the rumors were not true.

There was not one instance of sabotage or espionage by Japanese-American citizens or residents of the U.S. before or during the war. Nevertheless, the government did not deny the rumors of sabotage (Japanese camps (http://history1900s.about.com/gi/dynamic/offsite.htm?site=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.jainternment.org)."

Within hours of the news from Hawaii, FBI agents, many without evidence, search or arrest warrants, conducted house to house roundups of 1,212 Issei (first-generation Japanese immigrants) in Hawaii and the mainland (Japanese camps (http://history1900s.about.com/gi/dynamic/offsite.htm?site=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.jainternment.org).They were prominent leaders in the Japanese-American communities: priests, teachers in language schools, officers of community organizations, and newspaper editors. Often they were arrested in the middle of the night, taken to unknown destinations, and treated as prisoners of war (Japanese camps (http://history1900s.about.com/gi/dynamic/offsite.htm?site=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.jainternment.org)."

Within days of the attack on Pearl Harbor the round ups began. Within months of that there were restrictions placed on travel to those who were not interned and they were not allowed to possess items that the government called contraband.

On February 19, 1942, President Roosevelt signed Executive Order 9066 (view full text), authorizing the Army to "designate military areas" from which "any persons may be excluded (Japanese camps (http://history1900s.about.com/gi/dynamic/offsite.htm?site=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.jainternment.org)." The words "Japanese,"or "Japanese-Americans" never appeared in the Order. But the intent of the command was used only against persons of Japanese ancestry. Italian-Americans and German-Americans, whose ancestral countries were also at war with the Allies, were to be exempted (Japanese camps (http://history1900s.about.com/gi/dynamic/offsite.htm?site=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.jainternment.org)."

The camps were established in Washington, Oregon, California and Southern Arizona. There were also several in Montana. The decision that drove this action was founded in pressure by the military for the president to do it. http://www.lib.utah.edu/spc/photo/9066/t10.htm

HOW DID FDR REACH THE DECISION TO DO IT?

For many decades political debates have centered on the FDR decision to intern Japanese-Americans and what lead up to that decision. In basic form there were two key players who helped the decision come to fruition. In addition it has long since been rumored that FDR harbored a deep seated and long standing prejudice against the Japanese and that racist mindset made it easy to convince him that internment camps were a plausible idea.

The push to intern the Japanese-Americans did not come from local politicians. Instead the push came from several well placed and important military leaders. West coast anger at the Japanese was developed and grown until it became a federally mandated movement (Early Implementation of the Mass Removal (http://www.densho.org/learning/spice/default.asp).

The military and the political sides were so opposed to each other's view point that it created historic tension between the Department of Justice and the United States Army. The two could not agree on a course of action for what was deemed the "West coast Japanese problem" (Early Implementation of the Mass Removal (http://www.densho.org/learning/spice/default.asp).

Whereas the DOJ was content to leave people of Japanese descent on the West Coast undisturbed and advocated only a moderate crackdown on alien activity, the Army pressed for mass removal and incarceration (Early Implementation of the Mass Removal (http://www.densho.org/learning/spice/default.asp)." http://www.lib.utah.edu/spc/photo/9066/t12.htm

The Attorney General who was involved directly after the attack on Pearl Harbor, General Francis Biddle, moved quickly to squash any local fears of the Japanese. He ordered the immediate rounding up of what he believed were "dangerous enemies" (Early Implementation of the Mass Removal (http://www.densho.org/learning/spice/default.asp).How he got the names of these people is often a mystery but the initial round up included thousands of Japanese-Americans and their family members.

These issei were mostly leaders of various Japanese organizations and Japanese religious groups, which the government perceived as potential threats to national security (Early Implementation of the Mass Removal (http://www.densho.org/learning/spice/default.asp)."

At this time there were two important military figures who played a key role in the internment camp decision that was eventually made. The first one was "Lieutenant General John L. DeWitt, commander of the Western Defense Command (Early Implementation of the Mass Removal (http://www.densho.org/learning/spice/default.asp)." DeWitt believed that a mass removal of Japanese-Americans and the provision of their incarceration throughout the west coast in military camps was going to prevent any more Pearl Harbors from occurring. It was the belief of Dewitt that another attack was in the making but this one would come to the mainland of the United States. He also believed that it would be aimed at the west coast, though he did not know exactly what city, area, or state that it would occur in. He was a supporter of rounding up all Japanese-Americans in that region and placing them and their families in the camps that were being run by the United States military members (Early Implementation of the Mass Removal (http://www.densho.org/learning/spice/default.asp).

The second key figure in the push for FDR to sign an order in support of such internment camps was Provost Marshal General Allen W. Gullio. He was considered one of the top military police officers in the nation at the time. He was largely responsible for making sure there was peace and order in the military areas of the nation, which included the military camps that the Japanese were being brought to.

Gullion was considered an expert in legal affairs as well when it came to the actions of the military. He had serious concerns about the legal ability to lock up civilians who had done nothing wrong. He argued that the military could not get away with interfering in civilian lives. He believed the only time it was legally doable was in the case of Marshall law and that it was approved and sanctioned by local civilian leader such as local politicians (Early Implementation of the Mass Removal (http://www.densho.org/learning/spice/default.asp).

Although martial law was never declared on the West Coast, it was declared a "Theater of Operations" on December 11, 1941. Although this declaration was not made with Japanese-Americans in mind, it ultimately provided the Army and the courts with the legitimization necessary to place civilians under military control (Early Implementation of the Mass Removal (http://www.densho.org/learning/spice/default.asp)." third key player in the decision to have internment camps came from something called the Roberts Commission. The Commission provided the federal administration with a formal and in depth investigation of the events of Pearl Harbor. While the Commission did not blame Japanese-Americans for the attack on Pearl Harbor, it did little to exonerate them either.

The commission did not blame the resident Japanese population in Hawaii for the success of the attack, but neither did it go out of its way to exonerate them. The publication of the report was a sensation and stimulated many false rumors regarding Japanese fifth-column activity in Hawaii (Early Implementation of the Mass Removal (http://www.densho.org/learning/spice/default.asp).A "fifth column" refers to people within national borders who engage in espionage or sabotage for an enemy country (Early Implementation of the Mass Removal (http://www.densho.org/learning/spice/default.asp)."Despite their resolve to intern aliens, DeWitt and Gullion were military men, not publicly elected officials, which meant that they could not formulate the domestic policy necessary to carry out their plan. Moreover, since the DOJ, in particular Attorney General Biddle, did not support the idea of mass removal or any interference with civilians, the War Department began a lobbying effort among local politicians to gain the support they needed (Early Implementation of the Mass Removal (http://www.densho.org/learning/spice/default.asp)."

The two spent the next few weeks getting in touch with politicians on the West Coast and trying to get them to agree that it was time to do a sort of Marshall law movement that would allow the Japanese-Americans to be placed in the camps. The two military experts were well versed in manipulation and had learned how to present their case with ease and strength (Early Implementation of the Mass Removal (http://www.densho.org/learning/spice/default.asp).

While members of the War Department argued with members of the DOJ over the perceived necessity of the removal, these local politicians continued to fan the flames of war hysteria (Early Implementation of the Mass Removal (http://www.densho.org/learning/spice/default.asp)."

Then in February the Secretary of War called the president and spoke to him about the desire to intern the Japanese-Americans. A short time later a call came in from the War Secretary's assistance to Gullion's assistance. The call was to let them know about what they called good news. The call included the following conversation:

we talked to the President and the President... says go ahead and do anything you think necessary... If it involves citizens, we will take care of them too. He says there will probably be some repercussions, but it has got to be dictated by military necessity, but as he puts it, "Be as reasonable as you can (Early Implementation of the Mass Removal (http://www.densho.org/learning/spice/default.asp)."

Once this conversation took place the ball was put into motion and several of the president's closest advisors began to pressure him to sign an executive order that would allow for Japanese-American citizens to be placed in the camps without their rights being violated. In other words the order removed the civil rights of those who were being rounded up and placed in the camps.

Despite the objections of a handful of policymakers, including Attorney General Biddle, President Roosevelt signed Executive Order 9066 on February 19, 1942. Citing the need to protect against espionage and sabotage, Executive Order 9066 granted the Army, through the Secretary of War, the authority that Gullion had so long sought. The words "Japanese" or "Japanese-Americans" did not appear in the order, but it was they, and they alone, who felt its sting.[4] In the entire course of war, ten people were convicted of spying for Japan. All of them were Caucasian (Early Implementation of the Mass Removal (http://www.densho.org/learning/spice/default.asp)."

CONCLUSION

The decision to round up hundreds of thousands of innocent Japanese-Americans and place them in internment camps appears at first glance to be the idea of FDR. When one examines the situation more closely one will find that there were two military leaders who wanted it and they began a campaign to gain support. They got it and that is when FDR signed the order. The camps will forever remain in the history books as one of the biggest mistakes on the nation. FDR was well loved for many of his programs and ideas. The camps did not turn out to be one of them.

Click on Executive Order 9066 to see a larger version of the document.

Japanese-American Responses

The response of the Japanese-American community to the mass removal and incarceration was mixed. While some viewed them as opportunities to contribute to the war effort and demonstrate loyalty to the United States, others objected to the process as a violation of civil rights. Many Japanese-Americans fell into the first category, led by the Japanese-American Citizens League (JACL), an influential Japanese-American political organization. As an organization, the JACL believed in the integrity of the U.S. government, and thus encouraged the Japanese-American community to fully cooperate with the mass removal and incarceration. Some of the JACL leaders acted as informants for federal intelligence agencies and turned over the names of Japanese (both alien and U.S. citizens) who they felt were potentially subversive.

In this video clip, Toru S. recalls the Japanese-American Citizens League decision to encourage people of Japanese ancestry to comply with Executive Order 9066.

The Japanese-Americans who objected were relatively weaker in voice. One notable individual who argued against acceptance and cooperation was James Omura, a journalist based in San Francisco. He testified before Congress that, "I am strongly opposed to mass evacuation of American-born Japanese. It is my honest belief that such an action would not solve the question of Nisei loyalty."[5] Omura's opposition sprang from his sense of its injustice and of the ignoble motives behind Executive Order 9066. Omura and other Japanese-Americans who objected to the mass removal and incarceration also disagreed with the Japanese-Americans who accepted the order, creating a divide in the Japanese-American community itself.

Other Japanese-Americans expressed their objections to Executive Order 9066 by deliberately violating one or more of the orders. These violations were attempts to test the legality of the orders in the courts. Four notable Japanese-Americans had their cases taken to the Supreme Court. Minoru Yasui, an attorney from Portland, Oregon, violated a military curfew order which required that all persons of Japanese ancestry be indoors between 8 p.m. And 6 a.m. Gordon Hirabayashi, a student at the University of Washington, challenged the orders by refusing to register himself with federal authorities. Fred Korematsu, a nisei welder from the Oakland, California area, was arrested for failing to report to Tanforan Assembly Center -- one of 16 temporary camps that detained Japanese-Americans before they were transferred to the incarceration camps. All three men were convicted for their violations and in each case, the Supreme Court upheld their convictions. The fourth legal case that tested the constitutionality of the mass removal and incarceration of Japanese-Americans was brought under the name of Mitsuye Endo, an employee at the California Department of Motor Vehicles. Endo's attorneys argued that it was illegal for the government to detain her without trial while martial law was not declared. Although the Supreme Court, on December 18, 1944, ruled unanimously that Mitsuye Endo should be given her liberty, it failed to address the larger constitutional issues underlying the case. Thus, although the Endo case resulted in a technical "victory" for Japanese-Americans, the legality of the incarceration remained unresolved.

Click on this photo to listen to Gordon Hirabayashi talk about his decision to refuse the curfew and exclusion orders.

Despite the anti-Japanese hysteria that existed on the West Coast, not all policymakers were persuaded of the need to incarcerate Japanese-Americans. Most of the debate regarding this issue existed between the military and the DOJ, the military being for incarceration and the DOJ being against it. Similarly, a debate existed within the Japanese-American community itself between those who accepted the orders and those who did not. In the end, however, the objections were overruled, and the mass removal and incarceration began.

1. Quoted in Brian Niiya, Japanese-American History (New York: Facts on File, 1993) p. 54.

2. Roger Daniels, Concentration Camps USA (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1972) p. 29.

3. Daniels, Concentration Camps USA, p. 65.

4. Daniels, Concentration Camps USA, pp. 70-71.

5. Hearings Before the Committee Investigating National Defense Migration, Part 29, February 21 and 23, 1942 (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1942) p. 11229.

Questions

The military first exercised its new authority on the residents of Terminal Island, California. The military considered this island, located 25 miles south of downtown Los Angeles, a "strategic" location. On February 26, 1942, the Japanese-American residents of Terminal Island were given 48 hours to leave. The Terminal Island population was temporarily placed in churches and community centers before being sent off to "assembly centers" and incarceration camps. The Terminal Island incident was simply a precursor of the impending mass exclusion of Japanese-Americans from the West Coast.

On March 2, 1942, Lieutenant General John L. DeWitt, commander of the Western Defense Command, issued Public Proclamation No. 1 which classified most of the West Coast states as Military Area No. 1. The proclamation called for the military to evict Japanese, German, and Italian aliens. However, DeWitt stated that German and Italian aliens would be evicted only after the removal of the Japanese evacuation. A program of voluntary exclusion was briefly attempted. It was ill defined and not successfully implemented. In the end, Japanese-Americans were the only U.S. citizens affected by the proclamation.

Mass Removal

By late March, the government decided that both a mandatory removal and incarceration were necessary, but could not be done simultaneously. The government also began looking for sites for both temporary "assembly centers" and permanent incarceration camps to facilitate the two-step exclusion process. The military controlled the process of removal and the construction of the "assembly centers" while the Wartime Civil Control Administration (WCCA), a civilian agency, oversaw the administration of the centers. Another civilian agency, the War Relocation Authority (WRA), coordinated the relocation of the Japanese-Americans after they left the military "assembly centers."

On March 24, the military began a full-scale removal when it issued its first exclusion order on Bainbridge Island, Washington. After Bainbridge, exclusion orders were sent to Japanese-Americans living in 98 other exclusion zones within Military Area No. 1. Japanese-Americans were given between seven and ten days to move out. (http://www.imdiversity.com/Article_Detail.asp?Article_ID=3228)

December 7 - After Japanese attack Pearl Harbor, Presidential Proclamation No. 2525 authorizes Attorney General (AG) to conduct a round-up of suspects, many of whom had been under surveillance prior to the bombing.

December 8 - Dept of Treasury seizes all Japanese bank accounts and business

December 9 - Many Japanese language schools closed

December 11 - FBI warns against possession of cameras or guns by suspected "enemy" aliens

December 27 - AG orders all suspected "enemy "aliens in Western U.S. To surrender short wave radios and cameras

December 30 - California revokes liquor license held by non-citizen people of Japanese ancestry.

January 1 - AG freezes travel by all suspected "enemy " aliens, orders surrender of weapons.

January 14 - President Roosevelt orders re-registration of suspected "enemy" aliens in West.

January 27 - Los Angeles City and County discharge all Japanese on civil service lists.

January 29 - AG Francis Biddle issues first of a series of orders establishing limited strategic areas along the West Coast and requiring the removal of all suspected "enemy" aliens from these areas.

January 31 - AG establishes 59 additional prohibited zones in California to be cleared by February 15.

February 4 - AG establishes curfew zones in California effective February 4.

February 14 - Lt. Genl. John DeWitt, Commanding General of the Western Defense Command (WDC), sends a memorandum to the Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson recommending the removal of "Japanese and other subversive persons" from the West Coast.

February 19 - FDR signs Executive Order No. 9066, authorizing Secretary of War or military commanders designated by Secretary to establish 'military areas' and exclude therefrom 'any or all persons'.

February 20 - Secretary Stimson designates Genl. DeWitt as military commander empowered to carry out an evacuation within his command under the terms of the EO 9066.

Evacuation Poster

March 2 - General DeWitt issues Proclamation No. 1, designating the Western half of the three West Coast states and the southern third of Arizona as military areas, and stipulating that all persons of Japanese descent would eventually be removed.

March 7 - Army acquire Owens Valley Site for Manzanar temporary detention center.

March 11 - Genl. DeWitt establishes the Wartime Civil Control Administration (WCCA), with Col. Karl R. Bendetsen as Director, to carry out the internment plan.

March 16 - WCCA establishes military area in Idaho, Montana, Utah and Nevada, designating 934 prohibited zone to be cleared.

March 18 - FDR signs EO 9102 creating the War Relocation Authority (WRA), with Milton S. Eisenhower as Director, to assist in evacuation of JAs by the military under EO 9066.

March 20 - WCCA acquires Santa Anita as a temporary detention center.

March 21 - FDR signs Public Law 503 (77th Congress) making it a federal offense to violate any order issued by a designated military commander under authority of EO 9066.