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White Supremacy Extremism Threat Assessment

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TERRORIST THREAT ASSESSMENT Terrorist Threat Assessment: White Supremacy In its September 2021 report to the House of Representatives Committee on Oversight and Reform, the FBI acknowledged that the greatest terrorism threat in the US is posed by small cells and lone actors who use easily accessible weapons to attack soft targets (FBI, 2021). The main manifestations...

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TERRORIST THREAT ASSESSMENT

Terrorist Threat Assessment: White Supremacy

In its September 2021 report to the House of Representative’s Committee on Oversight and Reform, the FBI acknowledged that the greatest terrorism threat in the US is posed by small cells and lone actors who use easily accessible weapons to attack soft targets (FBI, 2021). The main manifestations of these threats are Homegrown Violent Extremists (HVEs) and Domestic Violent Extremists (DVE) arising domestically (FBI, 2021). HVEs are influenced or inspired by foreign terrorist groups although they do not have direct links or receive individualized orders from these groups (FBI, 2021). Conversely, DVEs commit acts of terrorism to further certain political or social goals arising from domestic issues, such as anti-government sentiments and ethnic or racial bias (FBI, 2021).

DVEs who act in furtherance of ethnic or racial goals are referred to as RMVEs (Racially or Ethnically Motivated Violent Extremists) (FBI, 2021). According to the FBI, RMVEs advocating for white superiority accounted for a majority of DVE-perpetrated lethal attacks in 2018 and 2019 (FBI, 2021). This text analyzes the threat posed by violent white supremacists in the US given their recent trends. It looks at their history, common tactics, and violent activity today to assess the threat they pose and make policy recommendations to police administrators, managers, investigators, and patrol officers. The intelligence used in generating the report was gathered through a review of relevant reports from the FBI, Department of Homeland Security (DHS), as well as committees of both Congress and the House of Representatives. The report begins with a brief background of the problem and reported issues.

A Brief Background of the Problem

The FBI acknowledges that violent white supremacists pose the greatest threat in domestic extremism against civilians in the US (FBI, 2021). In June 2015, Dylan Roof, a white supremacist, entered a church in Charleston, North Carolina, and slaughtered nine African-Americans attending a worship service (US Congress Report, 2020). In 2017, neo-Nazis in a riot in Charlottesville, Virginia, wounded a number of civilians and killed a counter-rioter, Heyer Heather, in a terrible automobile incident (US Congress Report, 2020). In another incident, a white Supremacist affiliated to the neo-Nazis entered the Tree of Life Worship Centre in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, killing eleven parishioners and wounding six others (US congress Report, 2020). In one of the worst extremist attacks so far, a white supremacist furthering hate against immigrants entered a Walmart store in El Paso, Texas, and shot indiscriminately at shoppers, leaving 23 dead and 23 others seriously injured (US Congress Report, 2020). These are only isolated incidents that have made news headlines in recent years. However, according to the Anti-Defamation League (ADL), RMVEs perpetrated 98 extremist incidents between 2011 and 2020, 40 of which were perpetrated by white supremacists alone (Byman & Pitcavage, 2021).

The ADL’s 2020 Report on Murder and Extremism found that 53 percent of the 17 murders related to extremist violence in the US in 2020 were perpetrated by white supremacists (ADL, 2020). White supremacists accounted for 81 percent of the 42 reported extremist-related killings in 2019, and 58 percent of the 430 terrorism-related killings between 2008 and 2018 (ADL, 2020).

In October 2020, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) described white supremacy extremists as a lethal and persistent threat, particularly with current trends that have seen it network with like-minded persons outside the US (Byman & Pitcavage, 2021). In the same year, the FBI elevated extremism linked to racial or ethnic bias, including white supremacy, to the same level of national threat as the Islamic State (IS) (Byman & Pitcavage, 2021). Unfortunately, racial extremism threatens the security of Americans and takes an emotional and physical toll on the affected communities.

White Supremacists’ Ideology, Goals, Methods, and Tactics

The Goal(s)

The goal of the White Supremacists is to ensure that the white man maintains his elevated status amidst increasing interracial relationships and immigration rates (Mulligan et al., 2021). The movement is founded on the ‘white genocide’ theory, which argues that the changing demographics resulting from immigration pose a threat to the white race (Mullian et al., 2021). For this reason, the group targets immigrants of color and justifies the use of war to protect the superiority of the white race from its enemies (Smith, 2019). The movement includes neo-Nazis, white nationalists, and those who subscribe to anti-Semitic, anti-Muslim, and anti-immigrant beliefs (Mulligan et al., 2021).

The Motivations

White Supremacists are motivated by racial and ethnic biases and their activities are pegged on the logics of slavery and genocide (Smith, 2019). The logic of slavery, one of the pillars of White Supremacy, equates blackness with slaveability (Smith, 2019). It commodifies black people as slaves or property and argues that the white man is justified to treat the black man as they do any other property, including making gains from their labor and selling them off at the marketplace (Smith, 2019). The genocide pillar argues that indigenous people need to disappear so that the non-natives can control the resources, culture, and land originally controlled by the natives (Smith, 2019). The genocide pillar justifies the psychological and physical removal of indigenous people to ensure they vanish completely and cannot reclaim their resources (Smith, 2019). Based on the genocide pillar, non-natives feel that they can rightfully eliminate indigenous people and take full control of their resources (Smith, 2019).

The Methods

White Supremacists use several methods to further their violence. They use social spaces, websites, and internet-based platforms to organize, recruit new members, and advance their narratives (Mulligan et al., 2021). A report by the Tech Transparency Project (as cited in Mulligan et al., 2021) found that White supremacists use social media platforms to amplify messages of hate and direct users to more extreme forums, channels, and content. For instance, hours before he was accosted by the FBI in 2020, Timothy Wilson, a white supremacist, had posted anti-Semitic messages on a white supremacist social group in the Telegram messaging app, expressing his plan to attack a school, synagogue, mosque, or hospital with large numbers of blacks (Perrigo, 2020). Further, the group was found to use the internet to reach out to, and engage with groups with shared grievances around governance, such as QAnon communities (Perrigo, 2020).

White supremacists also use in-person forums to plan attacks, organize, and conduct training for recruits (Mulligan et al., 2021). According to the American Progress, the use of in-person meetings has helped the organization thrive unnoticed as most law-enforcement efforts focus on online platforms (Mulligan et al., 2021). Reports indicate that Michigan governor, Whitmer’s kidnapping in 2020 was planned at a white supremacist in-person informal meeting in Dublin, Ohio (Mulligan et al., 2021). It is thus important for more research to “understand the relationship between online and in-person engagement and mobilization, especially as it pertains to white supremacist violence” (Mulligan et al., 2021, n.pag).

White supremacist attacks primarily involve small cells or lone perpetrators who mainly use firearms (Mulligan et al., 2021). Data from the National Crime Victimization Survey found that 72 percent of killings by domestic terrorists over the past decade involved the use of guns (Mulligan et al., 2021). Domestic extremists prefer to use firearms due to their ease of use and availability. The attacks in Charleston, Charlottesville, Pittsburgh, and El Paso all involved the use of firearms (Mulligan et al., 2021). Gun-related legislation prohibit ex-offenders convicted of felonies from purchasing firearms, but allows those accused of misdemeanors (Mulligan et al., 2021). Further, those prohibited from purchasing firearms could still purchase the same from unlicensed sellers, in which case they avoid background checks (Mulligan et al., 2021). Reports also indicate that a majority of white supremacists purchase 80 percent or unfinished receivers, which they then finish into unmarked and untraceable guns (Mullingan et al., 2021).

Targets

White supremacists mainly target racial and ethnic minorities, including Hispanic and Black populations (Mulligan et al., 2021). In recent years, the movement has increasingly targeted Americans of Asian origin, as well as religious minorities, including Sikh, Muslim, and Jewish communities (Mulligan et al., 2021). Reports point to a significant surge in anti-Semitic incidents since 2019 (Mulligan et al., 2021).

Funding

A 2017 report by the ADL titled ‘Funding Hate’ expresses that white supremacists mostly fund their own activities, including travel costs, weaponry, tattooing, purchase of paraphernalia, and clothing (ADL, 2017). As most of them are not economically-advantaged, organizations generate very little from this kind of self-funding (ADL, 2017). The groups also obtain funding from economically-advantaged benefactors. Key funders include Ben Klassen, one of the founders of the Church of the Creator white supremacist group, and William Regnery II, founder of the Charles Martel Society, which publishes white supremacy materials (ADL, 2017). White supremacy organizations also raise parts of their funds from annual member subscriptions, dues and donations, selling merchandise, including clothes and paraphernalia, and fees from events such as conferences and power music concerts (ADL, 2017).

Generally, these sources raise limited funds and the groups are not established or stable enough to command their members to pay their $50 annual fees since members can easily leave for other formal organizations (ADL, 2017). Resource limitations imply that white supremacists cannot obtain military-style and other sophisticated weaponry or offer the kind of training offered by established extremist organizations (Byman & Pitcavage, 2021). White supremacist resources have not matched their level of intent in the past, and therefore, the groups are often unable to launch sophisticated attacks (Byman & Pitcavage, 2021).

Collaborations

Reports by the FBI have shown heavy engagement between white supremacy groups and QAnon communities, which furthered anti-government views around mask mandates at the height of the Covid19 pandemic (Mulligan et al., 2021). The US Intelligence community has also noted collaborations between white supremacists in the US and extremists in foreign countries (Mulligan et al., 2021). For instance, founders of the Daily Stormer and The Base neo-Nazi group, both of which are white supremacist extremist organizations operating from Russia, have collaborated with domestic white supremacists to launch attacks in the US (Mulligan et al., 2021). The FBI has also established incidents of US-based white supremacists undergoing training from Ukraine (Mulligan et al., 2021). According to Mulligan et al. (2021), these are mostly avenues that foreign actors pursue to perpetrate violence in the US.

A Brief History of Movements, Activities, and Trends

As a result of resource limitations, most white supremacy extremism is committed by lone actors acting individually rather than as groups (Byman & Pitcavage, 2021). Moreover, white supremacists often lack access to sophisticated weaponry, and mostly carry out their attacks using easily available non-automatic firearms (Byman & Pitcavage, 2021). Further, white supremacy extremism lacks public support as well as support from within the organization (Byman & Pitcavage, 2021). For instance, some white supremacists blamed Roof in the wake of the Charleston attack in 2015, arguing that the timing was bad and the attack would attract a crackdown on the movement by the authorities (Byman & Pitcavage, 2021). In an online document that Roof typed just before the attack, he claimed that most white supremacists were doing nothing but talking, pointing to internal divisions that continue to limit the movement’s effectiveness (Byman & Pitcavage, 2021).

To increase their financial base, white supremacist organizations are increasingly moving towards soliciting funds using cryptocurrency, which is harder for law-enforcement to track, and crowdfunding, which capitalizes on social media platforms (ADL, 2017). In crowdfunding, the group uses dedicated internet platforms such as Kick Starter, Indiegogo, FundRazer, Patreon, and GoFundMe to solicit funds for specific projects from a wider base of funders (ADL, 2017). In one case of crowdfunding on Indiegogo, Kyle Hunt, a white supremacist, organized a funds drive to solicit funds for producing banners for the planned countrywide march of white men in 2014 (ADL, 2017). With only about 50 benefactors contributing, Kyle raised $3,500 for the campaign, which was way above his $2,000 target (ADL, 2017).

Another significant trend in white supremacist activities and tactics is the recruitment and infiltration of military, veteran, and law-enforcement communities (Mulligan et al., 2021). Experts view this as an attempt by white supremacists to enhance their movement’s credibility (Mulligan et al., 2021; Congress Report, 2020). According to Mulligan et al. (2021), shortfalls in screening procedures and lack of training on white supremacy ideology make service men vulnerable to recruitment (Mulligan et al., 2021). Veterans are even more susceptible due to post-military life identity loss, “loss of social support, and the appeal of ideologies that address personal grievances” (Mulligan et al., 2021, n.pag). According to Mulligan et al. (2021), veterans made up over 15 percent of the attackers during the 2021 Capitol attack. The involvement of law-enforcement officers in racial discourse has also presented a gap that white supremacists have sought to exploit. According to a 2019 report, over 100 police stations in 49 states have experienced scandals since 2009 after officers sent racist comments, texts, or emails via internet platforms (Mulligan et al., 2021).

Analysis and Justification of Threat Posed by White Supremacists

White supremacists continue to pose the primary terrorism threat to civilians in the US despite their limited resources and low public support. White supremacists carry out most of their recruitment online via social media platforms. Unfortunately, statistics point to a rapid growth in the membership of social media groups and Telegram channels run by white supremacists (Perrigo, 2020). For instance, in March 2020 alone, membership in Telegram channels by white supremacists grew by 6,000 users (Perrigo, 2020). One channel used by the supremacists to spread messages about the spread of Covid19 grew its user base by 800 percent, from 300 to 2,700 in March 2020 alone (Perrigo, 2020).

The lethality of white supremacists grew significantly during the Trump administration, with the government often accused of failing to condemn white supremacy and campaigning against allocating more resources to curb the threat they posed (Mulligan et al., 2021). Despite the change in administration, this text projects an increase in the lethality and threat level of white supremacy extremists as shown by the growing public support. In 2020, two Congressional representatives affiliated to the QAnon community were elected, an indicator that fringe ideas have diffused the mainstream (Mulligan et al., 2021). This, coupled with the increased funding through cryptocurrency and crowdfunding, threaten to enhance the diffusion of white supremacy ideas and finance more sophisticated training and attacks in future (Mulligan et al., 2021).

Forecasted Issues for Police Administrators/Managers

One of the primary issues threatening police administrators or managers is the increased infiltration of white supremacy ideologies in law-enforcement communities, veterans, and military service men (Mulligan et al., 2021). The involvement of service men, law-enforcement agents, and veterans is a strategy for white supremacists to enhance their credibility and effectiveness. Reports have shown that the infiltration is enhanced by lack of oversight and accountability for officers who engage in racial discourse both on the job and in online forums (Mulligan et al., 2021). Further, sources indicate that service men, veterans, and law-enforcement agents often lack the requisite training to identify radicalization, which makes them susceptible to recruitment by white supremacists (Mulligan et al., 2021). This text projects an increase in the rates of white supremacy infiltration into military and law-enforcement communities over the coming years given the growing public support for white supremacy ideology.

To address this, police administrators and managers need to enhance their oversight and accountability systems for officers with white supremacy affiliations (Mulligan et al., 2021). This could involve developing a set of widely-accepted policies and conduct standards that address racist behaviour online and on-the-job. Such policies will make it easier for administrators to hold accountable officers engaging in racial discourse or those affiliated with white supremacy groups. Moreover, such policies could be designed to include best practices that prevent white supremacists from serving as law-enforcement officers. It may also be beneficial for administrators to offer support and training to help officers identify radicalization, counter it, and report any recruitment and mobilization attempts for effective action.

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