The future of Cuba

Cuba After Castro

Cuba is an island nation some 90 miles from Florida, and proximity alone gives this country great importance in the thinking of American leaders. More than this, however, Cuba represents a major loss in the Western Hemisphere, a country that is Communist-led and that has therefore been viewed as a major security threat to the United States. At times, that threat has been given even more weight, as it was during the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962. At other times, the threat has been less specific and often derives largely from antipathy to the leadership and to the very idea of Communism. In addition, Cuba holds a place of importance because of the many exiles from Cuba who have come to the United States and who have considerable influence over U.S. policy toward Cuba, and Cuban exile groups often fight any indication that the U.S. government might be softening toward the government of Fidel Castro on any issue whatsoever. Castro has been in power in Cuba since 1959 when he and his rebel army overthrew the Bautista government, an act that would become the primary reason for the exodus of many Cubans to America, notably to Florida. Many of these exiles have worked since to end the Castro regime, and it appears now that the era of Castro's leadership will end as a mater of course given that he is approaching the age of 80. More and more consideration will therefore be given to what will follow Castro, meaning what improve the lot of the Cuban people. Although the Communist government in Cuba has claimed success in reforming agrarian policies and in achieving a fairer and more equal society, observers dispute this, and there is considerable evidence that the government has failed, that the economy is weak and in disarray, and that the Cuban people are actually worse off now than they were before the ascension of the Castro regime in 1959. For many, the primary issue is whether Cuba after Castro will remain Communist or will shift to a free market economy, or at least some semblance of one, as many of the former states of the old Soviet Union have done. In a more specific sense, it is vital that the economy of Cuba be revived and that the people as a whole be able to make a living. Indeed, many of the political issues would probably be decided by an improved economy. An analysis of the background of Cuba and of the Castro regime leads to a consideration of what that regime has done in Cuba over the last four decades before considering what many experts see for Cuba in the future.

BACKGROUND

When Columbus arrived in the New World, Cuba had a native Amerindian population that began to decline after the European discovery of the island and following its development as a Spanish colony during the next several centuries. Large numbers of African slaves were brought to the island to work the coffee and sugar plantations. Havana became the starting point for the annual treasure fleets bound for Spain from Mexico and Peru. Spanish rule was maintained as a severe and exploitative form of control, with occasional rebellions from the native population that were harshly suppressed. Spanish rule continued until 1898 and U.S. intervention during the Spanish-American War, leading to the Treaty of Paris that established Cuban independence. Independence was in fact granted in 1902 after a three-year transition period. In 1959, Fidel Castro led a rebel army to victory, and it has been his iron rule that has held the regime together since then. Cuba's Communist revolution had Soviet support, with efforts to was export this idea throughout Latin America and Africa during the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, with mixed success. More recently, the country has been slowly recovering from the severe economic recession of 1990, which came after the withdrawal of former Soviet subsidies, worth $4 billion to $6 billion annually. Castro and his Cuban government portray the country's difficulties as the result of the U.S. embargo that has been in place since 1961 ("Cuba" para. 1).

The end of World War II led to the beginning of a different kind of war, the Cold War, an enduring ideological battle between the democratic West and the Soviet bloc. The United States emerged from the war as the strongest power in the world, and the Soviet Union intended to challenge that strength. There were signs of tension between the U.S. And the Soviet Union before the end of the war. The tensions increased after the war. There is disagreement on the precise beginning of the Cold War, but the Cold War is seen as deriving from the historic background of Soviet-American relations and from the specific events of 1945 through 1948. In fact, the alliance between the Soviets and Americans during the war was an aberration from the norm since the Russian Revolution. American hostility toward the Soviet Union began with American animosity toward communism. America also had an image of the Soviets as a government that had negotiated a separate peace with Germany in 1917, leaving the West to fight the war alone. Americans had also been unhappy with the many attacks on the American capitalist system, and such attacks were particularly unwelcome in the 1930s when capitalism was in trouble. The Stalinist purges of the 1930s were also remembered, as was the short-lived pact between Stalin and Hitler in 1939. Soviet hostility toward the United States also had deep roots. The Soviets remembered American opposition to the revolution in 1917. The U.S. had also sent troops into the Soviet Union at the end of World War I, and the Soviets believed this was to overthrow their system. Russia had been excluded from world affairs after World War I until World War II, and this was resented. The U.S. did not recognize the Soviet government diplomatically until 1933. Most Russians also deeply distrusted industrial capitalism. World War II seemed to bring the two together, but events in the war also more deeply separated them. Americans were hostile to the Soviet invasion of Finland and the Baltic states in 1939. There was also antipathy to reports of Soviet brutality. The Allies did not invade until two years after Stalin wanted, and the Russians suffered terrible casualties in the meantime (Ranelagh 34).

The generation that brought the United States into international espionage and covert action and that established the CIA was rising to power by 1941 and included Dean Acheson, secretary of state under Truman; Robert Lovett, lawyer, and banker who served as Truman's secretary of defense and later an adviser to Kennedy; James Forrestal, secretary of the navy under Roosevelt and secretary of defense under Truman; John Foster Dulles, lawyer and secretary of state to Eisenhower; Allen Dulles, a lawyer and the longest-serving director of the CIA; and Walter Bedell Smith, chief of staff to Eisenhower during World War II, ambassador to the Soviet Union, third director of the CIA, and later undersecretary of state. All these men had experienced the excitement and hopes of World War I. From their experience in the years between the two world wars, they developed three strong convictions that would be the basis for their policies once they came to power. The first was that in 1919 the U.S. had been outsmarted by the British and the French in the postwar settlement and had reacted by withdrawing to its continental boundaries; they were determined that this would not happen again. The second was related to the events of Munich in 1938 when Hitler was let loose by the tired, dispirited, cynical politicians of the old empires, after which the aggressor gained step after step with little opposition. The third conviction was that democracy was a viable governing alternative, and the idea that the people could get together and make deals based on idealism and pragmatism appealed to them on a number of different levels. These were the convictions that supported the attitudes and activities of the governing elite from 1941 until the late 1970s (Ranelagh 34-35).

The surprise attack on Pearl Harbor was another impetus for the creation of an intelligence agency. Many facts were known at the time to the U.S. government, and had those facts been collected in one place and properly analyzed, the "surprise" might not have been a surprise at all:

If such an intelligence estimate had been presented to the president, defensive action would almost certainly have been taken. But the government had no central agency for marshaling all the information, making sense of it, and presenting strategic assessments to the president. (Kessler 98)

The only intelligence agencies existing at the time were operated by the military, and they were often seen as no more than the dumping ground for the least qualified military personnel. Each of the services was battling the others, and fiefdoms developed within the services that often suppressed whatever intelligence assessments were made:

The government had no tradition of assessing the intentions -- as distinguished from the capabilities -- of other countries. Those officials who did look at the question of Japanese intentions decided that Japan would never attack, because to do so would be irrational. Yet what might seem irrational to one country may seem perfectly logical to another country that has different goals, values, and traditions. (Kessler 98)

The failures apparent in the onset of World War II and during the course of the war led indirectly to the creation of the CIA in 1947. During World War II, Colonel William J. Donovan headed the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), and in 1941 Donovan submitted to the president a plan outlining the need for a government-wide organization that would pool and coordinate existing intelligence. Roosevelt followed this recommendation and created a Coordinator of Information as part of the Executive Office of the President. This office evolved into the OSS, and this would become the model for the CIA. During the war the OSS organized resistance movements and sabotage operations behind enemy lines and also tried unsuccessfully to centralize intelligence functions within the government through an analytical section known as Research and Analysis. When the OSS disbanded after the war, the State Department absorbed many of its functions.

The agency was reconstituted at Donovan's urging with the creation of the Central Intelligence Group and a year later the Central Intelligence Agency. The agency was established by the National Security Act of 1947, with the new agency absorbing the institutional values of the OSS.

Before and after Pearl Harbor, the idea of a centralized intelligence agency had been opposed by many in the War Department who saw it as an infringement on their turf, and it was now considered important that the new CIA be independent and not tied to the interests of the military. The defense Intelligence Agency would be created in 1961 to focus more on tactical questions, and it did indeed reflect the biases of a military that constantly sought bigger budgets. The concept of a centralized intelligence agency, one bringing together all the available information on a subject and analyzing it objectively, is embodied in the Directorate of Intelligence, which with 3,000 employees is the smallest of the CIA's directorates. This is the analytical side of the house, made up of eggheads rather than spies, with analysts who openly identify themselves as CIA employees and who contribute to academic publications and attend conferences in their field just like university professors. The operations side gathers the information:

Typically, the analysts want to disseminate material obtained by the operations side, and the operations officers object because they are afraid it will expose a source. (Kessler 100)

Much of the attention of the CIA was directed at monitoring activities in and around the Soviet Union, but in this hemisphere, a major locus of attention after 1959 has been Cuba.

History

Fidel Castro was the son of a Spanish immigrant farm worker and was born in Oriente province in 1926 or 1927 (there is some dispute about the date). He became a political activist as a student and joined the Cuban People's Party about 1947. He obtained a law degree in 1950, and in 1952 he was a candidate for a seat in the House of Representatives. On March 10, 1952, however, General Fulgencio Batista overthrew the government, and in 1953, Castro began to organize a revolution against Batista. This effort failed, and Castro was jailed. When he was released under a 1955 amnesty, Castro went to Mexico and organized the next steps of his revolution. In 1956, he led a small force into Cuba and forced Batista to flee. He took control of Havana on January 2, 1959, became prime minister in February, became the president of Cuba in 1976 ("Year in Review 1994: Biography" online).

Socialist Cuba made the transition from capitalism after 1961, and it had many noteworthy achievements as well as notable disappointments. The evolution of Cuban developmental strategies is noted by Louis A. Perez Jr., who says that Cuba undertook a system of planning to overcome the conditions of underdevelopment. This meant a reduction in the historic dependence on sugar exports. Sugar "symbolized the source of old oppression, slavery in the colony, and subservience to foreigners in the republic" (Perez 337) while also being a constant source of unpredictability. Sugar dependence was reduced through industrialization and agricultural diversification, a simple idea that never worked and was finally abandoned (Perez 337-338). Sugar production was indeed given preference and priority after the mid-1960s because it was a good economic move (Perez 337). A new campaign was started to improve production through an emphasis on moral incentives:

Material incentives were proclaimed incompatible with the goals of the revolution. Workers were no longer paid for quality of production or for meeting -- or surpassing -- production quotas. Overtime pay was eliminated. Production achievements were acknowledged in a non-monetary way with badges, medallions, scrolls, and awards, frequently distributed by Castro himself. (Perez 340-341)

This predilection to choose ideology over economic stability certainly contributed to the downturn taken by the Cuban economy after Bautista.

In 1968, Castro personally assumed the planning and execution of economic policies, transforming himself into "a total dogmatist ideologically, societally, and economically, in absolute disregard of the experiences of other men and other societies, but also in contemptuous rejection of many Marxist and Soviet views" (Szulc 608). At the same time, though, Cuba was nearing bankruptcy, a condition worsened by hurricane damage and a drought in 1968. Castro proclaimed a new radical revolution in Cuba and moved to nationalize the entire retail trade sector, perhaps feeling the need to inject a new ideological fervor in the people (Szulc 608).

An American who had lived in Cuba in the 1950s returned in 1979 and found the area of Havana to be shabbier but otherwise little changed over a thirty year period. The stores were now run by the government, and purchases required a ration book. The visitor found that where there had been no public beaches thirty years ago, now there all beaches were open to the public. He also found some evidence that the basic needs of the people were being met:

One sees no beggars in the Havana of 1979, nor any of the poverty and misery which abound in so many other Latin American cities. In Cuba, the basic needs have been provided to all. Everyone is guaranteed enough to eat, adequate clothing, access to education, medical care, and a place to live. The diet is monotonous, and one may have to stand in line to buy food; some of the housing remains substandard. Still, that no one goes hungry or homeless is no small achievement. (Smith 195)

It is not clear that this condition still prevails, and the standard of living has actually decreased since that was written.

U.S. Response

The existence of a Communist regime only a few hundred miles from the coast of the United States was a matter of special concern for the CIA from the time of the Cuban Revolution in 1959. The CIA had an operations headquarters in Miami seen by many as a state within a city because it was over, above, and outside the laws of the United States as well as of the international community. The headquarters had a permanent staff in excess of 300 Americans directed a few thousand Cuban agents in different actions, with a budget of more than $50 million a year (Blum 210). In 1961, Kennedy unveiled a program known as the Alliance for Progress, conceived as a direct response to Castro's Cuba. It was intended to prove that genuine social change could take place in Latin America without the need for revolution or socialism. It would also become part of the ongoing CIA effort to discredit the Cuban government, an effort that would continue long past the Bay of Pigs and the Cuban Missile Crisis (Blum 214-215).

The CIA monitored activity in Cuba and attempted to assess the military capabilities of the Cubans. This was accomplished through the use of Cuban agents, spy planes and satellites flying over Cuban territory, and the monitoring of ships, planes, and other outside means of travel and communications. CIA information served to indicate the potential threat from Cuba and particularly the threat of Soviet missiles that might be fired from Cuban soil. The missile crisis developed when it was clear that the Soviets were placing nuclear missiles in Cuba and were preparing to bring in more. This is a brief outline of the events that transpired, but more and more it is being noted that this is not the whole story and that much more was involved than was reported at the time:

The real history of the missile crisis has been coming out bit by bit for years, partly from Soviet sources and now from secret U.S. documents released by the CIA. Taken as a whole, that history is far less reassuring than the more familiar version. It is a story of blunder, miscalculation and dumb luck. (Morgenthau 36)

The missile crisis had its immediate origins in the Bay of Pigs fiasco and in the arms race between the superpowers. The Bay of Pigs occurred some two years previously and convinced Khrushchev that Kennedy would back down if confronted. The attempted invasion may even have convinced Khrushchev that Cuba needed Soviet protection from another U.S. invasion. The primary motivation was strategic, however, for Khrushchev knew, as did the United States, that the Soviet Union was far behind the U.S. In missiles, bombers, and deliverable nuclear warheads. At the time, analysts believed that the Soviets had no more than 44 operational intercontinental ballistic missiles and 155 long-range bombers, while the United States had 156 such missiles, 144 sub-launched Polaris missiles, and 1,300 strategic bombers:

Deploying medium-range missiles in Cuba gave Soviet forces a significant increase in the number of warheads that could reach the United States -- though it is unlikely that Khrushchev had nuclear war in mind. (Morgenthau 356)

What Khrushchev wanted was parity with the United States, or at least the illusion of it, and the Cuba gamble was the easiest way to redress the nuclear balance.

John P. Roche recently wrote about the missile crisis and about the reassessments of that issue taking place over the last several years and find much to argue about with those who are attempting to revise history or who have forgotten the reality of the original event. He notes first that while there may have been no objective evidence from the CIA regarding whether or not the Soviets had warheads in Cuba, it is clear that the administration believed they did, for Kennedy and his associates certainly did not believe the Soviets might fire missiles at the United States without such warheads. Second, Roche points out that we certainly knew that the Soviets were not producing missiles at the rate they claimed they were. The CIA and other agencies knew that Russian claims were spurious. The spy satellite Discoverer had spotted fewer than 20 SS-7 railmobile ICBMs on spurs of the Trans-Siberian Railroad, and this ended the missile gap which had been created by Khrushchev's boasts. Third, the missiles placed in Cuba did not have the range to reach Washington in spite of rhetoric to the contrary on both sides. These missiles were medium-range ballistic missiles with a range of about 750 miles. Soviet ships with missiles of a longer range were spotted and stopped:

The Kennedy Administration, presumably to maintain the sense of emergency both here and in Latin America, generated the myth that we were all in the target zone. This was prudent at the time, but the historical record should be opened. (Roche 5)

The Cuban Missile Crisis remains one of the primary reasons why Castro is held at arm's length by the U.S. government, for even as other parts of the world have ceased being Communist-led or have sought some accommodation with the U.S. And achieved it, overtures from Castro have been rebuffed.

The Hawk's Cay Conference

In 1989, with the opening up of the Soviet Union to a degree never known before, American and Russian analysts came together to discuss the Cuban Missile Crisis. CIA files had been declassified to a great degree so that much more was being revealed about the role of the CIA, about the extent of its knowledge, and about other details of the time. The archives of the Russians were also now being opened to reveal more information about actions on that side of the confrontation. As the data was brought together and compared, it became more evident that much of what was believed on both sides in 1962 was false or misleading, and the degree to which luck was involved in the outcome of the confrontation was apparent. There were a number of misperceptions on the American side because the data provided by the CIA was wrong or misleading. First, the United States believed that the Soviets were placing nuclear missiles in Cuba to counter the American installation of warheads in Turkey. It was now made known that the Soviet missiles had been intended in part to neutralize the threat of a U.S. invasion of the island, and both Khrushchev and Fidel Castro believed such an invasion was imminent. U.S. air and land forces had moved to the southeastern United States in the early fall of 1962, and an invasion was proposed to Kennedy as a serious option, which he rejected. Still, Robert McNamara, Kennedy's Secretary of Defense, states that an invasion was never planned.

Second, Kennedy and his advisers never knew for certain whether or not there were nuclear warheads already in Cuba in October 1962, for the CIA could not find this information at the time. It has since been revealed that 20 warheads were indeed in Cuba and that they could have been fitted within hours on missiles targeted for Washington, New York, and other major American cities.

Third, the estimate by U.S. intelligence was that there were 10,000 Soviet and 40,000 Cuban troops on the island. Actually, the Soviets had 40,000 troops stationed in Cuba, and the Cuban army numbered 270,000. If they United States had invaded, casualties would have been much higher than what was then estimated ("A Near Tragedy of Errors," 1989, 40).

Clearly, the CIA was not as effective at gathering information as it has often claimed to be in different situations, and the data that was used by the administration during the Cuban Missile Crisis was only partial and only partially correct. Some of the reassessments that have been made of actions taken at that time seem based on faulty memory and even a desire to justify actions after they have been taken, but it is clear that while the CIA did not have all the data it needed, the estimates the CIA made were important in prompting the administration to take action and do something about the missiles in Cuba before they became operational.

Latin America

Throughout the modern era, Latin American countries have sought to achieve political and economic independence from colonial, imperial, and neo-imperial powers. Latin America presents a series of contrasts in its history and in its current reality. Latin America is a region both old and young, old in terms of the national entities formed there, young in terms of political independence. Throughout its history, the region has shown tendencies to be both tumultuous and stable. Latin America has also managed to be both dependent and independent, autonomous and subordinate. As noted, the region is also both prosperous and poor. At the end of the nineteenth century, the region emphasized wealth as it was penetrated by external powers, beginning with Britain and France and then including the United States -- after which economic and political weakness with reference to Europe and the United States was accompanied by a lust for riches on the part of the foreign influences, creating the image of endless wealth (Skidmore and Smith 5-7).

The developing countries in Latin America display the effects of their colonial past in the income disparity between the rich and the poor. The influence continues to be felt to this day, and this can be seen in the policies of the United States to Latin America and Latin American countries through recent administrations. The countries of the region can, for instance, be treated regionally or individually. Wesson notes that what the U.S. wants in Latin America is influence and that there are three major bases for this -- military, economic, and cultural. The military can be decisive, but its use is questionable and usually avoided. Indirect military influence is more common:

The United States has developed close relations with most Latin American armed forces through military sales and assistance, training programs in the countries concerned, and education of officers in U.S. institutions (Wesson 3).

Economic influence is much broader and more complex. The U.S. is first of all the biggest market for and supplier of nearly all Latin American countries. The government has only minimal control over trade except in extreme cases like the embargo on trade with Cuba. Investments by U.S. corporations can be more controversial, for the U.S. company represents a power in the land that can be for good or ill. Cultural influence is even more diffuse and hard to estimate than economic influence, and the effects are not entirely positive as there is some resentment of American cultural hegemony around the world. The government tries to exert economic and cultural influence through aid and informational and educational programs (Wesson 1-5).

American interests throughout Latin America have been one of the rationales for intervention and for various policies, with Cuba often being seen as a special case. Under the leadership of Jeanne Kirkpatrick, former U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, the United States in the 1980s developed what Niess calls a spurious distinction between "authoritarian" and "totalitarian" regimes in Latin America, with the right-wing military dictatorships being considered authoritarian and thus acceptable, and with Cuba and Nicaragua being seen as totalitarian and therefore not acceptable:

This shameless differentiation allowed it to justify, for instance, the redemption of loans by international financial institutions to the military regimes of Argentina, Chile, Paraguay and Uruguay while arguing for withholding loans to revolutionary Nicaragua (Niess 194).

Two countries in Central America served as test cases for the Reagan doctrine. In neither case was the matter resolved satisfactorily. The first was El Salvador, where the revolutionary FMLN wanted to discuss a settlement. Reagan, however, was convinced by his advisers that giving military help to the government would assure a victory, a policy which floundered as the guerrillas more than doubled in number, controlled large sections of the country, and wrecked the economy. In Nicaragua, Reagan tried a similar policy with the intent of either overthrowing the Sandinistas or forcing them to share power with the U.S.-financed Contras. The Sandinistas prevailed, held an election, and won. Reagan continued to pursue his policy with no success (LaFeber 681-685).

Currently, Latin America is "our third -- 'largest trading partner, and American security is based in large measure on regional security and accessibility" ("The Importance of Latin America" 18). Cuba is conspicuous by its absence from any trade arrangement with the United States. American business interests have increased financing in Latin America in recent years, and one of the reasons for an increased role for U.S. -- 'based international financial activity can be attributed to changes in economic and social structures in Latin America. There has been a huge increase of indebtedness in several Latin American countries, and the shift from reliance on direct investment to a dependence on financial inflows was partly a consequence of social changes set in motion by the wave of import substituting industrialization which emerged during the Great Depression and the Second World War. This trend continued during the postwar decades. That industrialization established substantial national capitalist classes in several countries of Latin America, especially in the large countries of the region, and those classes, operating both in the private and public sectors, "did not break out of a position of dependence in the international economy, but they did take on a more thorough and more direct role in the industrial life of the region" (MacEwan 16). There has been a relative shift from direct investment to loan capital suggesting a more complete emergence of capitalism in the region.

U.S. relations with Latin America today are both strained and in some ways tightened by the Drug War. They are strained because so many of the drugs making their way to American addicts come from Latin American countries, fueling a huge underground economy, and they are tightened because of cooperative agreements between the U.S. And Latin American governments to fight the drug trade.

At the beginning of the twentieth century, American businessmen and government leaders, supported by the American people, settled on a policy of pursuing economic expansion while avoiding the explicit colonization favored by Europeans. However, in Latin America this policy was carried out with a heavy hand, and American corporations made a role for themselves in Latin America more and more between 1900 and 1914 in Latin America, backed by the U.S. government. American companies exported goods to these countries and also invested heavily in them, such as the huge investment made by the United Fruit Company in Central America. The expansion of trade and investment made the U.S. wealthy, and the U.S. benefited from cheaper raw materials in the form of cheaper finished goods. Some foods, such as bananas, became common in American homes. The American industrial economy boomed as a result of these policies and altered the shape of American industry and the American workforce. Economic growth posed challenges, and often demands were made in terms of foreign policy as a way of solving these problems (Freeman et al. 165-167).

Since that time, American foreign policy has been linked with business expansion and business practices of American firms on foreign soil. Institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and the World bank have been developed to provide funds to developing countries, and one result has been that the most powerful promoter of exploitative conditions for Third World women workers is the U.S. government. When opposition develops in Third World countries to the working conditions imposed by multinationals based in the U.S., non-governmental agencies and the State Department, or covertly the CIA, have worked to derail this opposition. The U.S. has provided military aid to many of these countries, and in so doing has contributed to a wide variety of oppressive regimes. Conversely, the U.S. sometimes works to destabilize regimes that do not support multinational corporate interests, as happened in Guatemala in 1954 and Chile in 1973 (Fuentes and Ehrenreich 41-44). Most of these kinds of moves do not apply to Cuba after the revolution, though before was a different matter. American interests were prominent in Cuba then as the U.S. government sought to protect those interests and expand the reach of American business. Since the revolution, though, Cuba is a country the United States has instead sought to marginalize and break economically as well as politically, seeing the two areas as linked.

Florida

One of the demonstrations of the failure of the Castro government is the number of Cuban exiles still seeking asylum in the United States as they flee the poor economic and political conditions in Cuba. South Florida today contains a large population of exiles and refugees from Castro's Cuba, all part of a mass exodus of persecuted Cubans who have left their homeland since the Cuban Revolution. They have come in several groupings, beginning as soon as Castro came to power and then in waves since. Many of those who came here in the first wave after the revolution thought they would be returning home in as little as a few months, but as the years have passed the Cuban population in the United States has become more socially and economically integrated into the American culture in Florida even while maintaining ties with Cuba and while trying to keep alive the hope that Castro could be overthrown and democracy restored in Cuba.

South Florida has long been a point of destination for refugees fleeing the economic and political problems of the Caribbean and Latin America. The first wave came in planeloads of Cubans on "freedom flights" in the 1960s and 1970s. They were followed by the Mariel boatlift of 1980 bringing 125,000 refugees. Thousands more fled the Sandinista reign in Nicaragua, with a massive influx in 1988 and 1989. The result has been a strain on Florida's already overtaxed social services (DeGeorge 48A, 48E). Many of the refugees brought in 1980 on the Mariel boatlift were Cuban criminals, however, and this contributed to a shift in public perception. Castro at the time made the following statement:

Those that are leaving from Mariel are the scum of the country -- antisocials, homosexuals, drug addicts, and gamblers, who are welcome to leave Cuba if any country will have them. (Portes and Stepick 21)

Cuban-American official in Miami who opposed Castro agreed in some respects:

Mariel destroyed the image of Cubans in the United States and, in passing, destroyed the image of Miami itself for tourism. The marielitos are mostly Black and mulattoes of a color that I never saw or believe existed in Cuba. They don't have social networks; they roam the streets desperate to return to Cuba. (Portes and Stepick 22)

In fact, the labels affixed to the marielitos by both the Castro government and the Cuban leaders in Florida created discrimination which made it very difficult for these new refugees to make their way in their new surroundings. At the same time, native white South Floridians saw these new refugees as a group to be firmly opposed (Portes and Stepick 21-23).

The Cuban Economy

The economy of Cuba has continued to deteriorate and to encounter problems in the 1990s. Cuba was less able to get international assistance now that the Soviet Union was changing and had been pressured by the United States to remove troops and other personnel from Cuba. The crisis caused the Cuban government to relax certain restrictions and to consider a return to some enterprises that had earlier been banned. In 1993, Castro lifted a thirty-year-old ban on Cuban citizens' possessing foreign currency. This was considered a significant departure from the nation's centrally-planned socialist economy and was intended to attract large sums of foreign currency then in circulation on the black market into the regular economy. Another move away from traditional economic policy came as the government authorized limited individual private enterprise in 117 occupations. Plans were also made for the introduction of agricultural reforms to allow for the decentralization and reorganization of state farms into "Units of Basic co-operative Production" that would be managed and financed by the workers themselves. The government was reorganized again in 1994, with the creation of four new ministries and the dissolution of several state committees and institutes. The new ministries were for economy and planning, finance and prices, foreign investment and economic cooperation, and tourism, and they were a reflection of a significant change in the economic management of the country ("Cuba Introductory Survey" 1076).

The people reacted to poor economic conditions in 1994 by rioting in the capital. Even more Cubans now tried to reach the United States, producing a crisis so that President Clinton had to take steps to stop them ("Cuba Introductory Survey" 1076). This produced a crisis in the U.S. As many in the Cuban community here objected. What the Clinton Administration did was to change the rules concerning the admittance and rejection of refugees from Cuba. The first of these changes is that Cubans who have been in detention camps in the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base will be admitted to the United States over the next few years. This comes after several denials that those refugees would ever be allowed into the country. The second change is historic and means that refugees from Cuban Communism, previously welcomed into the United States, will now be forcibly handed over to the Castro regime by the U.S. Coast Guard. While Castro has promised that no one who is sent back will be mistreated, and while President Clinton promises that no one in real danger will be sent back, neither statement is taken as accurate. Elliott Abrams recently wrote of this new approach,

The new policy is monstrous. This country never threw anyone back over the Berlin Wall; we never turned a Soviet Jew or Pentecostal over to the KGB; and under Presidents of both parties, we never turned a Cuban refugee over to Castro... In both moral and international legal terms, this is a departure for the United States. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that "everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own." This right to emigrate has been repeatedly endorsed by American Presidents and American Congresses.... (Abrams 36)

An editorial in The New Republic took a different view:

Clinton's policy is also justifiable, in part because it does not eliminate the freedom of Cubans to migrate to the United States. It simply subjects that right to regulation, rather than to the special exemption from regulation that has existed under the 1965 Cuban Adjustment Act. Some 20,000 Cubans a year will get visas (although for the next two years the inhabitants of Guantanamo who are to be allowed in now will be counted against these quotas). Considering that the entire Cuban population is 11 million, American policy will remain, as it has been, disproportionately generous. ("Closing the Doors" 7)

The story of Elian Gonzalez increased antipathy to Cuba but also made the U.S. government look bad. The news media was fascinated with this story from the beginning for obvious reasons -- a six-year-old boy found alive at sea, an escape from Cuba, losing his mother, anti-Castro feelings, the long-standing antipathy to Communist Cuba, and so on. Often, the longer a case drags on, the more interest wanes. This did not happen with this case because of the subtle but deep-seated image of David and Goliath, with the Cuban family and Elian seen as the small entity in danger of being crushed by the government Goliath. Added to this was a heating up of anti-American and anti-exile rhetoric on the part of Fidel Castro. All these elements assured that the story would continue to be played and that it would have an international appeal as well. From the American point-of-view, the story ended badly with the return of Elian Gonzalez. From the Cuban point-of-view, however, the case was a public relations boon, making Castro the victor and returning Elian to Cuba as a new model Cuban citizen.

Even though Cuba has been changing some policies, this has not been enough to make the United States change its mind about refusing to allow U.S. businesses to deal with Cuba. Such a change is less likely after the 1996 incident in which Cuban MiG fighters shot down two U.S. light aircraft piloted by members of a Cuban-American exile group. Cuba claimed that the planes had violated Cuban airspace:

Further U.S. sanctions were immediately implemented, including the indefinite suspension of charter flights to Cuba... President Clinton reversed his previous opposition to certain controversial elements of the helms-Burton bill, and on 12 March he signed the legislation, officially entitled the Cuban Liberty and Solidarity Act, thus making it law. ("Cuba Introductory Survey" 1077)

This legislation imposes sanctions on countries trading with or investing in Cuba and also threatens to reduce U.S. aid to countries providing Cuba with financial assistance ("Cuba Introductory Survey" 1077).

The state of the Cuban economy today remains tenuous, and analysts find that while it is changing, it may not be changing rapidly enough or broadly enough to make a difference. The Cuban people still have little as they wait for change, and American businesses are also watching to see what happens:

Borne of youthful idealism and Cold War politics, the Cuban economy has evolved into a peculiar hybrid, a blend of socialism and capitalism. The question now is whether it will work. Castro loyalists say they' re progressing despite nearly impossible odds. Cuba watchers in the United States call for deeper economic and political reforms. Unless people enjoy greater freedom, they argue, social inequities will only grow. (Eaton, Corchado, and Iliff 9R)

U.S. officials now say Cuba is trapped in the beginning of a reform process once seen as having potential but now with an outcome considered uncertain. According to Michael Kozak, head of the U.S. Interests Section in Havana, the situation could lead to more Cubans fleeing their home; and seeking asylum in Florida, and this would be another disaster for the U.S.:

Hundreds of thousands of refugees could take to the seas between Cuba and Florida during a future crisis unless Mr. Castro begins to develop a political and economic system that is no longer based solely on his personality, Mr. Kozak said. "If chaos is to be avoided, Cuba needs to have an internal dialogue now." (Iliff 1A)

At the same time, the means undertaken by the United States to challenge the Cuban government have been challenged by such actions as a recent United Nations demand:

The General Assembly this morning urged States that had and continued to apply laws and measures with extraterritorial effects on the sovereignty and the freedom of trade and navigation of other States, such as the United States Helms -- 'Burton Act against Cuba, to take the necessary steps to repeal or invalidate them as soon as possible. ("UN: Assembly Urges States to Repeal/Invalidate Laws with Effect on Sovereignty, Free Trade, Navigation")

Cuba's government is a socialist form that has been modified in recent years in an attempt to improve the faltering Cuban economy. Fidel Castro has held power since 1959, and his refusal to abandon certain socialist and communist principles has been one of the reasons why the United States has refused to soften relations with Cuba. The efforts to change the economy have not been sufficient as yet to bring much improvement to Cuba, and analysts around the world are watching to see what happens and if the Cuban market will be opened in the future to foreign investment and foreign business interests.

Over the past four decades, U.S. diplomatic policy toward Cuba has been generally consistent, though at times there have been efforts taken to normalize relations, as noted. The Cubans have managed to scotch such moves, however unintentionally, with actions antagonistic to U.S. interests. American foreign policy has always been shaped by concern because a Communist regime is so close to American territory. Some of those seeking normalization believe that increasing trade with Cuba would be a good way to change the ruling regime, the same approach followed with China, to mixed results. They have been unsuccessful so far because whenever the issue is rased, some action taken by Cuba convinces legislators that the Cubans are not ready for normal relations.

The Promise of Castro when Castro came to power, he offered a vision that was different from what the people of Cuba had known in the past, a vision based on Karl Marx as interpreted by Fidel Castro. Castro saw communism as the ideal stage of development to which all other stages aspired, as Marx had indicated:

Marx had argued that under communism people would contribute according to their capacity and be rewarded according to need. And drawing also on Lenin, Castro envisioned that a "vanguard party" would facilitate such a transition.

It was in 1965... that Castro established the Communist Party as the sole political party, with a "vanguard, " guiding function. Castro's vision was influenced by Che Guevara as well, even after the Argentine-born revolutionary no longer held a top government post and no longer lived in Cuba, and then was killed (in 1967) while attempting to "make revolution" in Bolivia. Castro drew most on Che's ideas after Che lost out in an open debate about the appropriate development strategy for Cuba that occurred between 1962 and 1965. (Eckstein 33)

The shift to communism meant the end of private ownership, exception for some accommodation in the agricultural sector. In addition, various accepted market forces no longer applied because of the "budgetary system" proposed by Guevara as a means of economic organization:

State appropriation of the "means of production" at the time centered on the two sectors where private ownership of any significance had escaped earlier nationalizations -- "agriculture and private retail trade. A 1959 agrarian reform had nationalized only agricultural holdings over 402 hectares. A second reform in 1963 led roughly 76% of the total land area and 63% of the cultivated land to pass to state hands. (Eckstein 33)

More agrarian restructuring was undertaken after that. The government for communism" entailed additional agrarian restructuring. The government "deprived workers on the newly formed state farms of private plots previously allotted them, and it pressed (but did not force) remaining private farmers to incorporate their properties into the state sector" (Eckstein 33). For the remaining independent farmers, their role was changed so that they were to help out on state farms, to sell all their produce to the state (at low prices), to cooperate with state plans, and to hire no labor. In addition, the government encouraged private farmers to organize Mutual Aid Brigades, and these tended collectively to harvesting and other tasks and formed credit and service cooperatives. The government further rented land at a low price from private landowners, and the latter would hold on to the parcels while the peasant landowners would also have to work part-time on state farms (Eckstein 33-34).

In urban regions, Castro nationalized small businesses:

In the spring of 1968 the so-called Revolutionary Offensive absorbed into the public sector some 55,000 to 56,000 small businesses, especially retail food and service shops but also other stores, bars, restaurants, and snack and artisan shops. As a result, the one sector besides agriculture where private activity had partially escaped earlier nationalizations officially passed to state hands. (Eckstein 34)

Earnings were more or less equalized by the elimination of most private ownership, together with wage increases for the poorest paid workers and a guaranteed employment policy. Analysts state that these initiatives caused Cuba to achieve the most egalitarian distribution of wealth in Latin America. The government used rationing beginning in 1962 to equalize consumption at prices affordable to all (Eckstein 34).

Part of the process was the promotion of Che's Guevara's vision of the "new man."

Workers were encouraged to work for society rather than for personal gain, and instead of material reward for overtime work and exceptional productivity, workers individually and collectively were asked to work hard out of a sense of moral commitment. Among the rewards offered for "socialist emulation" and "fraternal competition" were diplomas, pennants, flags, and titles, and sections, departments, and factories, as well as individuals, competed for these nonmaterial "rewards." The government expanded social services so that all education, medical care, social security, day care, and much housing were provided free of charge. At the same time, money lost much of its historical meaning, which is what Marx argued should happen in a utopian communist society. As part of this process, the government attacked social distinctions and privilege in order to homogenize the society:

Drawing on idealistic societal visions advanced by Marx, as well as by Cuba's independence hero Jose Mart', Castro urged the breakdown of barriers between manual and nonmanual labor. City dwellers, including professionals, were exhorted to volunteer for seasonal agriculture activity and other tasks. By 1970, 40 to 57% of the labor force worked part -- 'time in agriculture, mainly in sugar -- 'related activity. (Eckstein 34)

Castro also conducted a campaign against bureaucracy as part of his egalitarian theme.

With the embargo imposed by the United States, Cuba has long had a trade problem, and this worsened with the dissolution of the Soviet Union, which had been the major trading partner and which had subsidized the government of Cuba for some time. The Yeltsin government of the Russian Republic passed a bill in 1990 to invalidate contracts signed between the Soviet government and other countries, and the new republics were no longer bound by any former agreements. Cuba's former financing had been favorable but now ended as Moscow extended no new credits and as the conversion of debt from rubles into dollars meant that Cuba owed $24 to $25 billion, while the real value in hard currency was much lower and estimated to be somewhere between $1 to $2 billion at the exchange rate then in place in Soviet hard currency auctions.

IN 1990, the Soviets stopped shipments of arms to Cuba just at the time when Cuba could no longer rely on Russia for defense support, and Cuba was now forced to depend on the world market for future military supplies, as well as for imports for the civilian economy. The Cubans assessed the cost to Cuba of the collapse of Soviet -- 'bloc relations at $5.7 billion in 1992, losing 70% of their purchasing power in three years. The only Communist country still trading with Cuba was China:

In 1990, China became the island's second most important trade partner, with trade worth between $500 and $600 million. A five -- 'year agreement for the 1991 to 1995 period involved an exchange of sugar, citrus, nickel, iron, pharmaceuticals, medical equipment, and for the first time, biotechnology products, in exchange for foodstuffs, bicycle parts, and financing for electrical fan and bicycle factories and fish breeding. And in 1992 the two countries initiated a joint venture, their first ever, for production of medical equipment. However, trade between the two countries amounted only to about one -- 'fourth the value of the island's total market economy trade, and it too was denominated in hard currency; the relationship showed little sign of being premised on "Communist solidarity." (Eckstein 93)

While Cuba and China worked together and were much alike in terms of government, the stance taken by Washington differed toward each:

Washington maintained a hard line toward Cuba while improving relations not only with Gorbachev's Communist government, before its collapse, but also with China after Beijing's repression of a prodemocratic movement there (and with Vietnam after Hanoi shared information regarding U.S. prisoners of war). To justify his China policy President Bush used the opposite rationale that he articulated in his Cuban stance. He argued that isolating China was not the best way to pressure for democratic reform. (Eckstein 93)

In doing so, Bush was responding to internal political pressures and also to the fact that china has greater economic importance to the United States.

Cuba After Castro

When anyone speaks of the future of Cuba, at this stage, that person is speaking of Cuba without Castro. What four decades of opposition, threats of invasion, plans for assassination, and similar actions could not achieve, time most certainly will, most likely sometime in the next decade or so. In 2004, Castro celebrated his 75th birthday and the 45th anniversary of his rise to power, and it seems clear that some change will be made in the near future. More and more speculation is apparent as Castro ages:

Castro is deteriorating physically. During a speech in mid -- '2001, he collapsed. His brief fainting spell, shown on Cuban TV, produced significant anxiety within the island and increased speculation about succession. (Suchlicki para. 8)

Jaime Suchlicki considers what may happen in Cuba after Castro and notes that the change may not be as extensive as some hope, for the "possibility of regime continuity seems stronger for Cuba than it was for other communist states" (Suchlicki para. 3). Change can be difficult to achieve in Latin America in any case:

In Latin America, many noncommunist authoritarian regimes held out for decades despite external pressures and internal weakness -- ' -- 'among them, Rafael Trujillo's regime in the Dominican Republic, the Somoza dynasty in Nicaragua, Augusto Pinochet's dictatorship in Chile, and the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) in Mexico. Despite profound financial and economic crises and the erosion of popular support, the PRI -- 'based regimes remained sufficiently strong to stay in power for 70 years until defeated in the last elections. (Suchlicki para. 4)

The Castro regime is likely to learn from the experience in other Latin American countries and from the negative experiences of Eastern Europe. What Castro has done in recent years is seen in the arrest and execution of political dissidents, a violent crackdown that is seen as a clear indication of his concerns with succession and desire to create a clear road for the smooth assumption of power by his brother Raul, head of the Cuban armed forces and second secretary of Cuba's Communist Party. He has also replaced hundreds of Communist Party officials and has rehabilitated Ramiro Valdes as a new member of the ruling Council of State. Valdes is "a dreaded figure in Cuba, remembered for his human -- 'rights abuses and brutal repressive methods" (Suchlicki para. 6). Another sign that Castro is preparing for some form of succession is seen in the greater emphasis he has been placing on ideological rigidity:

The "Battle of Ideas," a program to imbue the masses with stronger anti -- 'American feelings; the appointment of an old Marxist leader to run the Communist Party schools; and the clampdown on Internet access are further evidence that Cuba is undergoing a Chinese -- 'type cultural revolution (albeit one slower and less dramatic than in China). In such a scenario, an aging leader insists on purifying and rejuvenating "his" exhausted revolution before departing from the world. (Suchlicki para. 7).

Suchlicki says that the issue of succession is important to the regime and would avoid the problem of transition, a problem no totalitarian regime has been able to achieve smoothly. The removal of Castro by whatever means would lead to an internal power struggle, which is thought likely to take place within the revolutionary ranks rather than outside them. The revolution is unlikely to collapse if he dies or is otherwise incapacitated, and the strong institutions that make up the regime wold come to the fore to support the structure of power:

The armed forces are undoubtedly the most vital of the three "legs" on which the revolution stands. The other two, the Communist Party and the security apparatus, serve, under increased military supervision, to control, mobilize, socialize, and indoctrinate the population. The organization and strength of the bureaucracy that has grown up around these institutions seem to assure the revolution's continuity. (Suchlicki para. 9)

While many of the exiles have hoped for a revolt from within, such an eventuality is unlikely so long as the Cuban armed forces remain loyal to Castro and to their immediate commander in chief, Raul. The armed forces are a Castro creation, and they have developed a large degree of professionalism, have been thoroughly integrated into the political system, and can claim an important role in the general management and control of the economy. More than 65% of major industries and enterprises are controlled by current or former military officers. Various opposition and dissident groups and projects have been identified in the recent past, with the best known being the Varela Project, "which gathered more than 11,000 signatures to petition the National Assembly to amend Cuba's laws and permit free elections" (Suchlicki para. 12).

This effort was noble but disastrous:

Castro's response was swift and brutal. He held his own plebiscite to proclaim the permanent and unchanging communist nature of his regime and prohibit the National Assembly from considering such projects. This was followed by the arrest and sentencing to long jail terms of several dozen dissidents, journalists, and librarians, including many members of the Varela Project. (Suchlicki para. 13)

In spite of the fact that many in Cuba are dissatisfied and oppose Castro (at least silently), the dissident groups that have formed are weak and are often infiltrated by Cuban state security, and in such a controlled society, these groups find it difficult to organize and operate in spite of the courage shown by the leaders.

Another possibility for the future raised by Suchlicki is that Castro might want to go out with a bang by fighting the United States:

An aging, sick leader facing a decaying and collapsing revolution and the prospect of civil war and violence that threaten his power could decide to provoke Washington. A Cuban military attack on the Guantanamo Naval Base or south Florida would force the United States to react militarily, leading to massive destruction on the island and, perhaps, a U.S. military occupation. (Suchlicki para. 15)

However, Suchlicki sees this as an unlikely scenario as well, though he believes it should be considered in light of his attitudes and such actions as asking the Soviets to launch a nuclear strike against the United States during the missile crisis in 1962 and his continuous massive buildup of reinforced underground tunnels throughout the island.

Suchlicki believes that the current line of succession is clear and that Raul would follow his brother as leader. He also believes that Raul would "allow for a collective leadership, with himself remaining in command of the military and the party and for a civilian as president. The three most likely candidates are Ricardo Alarcon, president of the Popular Assembly; Carlos Lage, vice president in charge of the economy; and Marcos Portal, minister of industries, who married Raul's niece" (Suchlicki para. 14).

However, Suchlicki also notes that this might not be right because Raul is also in frail health and could die or become incapacitated before Fidel, in which case he says a "collective leadership would emerge, with representatives of the party and the military in key positions but with the latter exercising greater influence" Suchlicki para. 15). If Raul does manage to succeed his brother, he would face difficult challenges, including a bankrupt economy, popular unhappiness, and the need to maintain order and discipline while also trying to increase productivity within the labor force. Suchlicki says that Raul would have to be dependent on the military and would have more trouble because he lacks the charisma and legitimacy of his brother. To remain in power, he would require the support of key party leaders and technocrats within the government bureaucracy and so would be likely to create a framework for collective leadership controlled by the military. In time, says Suchlicki, this collective leadership would probably initiate limited and gradual economic reforms, which are certainly needed. Extending his remarks, Suchlicki believes that the critical challenge to a Raul Castro regime "would be to balance the need to improve the economy and satisfy the needs of the population with maintaining continuous political control. Too rapid economic reforms may lead to an unraveling of political control, a fact feared by Raul, the military, and other allies bent on remaining in power. Some overtures to the United States also seem possible after a time, especially if no major opposition develops on the island. While maintaining an anti -- 'U.S. posture, a consolidated Raul regime may welcome American tourists and limited U.S. trade and investments" (Suchlicki para. 18).

Suchlicki identifies this as the most likely succession scenario, at which time limited political and economic changes would occur, making it possible for a significant number of U.S. citizens to visit Cuba, while investments would be on a small scale. An end to the embargo would allow for greater trade to develop as U.S. companies attempted to penetrate the Cuban market and stake a claim, following what some Canadian and European firms have already done. The potential for such trade is considerable given the need Cuba has for all sorts of products and consumer goods. This means there is a demand, but Cuba also has to be able to pay for these goods. One source of income would be the tourist dollars Americans would bring. In time, Cuba must sell its products in the U.S. market as well. Investment would still be slow in growing, however, "given the lack of an extensive internal market, the uncertainties surrounding the long -- 'term risk to foreign investment, an uncertain political situation, and the opportunities provided by other markets in Latin America and elsewhere. Modest initial investments would be directed primarily to exploiting Cuba's tourist, mining, and natural resource industries. Unless major reforms were to take place, it is unlikely that the U.S. government or corporations would be willing to plow significant investment funds into Cuba" (Suchlicki para. 22). Clearly, for any such advancement to take place, Cuban economic reforms are essential.

Suchlicki also discusses what he says would be a faster but much less likely scenario in which there might be a government without either Fidel or Raul, and such a government might open up the economy and encourage private, domestic, and foreign investments and might also provide political change and respect for human rights:

Laws would be introduced protecting foreign investments, negotiations might begin either to compensate or return to their original U.S. And Cuban owners companies and properties confiscated by the Castro regime in the 1960s; Cuban exiles would be welcomed to visit, invest in, and trade with Cuba. The U.S. government would lift the travel ban and end the embargo and would initiate foreign -- 'aid programs to help the island's economic development. (Suchlicki para. 23)

Obviously, such an eventuality would be preferred by the U.S. If it could be achieved, leading to a rapidly improving Cuban economy and restoring freedom to the worker. Suchlicki notes that however a new regime develops, "any post -- 'Castro government will face significant challenges and problems. There will be the awesome task of economic reconstruction. Cuba's extreme dependence on Soviet -- 'bloc trade and the adaptation of its economy to an unnatural and immense subsidy inflow for nearly four decades created an artificial economy, which has disappeared. Cuba does not have a viable economy of its own. As nearly every category of imports keeps shrinking, a vicious cycle of poverty mercilessly grips the country" (Suchlicki 24).

A recent survey suggests the depth of some of the divisions in Cuban society over issues of Castro and the future. Fyllis Hockman writes that Cuba may be on the brink of a new revolution because of an increasing focus on tourism to correct for the damaging loss of Soviet dollars, noting that the country is currently undergoing an architectural makeover with political and economic implications. The need to increase tourism means there is a need to renovate hotels, attractions, and historic sites. The economic conditions are changing as the country uses dollars as the currency of tourism, because dollars are negotiable on the world market. The dispersion of money creates situations where waiters and cab drivers make more than doctors and teachers. The economic disparity is creating a two-tier economy and more than a little resentment among those no in the tourism industry. Dissension is increased by the fact that Cubans are not allowed to stay in or dine at hotels and restaurants designated as tourist destinations, and many Cubans do not see that tourism is a major force in the economy that will benefit the entire population over time. Other changes are noted:

The government's additional need for money has led to an uneasy experiment with capitalism as an alternative income-producing measure. Enter the self-employed. Some fast-food stands have cropped up, selling pizza and ice cream. Tourist-designated Coco taxis roam the streets. Private homes have been transformed into bed-and-breakfast accommodations and restaurants. In each case, the new entrepreneurs must purchase licenses and pay taxes. (Hockman para. 6)

In spite of these experiments, poverty remains widespread, though starvation is not because a rationing program guarantees every household a minimum supply of staples each month. Without money to supplement this government allotment, however, living is at the subsistence level. To improve the diet, the government encourages urban gardening. In terms of attitudes expressed about Castro, the people are torn as to whether to praise him or berate him, though most hope that things will improve once he is gone.

Future of U.S. Policy

Just as Cuba is likely to change over the next few years, so will American policy toward Cuba be tested and questioned and perhaps changed as well. That policy is almost certain to change once there is a regime change in Cuba, and the greater the change in Cuba, the greater the change in U.S. policy toward Cuba. An issue raised for some time is whether a change in U.S. policy now would bring about a desired change in Cuban actions and in the regime itself. At one time, various plots were hatched to discredit the Castro regime or to eliminate Castro altogether, ranging from assassination attempts to odd seeming efforts to make his beard fall out so he would be humiliated. More overt efforts included the Bay of Pigs invasion and the contretemps between Washington and Moscow over missiles in Cuba, while some of the more covert efforts seem comical in retrospect. The primary fact of American relations is that the policy has attempted to isolate Cuba in the world community, to prevent most Cuban trade, and especially to prevent commerce of any kind between Cuba and the United States.

Shawn Malone points out that U.S. policy toward Cuba has recently been guided by two primary objectives, the first to isolate the Cuban government, and the second to provide support to the Cuban population. Isolating the government has taken first position, often precluding measures that would help the Cuban people but might indirectly benefit the government as well. The effort to isolate the government extends back to 1960, at which time the United States imposed an economic embargo on trade between the two countries. Many thought that the end of the Cold War would bring some decline in this policy, what has happened instead has been an intensification of U.S. pressure tactics, brought about primarily by the legislative branch:

The Cuban Democracy Act, passed in 1992, prohibited foreign subsidiaries of U.S. companies from trading with Cuba, urged other countries to restrict trade and finance arrangements with the island, approved economic sanctions for any country providing Cuba assistance, and prohibited ships docking in Cuba from entering U.S. ports for six months. (Malone para. 3)

The one change in policy was also embodied in this act, creating possibilities for providing "support to the Cuban people" through the authorization of regulated donations of food and medicine to Cuba, payments to Cuba for telecommunications services, and travel to Cuba for journalistic, religious, or educational purposes. As Malone writes,

Though humanitarian in intent, many of these initiatives were later justified by U.S. officials as yet another means of subverting the Cuban government. Already apprehensive about increased people-to-people contact, Cuban leaders found in such rhetoric both genuine cause and political justification for greater restrictions in this sphere, resulting in less space for interaction than before the U.S. "opening." (Malone para. 5)

Another major piece of legislation in this area is the Helms-Burton Act, which was passed in 1996 and includes a codification of U.S. sanctions against Cuba, which formerly were implemented by executive order. This law gives the administration less flexibility to adjust U.S. policy in this area without congressional approval. The law also added new penalties for foreign companies that do business in Cuba and allows U.S. nationals to sue foreign investors who profit from property confiscated by the Cuban government. The law can also deny these investors entry into the United States. The law further indicates the internal conditions Cuba must meet before Washington can consider normalizing relations, including elections that specifically exclude Fidel and Raul Castro and the establishment of an American-style system of representative democracy and one of free market economics. These laws express the outrage of certain segments of Congress but have been the target of much criticism from other quarters:

International reaction to these acts, particularly Helms -- 'Burton, has been overwhelmingly negative. Key U.S. allies have denounced the laws as an extraterritorial attempt to bully sovereign nations into adopting a particular foreign policy. The conflict has been especially sharp with close U.S. trading partners such as Canada and Mexico, who argue that the U.S. is in violation of NAFTA, and the European Union, which had threatened to bring the case before the World Trade Organization before reaching a tenuous last -- 'minute understanding. (Malone para. 9)

In spite of these laws, the U.S. has taken steps in recent years to cooperate with Cuba on regional security interests, such as negotiating an agreement on migration in 1994 to address a crisis brought about the rafters escaping from Cuba, or efforts to provide humanitarian and moral support to the Cuban people.

Mark Falcoff sets up what he sees as the general future of Cuba and of Cuban relations with the United States, writing,

First, the Castro regime cannot survive the person of the dictator, but as long as he lives he will probably rule, and as long as he rules, the island will undergo no meaningful political changes. Second, having lost its Soviet patron, Cuba can no longer pose the same sort of threat to the United States and its neighbors; this in turn requires a reexamination of the fundamental premises of U.S. policy. Third, the problems for the United States posed by the end of Castroism are probably potentially as great as its indefinite perpetuation. (Falcoff 117)

These views are based on the nature of the regime, its condition at the present time, and speculation concerning what might follow Castro and what that would mean to the United States.

For one thing, Falcoff's view of what might follow depends on the removal of both the Castro brothers and not on what might happen if Raul succeeds Fidel. The latter possibility might create a different dynamic, and in any case, what Falcoff writes is largely speculation. When Fidel Castro is removed, by death or other means, pressures are sure to increase within Cuba to create some sort of political opening. While Washington might hope that these pressures will be toward some form of Western political and economic structure, this remains uncertain. The forces that will be unleashed will be difficult to control or contain, however, as is well understood by the present regime, which keeps these forces in check to assure the perpetuation of the Castro regime as long as possible. Falcoff states that for Fidel, this means maintaining the current system, which makes any hope that a more liberal system will evolve naturally highly unlikely. This fact is contrary to the stated goals of Castro in many cases, for he often discusses the idea of new "revolutionary institutions" to be created after his death. He himself has been unwilling to create any of these institutions while he is in power, and the Cuban government continues to be operated along the same personalistic lines as before, and potential rivals tend to disappear or be driven into exile. Some have in fact been executed. Falcoff believes that this means that the existing dynasty is therefore limited, with no real successor beyond Raul, and with even that eventuality uncertain. Cuban leaders do not know what form the future government will take except to assure that it will be some form of socialism. They claim this is necessary because the achievements of the current regime have the support of the vast majority of the people, such as advancements in education and health, with particular support coming from those who remember the ills of the pre-revolutionary period. AS Falcoff writes,

Since there are no public opinion polls or elections in Cuba, one cannot know the extent to which these claims are true or false. Nonetheless, the regime's own lack of curiosity -- it has resisted calls, for example, for a plebiscite on the Chilean model -- does not inspire confidence on the part of most outside observers. (Falcoff 118)

The current leaders clearly have a stake in the outcome and so may be shading the truth in order to make themselves look more reasonable.

Falcoff notes that the fact of sour relations with the United States is not merely a reflection of political pressure within the U.S. But is often the fault of Cuba as well, given that Havana has refused several opportunities to improve relations extending back to the 1970s. At the same time, the United States is not interested in making things easier for Castro by widening opportunities for credit and trade or by aiding in American tourism. While some claim that allowing such changes would in time destabilize the communist regime, Washington believes that in the short-term, all that would happen would be a boost to Castro by giving him resources to survive (Falcoff 119).

In the past, the U.S. response to Cuba was justified because Cuba was aligned with the Soviet Union and sought to undermine U.S. interests in the hemisphere by "the training of revolutionary cadres, the transfer to them of arms, intelligence information, and financial resources, as well as the deployment of a considerable political influence in what used to be called the Third World and at international organizations" (Falcoff 120). However, the conditions that brought this about no longer exist, just as the Soviet Union no longer exists, and Cuban influence is greatly reduced even in this hemisphere. Castro has even claimed to have abandoned his policy of subversion against his neighbors, though Cuba clearly still has the capacity to do so if it chooses. Without Soviet power behind the country, however, Cuba is still not as great a threat as was once believed. Normalizing relations remains out of the question because of a belief that "to welcome it back to the inter -- 'American family, as it is today and with no questions asked, would fly in the face of U.S. policy in the rest of the region as it has evolved over the past dozen years -- 'from 'business as usual' with dictators to a greater concern for human rights and democracy. An unconditional normalization of relations would overturn the bipartisan consensus forged on these issues and undermine the credibility of U.S. policy in other countries where democratic institutions are still fragile" (Falcoff 121).

Another factor of importance is the Cuban exile population, largely in Florida, which is not as unified as it is often depicted as being. A recent survey shows some of the divisions in terms of who should decide Cuba's future:

Fully 33% believe that it should be resolved exclusively by those who have remained behind; 48% favor codetermination by the two communities; a mere 8% assign this task to the diaspora alone. Significantly, some 79% cannot name someone they wish to see as Cuba's next president. Even when supplied with a list of probable candidates, the "winner," Jorge Mas Canosa of the Cuban American National Foundation, drew only 44% of the vote. (The "runner -- 'up," Tony de Varona of the Partido Cubano Revolucionario (Autentico) received only 11%, and "Don't Know/No Answer" received 25%.) Rather surprisingly, in light of the exile community's somewhat unfashionable conservative political image, fully 73% believe that "socialized medicine and free education should continue in democratic Cuba"! (Falcoff 122-123)

For now, says Falcoff, the current U.S. policy needs to be maintained.

Gillian Gunn disagrees, stating that the current policy is "caught in a time warp" and goes against the changes taking place around the world. Gunn also believes that the policy is harmful to the transition process within Cuba and could damage U.S. interests in the long tem. Showing how the policy is mired in the past, Gunn writes,

In the 1992 election campaign, President Bush and Democratic candidate Bill Clinton vied to issue the most aggressively anti -- ' Castro rhetoric as they competed for the critical Florida vote. The former's pledge to be the "first U.S. president to set foot in a free Cuba" and the latter's claim that the Bush administration had lost an opportunity "to put the hammer down on Fidel Castro" could just as easily have been issued in 1962 as in 1992. (Gunn 127)

Indeed, Gunn finds that the policy has hardened to make it all the more difficult for Cuba to comply. In the past, the United States has only demanded an end to Cuban export of revolution, withdrawal of troops from Africa, and reduction of military ties with the Soviet Union, while the administration of the first George Bush changed this to demand the establishment of a market economy, free elections, and a reduction in the size of the military. To a great degree, Cuba satisfied the original requirements, so Washington created new requirements and conducted various actions that could be considered a deliberate incitement toward Cuba. Gunn finds that these and other actions have made it less likely that Cuba will change in the way the United States wants:

The United States had done Fidel Castro an enormous favor. It had provided an explanation for a refusal to reform that was plausible to the very constituency most likely to effectively protest the political stagnation -- ' -- 'the well educated. The United States was not responsible for the hard -- 'line shift. Cuban domestic politics, Castro's character and other events in the international arena had done that. U.S. policy did, however, legitimate the shift in the eyes of many Cubans. (Gunn 140)

Gunn sees an alternative way to approach the issue, though noting at the same time how forces in the United States are certain to pressure for a hard line to satisfy political pressures and ideological concerns. Gun writes,

If a swift peaceful transition to a pluralist, market -- 'oriented society is unlikely, and a violent transition might seriously damage U.S. interests, what are the alternatives? All are unpalatable, for they involve a gradualist approach and a willingness to accept Castro at the helm of Cuba for some interim period as the price for stability. Distasteful though these alternatives are, however, they are more realistic than the first scenario, and less damaging to U.S. interests than the second. Indeed, one Western diplomat interviewed in Havana recently went so far as to say: "It may turn out that the only way to avoid bloodshed in Cuba is to have a partial transition while Fidel remains in control, leaving full democratization until he passes from the scene." This, from an individual implacably opposed to Castro, is a remarkable statement. It is also probably true. (Gunn 141)

Gunn Also worries that "U.S. rigidity could contribute to a major human tragedy on the island, which exacerbates hatreds and pushes back still further the day that it will be ruled by a government deemed both democratic and legitimate by its citizens" (Gunn 143), precisely the opposite outcome desired.

Not everyone sees the situation in Cuba as a continuing threat, and Irving Louis Horowitz finds that Castro himself has reduced his own effectiveness because as the world has changed, he has not:

While Cuba remains a force to contend with, its xenophobic nationalism has institutionalized an economic backwardness that has in turn created a diplomatic impasse. Cuba is now isolated from the trends sweeping the region. Bolstered by revitalized democracies from Mexico to Brazil, Latin America is undergoing a degree of economic integration unforeseen by the allies of the United States and unnoticed by its enemies. Economic upheaval notwithstanding, the situation in 2002 is profoundly more favorable to the forces of hemispheric democracy than it was in 1961, or for that matter throughout the 1960s and 1970s. This illustrates Fidel's myopia as the century of ambiguity nears its end. Post -- 'Castro Cuba will become part of an extraordinary hemispheric vitalization in which the fabled ogre of U.S. domination is absent. The problem of Cuban nationalism and jealousy for its sovereignty will be bound up in choices concerning hemispheric multilateralism, not obeisance to a new Platt Amendment. The long -- 'term positive future of Cuba is neither utopian nor ideological. Rather, it is normalization in the best sense of politics, and rationalization in the best sense of economics. (Horowitz para. 25)

Clearly, though, American leaders do not see this as the way to address the issue and believe that Castro remains a major threat, even if few other countries agree with them. Any concession to Cuba is seen as something that bolsters Castro and keeps him in power, and the more these leaders see an end to Castro's reign in sight, the more recalcitrant they seem to become.

Indeed, many see all economic transactions with Cuba as having no more important effect than to keep Castro in power. George Lucas discusses tourism in Cuba and determines that every tourist dollar keeps Castro in power. Lucas notes the growth in various kinds of business in Cuba in the 1990s when he writes,

Scarcely a week passes in Havana without another new multinational business venture being announced, another operator heralding another all -- 'inclusive first -- 'world -- 'friendly holiday place. Last year [1996] more than a million foreign visitors arrived, including 186,000 Italians, 148,000 Germans, a gargantuan 215,000 Canadians -- ' and 40,000 Brits. A whopping 80,000 of the latter are expected this year. (Lucas para. 2)

Lucas states that the rush for tourism is fueled by the continuing American embargo, which keeps Cuba from trading with the world in a normal fashion, and by the loss of Soviet money so that others are rushing in to fill the void. However, as Lucas notes, there are dangers in this reality: "The first dark betrayal behind Castro's dash for cash is that it returns Cuba precisely to the 1950s client status which enabled his revolution in the first place" (Lucas para. 9). Lucas sees an even greater problem in the fact that "every tourist dollar helps bankroll the dictatorship through its dotage: Cuba is thus well under way to being trashed by the worst of both communism and capitalism combined" (Lucas para. 11). This is not a society where the money trickles down to the people who need it most and instead collects in the coffers of the already wealthy and the well-connected, while the people get by as best they can in a country marked by repression and bankruptcy, described as a "utopia people risk excruciating death to escape" (Lucas para. 15). Lucas calls on Castro to do the only things that will correct this situation, namely opening the jails, organizing free elections, and seeking the end of sanctions, unlikely as such moves really are.

Many exiled Cubans send money to relatives and friends still on the island, a form of economic aid that is informal but necessary to keep some people alive in the faltering Cuban economic system. Sarah A. Blue offers a study of how changing economic conditions in the home country act as an important determinant for sending remittances. She notes that research on the determinants of remittances has focused in the past on the characteristics of the sending population, and in the case of Cuba, this means that a disproportionate amount of attention is given to political disincentives to send remittances and not enough to changing state policy and the growing economic demand for remittances in Cuba. Blue uses empirical data gathered from households in Havana to test the importance of economic conditions in the home country, political ideology, the relationship of the sender to the receiver, the length of time away from home, and gender as determinants for remittances:

Migration during an economic crisis, having immediate relatives in the home country, and female gender positively influenced remittance behavior for Cuban emigrants. Visits to the home country, especially for migrants who had left decades earlier, were found to be critical for reestablishing family connections and increasing remittances. No support was found for political disincentives as a major determinant of remittance sending to Cuba (Blue para. 1).

Among the political disincentives that do not change this movement of funds are both Cuban and American policies that might prevent it.

Of course, the fact that such remittances are required reflects poorly on the economic system in Cuba. There are reports of some changes, however, that might be good signs. Cuba's cement industry holds and important place, and recently it was noted that the name Karl Marx was removed from one of the largest cement plants in the country. This plant is a joint venture partially owned by a Spanish company controlled by a private investment bank, with a total investment of around $105 million to modernize the plant and bring it up to international standards in order to boost production and make Cuba a major cement exporter to the Caribbean and West Africa (Luxner paras. 1-6). More than a name change is required to eliminate the stigma of communist influence in Cuba, of course, but some see such a move as a sign of change.

Projections into the Future

Istvan Meszaros writes about what Cuba may be like over the next half century or so. He notes that there is a widespread view that the American policy towards Cuba has been a failure, and he refers to an article by a former minister of Margaret Thatcher's Conservative British government stating that some in the U.S. are naive to think that "in the post -- ' Castro era Cuba will effectively become the 51st state of the U.S. In fact, the very opposite is likely to happen.... We must avoid the danger of borrowing the blunt instrument of America's political sledge -- 'hammer [nor should we view Cuba] through the unfocused binoculars of American wishful thinking" (Meszaros para. 6). Meszaros notes that the American policy has forced Cuba to be in a state of emergency for many years, creating major hardships even beyond those created by the American blockade. The end of the Soviet Union only added to the hardships faced by Cuba, because this meant a tightening of the American blockade in the vain hope of precipitating an immediate collapse, and also because of the loss of its main markets and supply sources. This reduced the food supply of the people by about half, followed by difficult years before the country could restore the nutritional requirements of the people to the earlier level. Meszaros concludes,

It goes without saying, the conditions of a continued state of emergency are unfavorable to the achievement of several desirable objectives both on the political/cultural and on the economic plane. But they cannot be simply wished out of existence, nor should they be, of course, prolonged any longer than it is historically justified, once the conditions change for the better. (Meszaros 10)

Meszaros sees hope for the future in the fact that Cuba has survived this period of hardship and will emerge stronger as a result:

Obviously, there is nothing artificial about Cuba's painfully long state of emergency in the face of the constantly renewed and intensified military threats of its preponderant adversary. Nevertheless, no one can deny that the full potential of the Cuban Revolution will be brought to fruition in a future when, as a result of a fundamental change of circumstances and global relation of forces, it will be possible to say that the almost prohibitive burden of confronting capital's destructive forces belongs irrevocably to the past. (Meszaros para. 12)

The view taken by Meszaros is clearly socialist and paints the U.S. As an imperialist power seeking to thwart a revolution by the people, which most agree the Cuban revolution no longer is, if it ever was.

Cuba has been under Castro's thumb for decades, and in spite of the socialist rhetoric from the Cuban government, Castro was never really a Marxist revolutionary at all. Georgie Anne Geyer writes,

One thing, however, is very clear in all the romantically deceptive webs that this "mysterious" leader has so cleverly woven about himself: Fidel Castro is not really ideological at all. Despite his dramatic exclamations of faith, he has never been a communist or Marxist in any imaginable traditional sense. He has no real Communist Party, no politburo, and no socialist central planning system in any traditional sense. He is really not even Cuban in any historic style, but rather Spanish in the manner of the caudillos (military dictators) of old: he is a Fidelista in the spirit of, as the Spanish like to say, "Primero soy yo." (Or, "Me first!") (Geyer 265)

Castro also clearly believes in violence as a way to keep his followers and the people in line. Jorge I. Dominguez sees the violent past of Castro and Cuba as shaping Cuban politics today and as a problem to be overcome once Castro is no longer in power. He notes the concern that once Castro is out of power, wider violence will return to the nation. Cuban officials believe they can forestall this through Raul Castro, a man respected within the Communist Party leadership "for paying more attention than his brother to party organization and development and the party's role in society. Officials hope Raul Castro will choreograph the succession from his brother without actually transforming the political regime" (Dominguez para. 3). Another force that could prevent an eruption of violence is "a deepening commitment to nonviolence within Cuba's growing domestic opposition" (Dominguez para. 4), and these opposition groups have become more adept at establishing domestic and international alliances and at garnering internal support. Cuba's Roman Catholic bishops have also become more experienced at addressing the broad issues that confront Cubans.

As Dominguez further notes, though, there are dangers in the existing situation just the same, and he notes that "conflict would deepen in Cuba between government and opposition if, the Day After Fidel, Cubans face mere succession without a true transition toward a new regime" (Dominguez para. 5). Dominguez says this transition can be better managed and remain more peaceful than past regime changes in Cuba, and he believes this because of the presence of Raul Castro:

tacit agreement between a Raul Castro -- 'led government and the opposition could produce a deeper economic opening. As an innovative Armed Forces Minister, Raul Castro authorized "best business practices" in enterprises managed by the military. He has orchestrated a successful retirement scheme for military officers who run and staff many autonomous quasi -- 'private successful enterprises (still wholly state owned), especially in the tourism sector. In so doing, he has shrunk the armed forces, cut military spending, sustained military loyalty to established authority, and facilitated a wider future regime transition. In 1993 -- '94, he helped persuade his brother to authorize fleer agricultural markets. (Dominguez para. 5)

The Cuban opposition has been advocating greater freedoms and more market openings in order to achieve wider freedoms, and Cuban society does need non -- 'state funding that is more reliable than simply remittances from Cuban -- 'Americans.

In any case, says Dominguez, the immediate post -- 'transition outcome is likely to be unstable in Cuba for three reasons:

1) While Raul Castro is politically talented, he lacks his brother's ability to obtain broad public support, and he is also already in his 70s.

2) The domestic opposition and other forces in civil society will demand a more complete transition.

3) The international community will become more active in seeking to facilitate deeper, wider changes.

Dominguez also notes the many questions that will have to be answered once the transition is a reality:

Ultimately, the Day After will be defined more by developments in Cuba than influences from abroad. If Raul Castro becomes president of Cuba, even for a short time, key questions would emerge. Would a Raul Castro government lift state constraints on semi -- 'private peasant cooperatives to free production and marketing decisions? Would it permit the development of small -- ' and medium -- 'sized Cuban -- 'owned business firms? Would it allow foreign firms operating in Cuba to hire their own workforces and authorize labor unions? Would it fully privatize some state enterprises, selling them to foreigners, or would it preside over "insider" privatization? Would it adopt mild political reforms possible under existing laws? For instance, would such a government allow municipal candidates to campaign and permit multi -- 'candidate elections for the National Assembly? (Dominguez para. 8)

The rest of the world is certain to be watching these developments closely, but in the end, the decisions will be made by the Cubans themselves.

Perry Anderson notes that there is a gulf between those who see Cuba as hopelessly mired in a failed system and those who see some beneficial change, and he notes that "most writing about the island has been polarized: either ardently sympathetic or passionately hostile" (Anderson para. 1). There are also wide disparities as to what various commentators believe will happen once Castro is out of power. Many American companies at the present time see a potential market in Cuba, much as they have seen in the past in China (though much smaller). Todd Lewan cites Jaime Suchlicki, director of the Institute of Cuban and Cuban -- 'American Studies at the University of Miami, who notes that while both Cuban -- 'American entrepreneurs and multinational conglomerates such as IBM, McDonald's, Texaco, and Anheuser -- 'Busch are concocting "entrance strategy" plans, these firms may have to wait from five to ten years after Castro's death to put these plans into operation, and he notes, "Cuba isn't going to open up the way Eastern Europe did... I think Cuba will probably act more like China, only with a lot less economic freedom. In the beginning, anyway" (Lewan para. 13). This is because the military runs perhaps 65% of the Cuban economy, and the military is not going to relinquish this control for some time and may not do so at all unless they can see a profit in it for them. The insulation of the country will allow the generals to maintain control for many years. What ultimately happens is likely to depend on how well they handle the economy, and Suchlicki states, "Sure, it's a disaster right now, but the Communists are helped by three factors: cheap Venezuelan oil, tourism, and remittances from Cuban exiles. I think they'll be able to muddle through for a good, long while" (Lewan para. 18). Race on some level will play a part as well, for Cuba today is one-third white and two-thirds black, and the darker-skinned elements in the population will be the likely beneficiaries of any changes in the beginning.

Lewan also notes how many believe that Cuba will be awash in returning exiles once Castro is gone, a view countered by Antonio Jorge, professor of Cuban economics at Florida International University. He cites studies showing that fewer than 100,000 of the more than 1.2 million Cuban exiles in the United States will return to Cuba once Castro dies. He also believes it will be very difficult to bring Cuba back even to the level it had in 1959 because Castro has managed to make underdevelopment the characteristic state for the Cuban economy. He also states that the longer Castro remains in power, the more deterioration there will be and the higher the cost of reconstruction. The exiles in South Florida operate more then 80,000 businesses, and many are likely to invest in a post-Castro Cuba. However, what will really be needed is investment by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and U.S. banks to finance big ventures (Lewan paras. 20-21).

The question that will be asked during the transition is the same one being asked today -- is Cuba a threat or an opportunity? Hilary M. Becker analyzes this question by noting that Cuba has undergone major changes over the past decade, both socially and economically, with some political changes after the demise of the Soviet Union and the decline of soviet monies and support. Becker states,