War and Occupation: The Effects of the U.S. Occupation on Japan's Government and Politics
The recent change in the American foreign policy direction which has seen the replacement of its traditional anti-colonialist tilt by the neo-conservative belief of guided nation building evokes a lot of interest in the history of United State's occupation of post world war II Japan. Although each such occupation is different -- the political, social and cultural environment as well as the historical context of every war and country being different-- it is interesting to study how the Americans handled the re-building of Japan in the post-World War II period.
There is no doubt that the United State government's influence in shaping the future of Japan was overwhelming. In fact it would not be wrong to state that Japan's current political and economic status as a first world power is a direct result of the guiding philosophy developed by the Post Dam Declaration and further defined by the United States Government. In the aftermath of the War, the Supreme Commander for Allied Powers (SCAP) became responsible to carry out these policies and directives. The Allied Council and Far Eastern Commission had a formal but token involvement in the reconstruction of post war Japan. This was essentially an American undertaking. The reconstruction of Japan was accomplished by SCAP relying on the existing Japanese government and its agencies, especially the bureaucracy, to implement its policies. In this paper we shall examine how far the U.S. was responsible in changing the course of Japan's political and social direction and whether the lessons learnt from Japan's post war occupation and nation building are applicable in the present day scenario.
The Potsdam Declaration provided the initial theme and direction of the post Word War Japan. Although less tough and vindictive than the JC 1067 imposed on the defeated Nazi Germany it described how stern justice, reparations, and demilitarization were necessary for democratization of Japan. (Jennings, p.16) Stalin himself agreed at the Potsdam Conference that the American Supreme Commander should act as the sole executive authority for the Allies in Japan. (Bell, pp.199-200) General MacCarthur, therefore, had the fullest authority in post war Japan and was the dictator of Japan, except in name. At times, the United States was out voted in the Allied Council but simply ignored the Council and proceeded to do as he pleased. Other policies that further defined Japan's future direction were the "U.S. Initial Post-Surrender Policy Relating to Japan" and the classified "JCS1380/15. " The "Post Surrender Policy" gave MacCarthur authority over the media, the educational and social policy designed to politically re-orient the country, and the classified "JCS1380/15" specified the avoidance of a policy of collective punishment. MacCarthur used his authority effectively to drive a "wedge" between the militarists on one side and the public and the emperor on the other. (Dower, Embracing Defeat)
Demilitarization and Democratization
Demilitarization" and "Democratization" of Japan were the two key aims of General MacCarthur from the start of the U.S. occupation. This was not an easy task since the direction meant a complete reversal of the hitherto social, political, and cultural direction of Japan. The U.S. not only believed that "the country should not only be 'democratized' to prevent the reemergence of militarism, but simultaneously immunized against a rising tide of communist influence" (Dower, 75). The task could not have been achieved without the free hand and backing given to MacCarthur by the U.S. government and President Truman himself. The fact that MacCarthur's effort was successful to a large extent is all the more remarkable since there was no massive economic aid package for Japan as the massive "Marshall Plan" worked out for the reconstruction of Europe. This is despite the fact that Japan had been just as extensively "fire-bombed" as Germany during the Second World War and had suffered widespread "collateral damage." The only saving grace in case of Japan (and which MacCarthur was able to put to effective use in the re-building process) was that the country's bureaucracy had largely survived the war. In many areas of the Japanese administration after the war there were signs of continuity. For example, the Ministry of International Trade and Industry formed in 1949 to direct Japan's economic development took over elements from the earlier Ministry of Commerce and even wartime Munitions Ministry. (Bell, p. 2000) The continuity in administration was made possible by the American decision to avoid the application of "collective guilt" for the war (and therefore collective punishment) in Japan. Nevertheless, well-known militarists and wartime collaborators were purged from their posts. These numbered more than 210,000...
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