Reservoir Refugees and the Three

Reservoir Refugees and the Three

Gorges Dam Project

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Reservoir Refugees and the Three Gorges Dam Project

The Three Gorges Dam on the Yangtze River is the largest project of its kind undertaken in the history of the world. It has also been the costliest in more ways than just the amount of money spent to build it (approx. 80 billion U.S.). The dam can generate 18,000 megawatts of electricity. The intent of former premier Li Peng, the driving force behind the dam in the early 1990s, was to rebuild his own political legacy after the disastrous events at Tiananmen Square in 1989. He claimed the dam would "inspire people but also demonstrate the greatness of the achievement of China's development" (Thai News Service, 2009).

Socio-Economic Impacts

But it is the other costs we will discuss. While building the dam, 1,350 villages were submerged out of existence and 1.3 million people were displaced. Damming the river has changed the ecology of the Yangtze River to such a significant degree that certain types of sturgeon and dolphin are now virtually extinct. Commercial fisheries, not only on the Yangtze, but also in the East China Sea have declined considerably. Fresh water supplies have been polluted. And there has been an increased risk from both landslides and earthquakes (Thai News Service, 2009).

Resettlement Issues

Other estimates of the numbers of people needing to be resettled push the 1.3 million number up to between 1.6 million and 1.9 million. This number is evenly split between urban and rural residents, so that new farmland and urban jobs are both significant issues to resettlement (HRIC, n.d., p. 2).

The first shovelful of dirt was lifted in 1994, and, almost immediately, problems with resettlement became apparent. Though official government sources kept insisting that things were going smoothly, they were not. Mismanagement, corruption, inadequate compensation, and shortages of farmland and urban jobs were a few of the most significant issues.

On the part of the residents being resettled, there was, as might be expected, resentment and procrastination in fighting the resettlement. This was no small issue, but rather, widespread, and it portended a crisis of major proportions as the project continued (HRIC, n.d.).

Additionally, there seems to have been a severe repression of those who had the audacity to complain about the problems including being swindled and mistreated after being moved to inadequate locations with barren hillsides, poor soil for farming and less than satisfactory water supplies.

The problems of resettlement had become so pervasive that, in mid-2006, the Chinese government announced a program to subsidize resettled farmers 600-yuan ($74 U.S.) for 20 years.

It was hoped this would put a lid on the ever-bubbling discontent. Each farmer who moved prior to July 1, 2006 received the supplement. For those still in the process of moving at the time, the subsidy began after resettlement (Haggart & Lan, 2006).

Journalist Dai Qing, a long-standing vocal critic of the Three Gorges Dam, says, "In my view, the new subsidy will discourage people affected by dams from coming forward to voice their problems and to vehemently defend their rights" (Haggart & Lan, 2006), suggesting that the Chinese government is buying silence.

This history of problems with the Chinese government resettling its population for water projects is nothing new. Since the late 1940s, approximately ten million people have been moved often resulting in significant confrontation between those moved and those moving them.

And, in a 1998 investigation conducted by a noted Chinese sociologist with broad experience researching and studying water project resettlements, several additional problems and potential issues with the Three Gorges Dam were noted regarding resettlement issues. These included systematic corruption and misuse of resettlement funds such that significant amounts of subsidy Yuan did not reach resettled people, as well as discrimination against rural residents with the allocation of the resources. There was also found to be a failure of coordinated and satisfactory efforts to ensure information was given to migrant families, and almost no consultation with the populations to be resettled (Three Gorges Dam - the human cost, n.d.). The list of these issues is extensive.

The Chinese government even went to the extent of pointing to "model resettlers" (yimin dianxin), who received preferential treatment, unknown to the general public, and who were presented to the press and visiting dignitaries as typical examples of happy, satisfied resettled families. Some had even opened small shops along with enjoying their new homes, well-paid jobs and adequate compensation. However, each model resettler cost the central government almost four times the amount available for the average relocation of a household, and one wonders what will happen to future resettlers since the total amount for resettling is fixed with millions yet to be resettled (HRIC, n.d., p.3).

And, in just one more example of the drastic attempts to deceive, when Premier Li Peng visited a town that was about to be resettled, many of the residents were upset over the lack of adequate compensation offered and had even organized petition drives with demands for more money. While Li Peng was in the local area, these residents were banned from attending a meeting with the Premier and "substitutes" were brought in to pretend to be satisfied resettlers (HRIC, n.d., p.3).

In early 2007 the government announced a further resettlement plan for some of the farmers previously resettled in a further attempt to quiet the discord, "cure poverty, unemployment and environmental hazards in the area" (Reuters, 2009). The plan did include a statement on the central government's website that acknowledged previous plans had "fallen short" and left some of the displaced residents jobless and "exposed to dangerous geological jolts."

"Problems left over from migration and resettlement must be dealt with in detail, helping migrants to solve the real hardships and problems in their work and lives," the statement goes on to say, " and building a harmonious and stable dam area" (Reuters, 2009).

This was a surprisingly complete refutation of their earlier 2007 statements (above) but was couched in ecological terms, suggesting that some portion of the migrants were being removed to solve erosion and pollution issues. The statement did not address the enormous costs involved in the "re-resettlement."

Human Rights

But the "socio" in "socio-economic" impacts also includes the human rights issues. And, as has been pointed out, violations in this area are rampant. According to Human Rights Watch (1995), any and all opposition to the Three Gorges Dam has been dealt with in the form of firing government officials to arresting activists and demonstrators. In some cases, China's vile penal labor camps have been brought into the equation and raise even more serious concerns.

And, since information to the public is minimal and distorted, it is assumed that the failure of the resettlement program will be significant. This assumption is based on what little data is known and from the failed history of the Chinese government in resettling the population from previous construction projects. In these previous attempts, compensation has been known to be minimal, and, in some cases, absent completely. People from these previous resettlements have ended up in "refugee camp" environments -- far less than the government promises with their talk about happy, satisfied, settled lives and prosperous new beginnings (Hsu, n.d.).

Economic Issues

"In western China, the one-sided pursuit of economic benefits from hydropower has come at the expense of relocated people, the environment, and the land and its cultural heritage," says Fan Xiao, a Sichuan Province geologist and critic of the Three Gorges project (Yardley, 2007). Dams in China are popular and they are part of big business and a booming economy. Profit-seeking is one of the major reasons that so many dams exist and that there is such a tremendous push behind hydropower. Though it has much to do with self-sufficient energy from a national perspective, there is no question that the big utility companies that build the dams are saturated with both government and private investment money (Yardley, 2007, p.3).

Three Gorges Dam is only the center point of a unified system of up to a dozen large dams on the Yangtze River. Central Chinese officials indicate that more than 100 hydropower stations could be built within the next 20 years. Thirteen more dams are planned along the Nu River, as well as many more along other tributaries.

One of the economic considerations is that, as with Three Gorges, development of hydropower does not necessarily make social and economic conditions better. In a report written by Chinese scientists, it states that though the dams are as modern as any in Europe, "the residents will become as poor as people in Africa" (Yardley, 2007. P.4).

Fifty-six square miles of China's best agricultural land has been drowned. In order to compensate for this loss of production, farmers in other areas have to increase output from already depleted and overused land. This means the population will probably face food shortages. And towns where millions of resettled villagers and farmers have been located have no choice but to accept already overcrowded conditions, and job and housing shortages.

Because of the many dams, those farmlands located close to the estuary will be rendered useless due to the lower than usual flow of the river. This will occur because salt water will intrude during dry seasons, ruining the land for growing crops (Hsu, n.d.).

Sedimentation will affect fisheries downstream from Three Gorges Dam, while the reservoir behind the dam will affect those in the middle stretches of the Yangtze by slowing the flow of water. This changes the fish habitats and results in a drop in fishing productivity. The dam will also trap 75% of the nutrient-rich sediments which are usually used as fertilizer for fisheries and agriculture resulting in additional losses to fishing and agricultural production.

Even tourism will be affected, at least for this local area. Extremely rich in scenery, and with many archaeological sites, it is estimated that numerous temples, historical sites and evidence of human habitation dating back to the Paleolithic Age, along with 800 cultural relic sites, will all be submerged and lost. The negative impact to local tourism and the resultant income that local residents might gain from it, is significant (Hsu, n.d.).

Numerous factories will also be lost. No one can really state how significant the loss will be to China's economic growth -- perhaps minimal and perhaps not. Relocation of those factories would be very costly to the government. And the many coal and metal mines located in the area of the reservoir, and worth millions of dollars will be submerged along with numerous transportation avenues such as highways and roadways. All of this would have to be rebuilt if the factories are relocated.

Finally, though profit-making is one of the stated reasons for the push for hydropower in China, the total benefits from Three Gorges Dam, at $80 billion dollars (U.S.), will not compensate for the costs of construction for a very long time. Economic sustainability, at this huge cost, cannot be maintained. The profit is out of the project (Min, n.d.).

Man-Made Disaster?

According to the sources read to pursue the research for this paper, two types of man-made disaster are of major concern to all but the central Chinese government officials -- dam safety and disregard for human rights.

A man-made disaster is generally defined as any event, except enemy action, resulting from man-made causes, that threatens or damages property, causes human suffering or results in loss of life. Negligence is often thought of as a necessary part of this definition, but that negligence may be either intentional or just plain human stupidity, to put it bluntly. In the case of Three Gorges Dam, it appears to be both.

Qing, et al., (1998) point out in their book that, though meticulously planned technically, the potential disaster of Three Gorges is caused by a conscious failure of China's leaders to "control" their behavior (Qing, Williams, International, & Network, 1998). Their failure to understand key Chinese concepts such as self-restraint and the control of "brazen arrogance" could lead to disaster. What they have not considered is that they will not be able to control the dam's effects on the environment and on society as we have pointed out already in our discussion of the social and economic impacts of the project.

It is true that most of what the authors predicted in the mid-to-late nineties has come true regarding the impacts of the dam. The Chinese leadership lost sight of a fundamental Chinese philosophy of balance, between humankind and nature. "Each decision made has caused significant damage to the country's environment and natural resources" (Qing et al., 1998, p. 10).

In May, 2008, a massive 7.9 earthquake in Sichuan province caused 70,000 deaths and left five million Chinese homeless. Today, Chinese scientists say that pressure from the Zipingku Dam reservoir, weighing on geologic fault lines, may have helped trigger that quake. Human activity, the scientists say, played a role in that disaster. The dam was built 550 yards from the fault line and was cracked to such an extent that the reservoir behind the dam is being drained.

Scientists and geologists claim the quake would have occurred with or without the dam, but that the 315 million pounds of pressure from the water in the reservoir "likely" affected the timing and magnitude of the quake, and, according to one of the chief engineers, "created a more violent quake" (Associated Press, 2009).

The Three Gorges Dam is situated near six active fault lines and above 15 million people. A dam burst at Three Gorges would, says engineer Philip Williams, president of the San Francisco-based International Rivers Network, "rank as one of history's worst man-made disasters." An international team of engineers, who assessed Three Gorges said, "the chosen approach to the design and implementation of the coffer dam appears to us to indicate a surprisingly cavalier attitude to risk." According to the team of engineers, major cracks have developed in the dam, and even after extensive repairs, the cracks have reappeared (The Three Gorges Dam: Part IV, will it work?, 2003). Farmers living near the dam's reservoir speak of tremors only since the dam was completed, that have left their homes with cracks in the walls. A landslide in Badong County in Hubei Province, along the reservoir, killed more than 30 people, buried alive in a bus.

Though experts and engineers hurried to check the safety of the Three Gorges Dam after the massive quake that cracked Zipingku Dam and found it safe, in light of all this data, was it enough? Perhaps our discussion about Chinese leadership's arrogance and ignorance of Chinese beliefs about the balance of nature and humanity comes into play here. Why not check the safety of the dam and other environmental issues for the local region before Three Gorges was built. That action did not seem to have the same urgency for a country rushing as fast as it can towards economic development with no thought to much else.

Displacing Millions More

While resettling the original number of approximately 1.3 million inhabitants has led to unbelievable hardships on the population, it is the announcement that perhaps four million more citizens of China will have to be relocated that also places humankind into the category of victim of a potential "man-made disaster."

Over the next 10 to 15 years, these additional millions will be removed from northeast and southwest Chongqing and resettled in the outlying areas of Chongqing city. Chinese government officials insist, for whatever reason, that these relocations are not related to the dam, but rather "a part of a national experiment in economic reform." The main concern seems to be the ecological and geological impact of overpopulation along the reservoir's edge (Gleick, 2007). "Environmental capacity" was eventually given as the direct cause of the additional displacements. Erosion and water pollution seem to be the main issues caused by felling trees to create farmland which allows additional silt into the river already burdened with it. And water pollution is due to the industrial and residential dumping of waste water into the Yangtze. It seems that geologists and scientists believe that when the river flow slows, the reservoir will essentially become a giant cesspool. (Heggelund, 2004, p.86) That cesspool of raw sewage and industrial chemicals will back into Chongqing -- where many of those displaced from their homes along the reservoir have been resettled (Reuters 2, 2007).

It is already known that the majority of those who have been resettled of the original 1.5 million or so ended up poorer, with less food supplies, fewer and lower paying jobs, and some even landless as well as socially marginalized, experts fear the results. To add to the problems, farmland and jobs were taken from those already living in the resettled area which causes conflict. Women are the most severely impacted by these issues and are the most likely to become impoverished (Gleick, 2007).

It is now known that thousands of displaced citizens displaced from the Three Gorges Dam reservoir area have now migrated back because of the lack of jobs, food, and compensation in their newly resettled areas.

Needless to say, the potential for a "man-made human disaster" in China, is enormous and, probably, already in progress. But, unlike deaths from an earthquake, tsunami, or other violent natural occurrence, the general public may never hear of the enormity of the disaster. Citizens of a country will be forced from their homes and lands. Many will perish, others will spend a gypsy-like life wandering in an attempt to find jobs and food. Children will go hungry and without schooling. And, eventually, the significance of it will quietly fade away.

Public Health Issues

Involuntary relocation is an incredibly stressful situation. It causes people to make very painful decisions, sacrifices, and adjustments that often lead to both mental and physical health problems that can be very serious. The feeling of helplessness leading to depression is often associated with such a situation particularly, as in the case of Three Gorges, where the relocation causes even more stress due to lack of money, loss of job, less availability of food for one's family, etc. An individual's or family's social network is broken up and, therefore, is not available to provide much needed support. In many cases, those affected may just give up and illness or even death can be a result. This is the case with many of the relocated from Three Gorges Dam.

In a short-term study, Hwang, et al. (2007), studied the social, economic, mental and physical health impact of the Three Gorges relocation. Their analysis was based on two interviews, spaced three years apart, and began with approximately 975 migrants and over 500 non-migrants from five randomly selected towns. In the later of the two interviews, in 2006, they tracked down and actually interviewed 1070 people. They controlled the influence of non-migratory health problems by including a sample of non-migrants located in the same area (Hwang, Cao, & Xi, 2007).

They found "overwhelming" evidence that the level of mental distress increased significantly among migrants that could definitely be attributed to forced migration. Migrants showed a significantly larger increase in problems such as insomnia, loss of appetite, loneliness, crying spells, and feeling unhappy. Levels of depression were also markedly increased over non-migrants.

Regarding physical health, the researchers found that migrants showed a significant decline in health vs. non-migrants. Most had seen a doctor more often and more recently. Of all the areas studied by this group of researchers, the decline in mental and physical health was the most overwhelming (Hwang, Cao, & Xi, 2007).

In another area, there exists a large amount of data concerning the relationship between hydro-projects and human health. It is known that the construction of dams can have many, and significant, consequences. As an example, schistosomiasis, a waterborne parasitic disease, impacts about 200 million people in 74 countries. Dams change the habitat for snails, which serve as hosts for the parasite. Why is any of this important?

First, because, downstream from Three Gorges Dam there exists the largest endemic transmission areas for schistosomiasis in China: Dongting and Poyang Lakes (Seto, et al., 2008).

And, second, according to most health experts, because the disease can cause serious problems such as bladder cancer, kidney failure, seizures, liver and spleen enlargement along with lymph node enlargement, fever and chills, and can, eventually, infect the brain.

Chinese medical personnel are carefully monitoring the situation at Three Gorges Dam.

Environmental Impact of Three Gorges

It is reported that, for over 30 years, the Chinese government would not listen to warnings from both scientists and environmentalists that Three Gorges Dam had the potential of becoming one of China's biggest environmental nightmares (Hvistendahl, 2008). It was late 2007 when they finally accepted the possibility.

Just the filling of the reservoir caused unforeseen problems. The change in water pressures on the bottom and sides disturbs the land; and the draining and filling to accommodate flood waters exacerbates the conditions that cause landslides along the reservoir, which have occurred too frequently, both killing, and displacing residents.

And, as we discussed before, since the dam sits near several earthquake fault lines, and on top of two of them, changing the water levels along with the sheer weight of the reservoir on top of them, can impact the intensity of an earthquake.

Surveys showed that the Three Gorges area registered over 800 tremors in a 7-month period after the reservoir level was increased. None caused severe damage, but the reservoir was only partially full at the time. However, the landslides continue and huge cracks appear running through residential areas. Residents, relocated due to the problems, are happy to get away from the awful possibilities -- until they arrive at their new, and usually unsatisfactory, location (Hvistendahl, 2008).

Believe it or not, the dam also seems to be affecting drought conditions in central and eastern China, in a negative direction. In early 2008, the Yangtze reached its lowest level in 142

years, which stranded ships in two provinces. The reason -- the dam reduced the flow volume of the river by 50%. In Shanghai, at the mouth of the Yangtze, water shortages are taking place, and the decreased flow of fresh water allows salt water from the East China Sea to infiltrate the river farther upstream. This increases the numbers of jelly fish, which compete with river fish for food, and eat their eggs and larvae, threatening fish populations that have already been depleted due to overfishing (Hvistendahl, 2008).

On a positive note, environmentally, Chinese officials say that that dam relieves the danger of flooding in the Chang Jing River Valley, which has been forever threatened. A flood, in 1954 killed 30,000 (Tillou & Honda, 1997). But, we have also noted the negative side of this (above). The dam has also reduced China's emissions of sulfur dioxide and carbon dioxide and has saved burning millions of tons of coal, and will supply two percent of China's total energy needs.

It will also improve navigation of and transportation on the Yangtze River, which does account for 80% of China's inland shipping. Larger ships, at times, will be able to travel the river. And a five-level set of locks will enable ships to pass through the dam. That is also expected to increase the possibilities of the city of Chongqing (mentioned previously) to undergo major economic development. It is expected to become China's fourth centrally-administered municipality with a population attainable, by 2020, of 21 million (Mt. Holyoke.edu, 2007).

Human Costs of Three Gorges

With all the problems at Three Gorges, and with the Chinese government's partial admissions over the past two years as to the extent of those problems, the worst-case scenario would be a repeat of Three Gorges experience. Stand-by for the worst case scenario. The leaders of China, though less enthusiastic than those who proposed and began to build the dams, will continue a massive hydropower building program over the next twenty or so years to place dozens of dams and hydro-electric stations along the Yangtze and other rivers in China.

As to the environmental and human impact of these dams, probably, not much will change despite the statements from the central government about environmental impact studies. New Chinese laws that require these studies are easily circumvented. The newest dam, Xiluodu, is being built in a national protection zone for several species of endangered fish (Yardley J. 2., 2007, p.4).

The human impact? Opposition to the dams is still overwhelmed with the use of force. When 100,000 protesters rallied at Pubugou dam, little was done to improve their compensation, which was one of the purposes of the demonstration. And in 2008, one of the protest leaders was executed for what officials "said" was his role in the death of a policeman. The dam is progressing nicely.

Multiply all the problems we have been discussing by the number of dams yet to be built, and one can easily begin to understand the massive negative impact on the Chinese people that surround these areas and what is in store for them. The landslides, steep unfarmable slopes, tremors from potential earthquakes, lack of any reasonable compensation except for those "model settlers," water pollution, failed relocations, the mental anxiety and depression caused by being torn from a local culture and friends, will go on and on in China, as we hear only of the great technological progress they are making towards reducing carbon emissions and breaking world records for constructing hydropower facilities. Oh yes, and like the Great Wall of China, officials remind us that the Three Gorges Dam is one of only a few structures in the world that can be seen from space!

Human impact?

"Around daybreak on June 22, 2007, Lu Youbing awoke to the screams of her brother-in-law and the sickening sensation of the earth collapsing. Her mountain farmhouse in Jianmin Village buckled as a landslide swept it downhill. In all,

20 homes were demolished. Five months later, Ms. Lu is living in a tent, fending off rats and wondering where her family can go.

"We have nothing left,' she said. 'Not a single thing.'

"Winter is approaching, and she is trying to block out cold air -- and rats -- by pinning down the tent flaps with rocks. Villagers have been told that more landslides are possible. Ms. Lu lives with her second husband and their two children. They are too poor to buy an apartment in the city or to build a new home on higher ground. Local officials gave them the tent. Villagers have donated clothes.

"The tents are pitched on the only available flat land -- a terrace with a monument celebrating efforts by local officials to improve the environment" (Yardley J. 2., 2007, p.5).

The irony of that last statement surpasses words.

What Was the Plan for Relocation? Challenges?

The "draft" resettlement plan for Three Gorges began in 1985, with the understanding among Chinese officials that "such plans could quite easily remain in 'draft' status while they are in fact carried out and the dam become a concrete and steel reality" (Fearnside, 1992). They referred to it as "resettlement with development," and called it "among the best in the world." As it would turn out, it wasn't. Past resettlements had been failures for the most part due to uncoordinated management, poor use of volunteers, limited funds, corruption, favoritism, and fraud. But this one would be better, said the Chinese leadership.

For instance, with the construction of the Danjiangkou Dam, funds were completely inadequate even for the development of infrastructure for the resettlement, including housing. Ten years later, in 1984, inadequate funding finally became available for those resettled.

The original idea at Three Gorges was to determine the magnitude of the resettlement by the height to which the area would be flooded by the reservoir. The higher the level, the more significant the impact and the higher the number of "reservoir refugees" there would be. The flooding of the city of Chongqing was also a consideration, as more of the city would flood upstream of the dam, the higher the level of the reservoir was raised. The decision was made at the time to endorse a 160 meter level for the reservoir and a flood control level of 140 meters. This inferred a dam height of 185 meters (Fearnside, 1992).