Cybersecurity threats and domestic terrorism in the United States

Cyber-Citizen, USA

Cyber-citizen USA

The debate over systems security

"If you see something, say something," the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) promotes the use of internet communications to warn of potential threats to national security. Targeting technologically savvy young adults, the DHS attention to domestic terrorism has increased precipitously since the events of 9/11, when the overall attention to the scope of terrorism internationally resulted in a number of strategic commissions to transform security risks into manageable operations. Cyberterrorism according to the National Strategy for Securing Cyberspace, 2003 offers recommendation to protection of critical infrastructure where industrial computer control networks monitoring energy may be vulnerable. The foregoing essay looks at the convergence of public and private efforts in counter terrorism, and particularly in the sphere of domestic hacker cyberterrorism which is now the provenance of even our smallest citizens.

Introduction

In the field of Criminal Justice, perhaps nowhere outside of Philosophy, are ethical protocol to decision making more relevant to the constitution of law. Inequitable access to resources and political representation has created a vacuum for power that has many effects, including the unfortunate devolution of economies and lives in response to war. An outgrowth of tyranny abroad, war has a tendency to promote extraordinary response by those who think they have unwittingly received the short end of the deal. High profile in circumstance, international terrorism has become one of the most studied criminal activities in the decade following the 9/11 incident in the United States, and in related events such as the London Bombings of 2004 in the UK, and elsewhere abroad.

Military professionals note that cyberspace is a unique environment in their pursuits, as missions now include the geography that is borderless, and provision against attacks must be equally as asymmetric and clandestine, as attackers have a virtually unlimited range and speed in timing in potential execution of assault on key national infrastructure. According to Col. (S) Bradley K. Ashley, USAF (2004), with cyber-terror, "massive results can be achieved without massing forces" as such attacks are "fast, easy and relatively inexpensive" (Ashley, 2004). Noted within Ashley's discussion is the number of conflicts that now have cyberspace dimensions. U.S. troops now employ hackers to engage in official military incursions online.

The theatre of war is not the only site where hackers threaten U.S. national interests through violation of key infrastructure architecture, however. As Ashley points out, "in 1998, a 12-year-old hacker broke into the SCADA computer systems that run Arizona's Roosevelt Dam" resulting in complete loss of federal control of the dam's massive floodgates (Ashley, 2004). While intentional in pursuit, hacking by a twelve-year-old U.S. citizen does not constitute "organized terrorism," and the intentionality of his mens rea in court proceedings will obviously be negligible due to minor status, the prevalence of cyber-terrorism as an "everyman" activity is made readily apparent. The dam mentioned in Col. Ashley's account, held up to 489 trillion gallons of water back from a flood plain inhabited by more than a million people. The story concludes with the citation of the use of "more than 3 million SCADA devices" to control systems monitoring and distribution in the United States today (Ashley, 2004).

The case of the twelve-year-old boy illustrates the common place nature of the crime of cyber-terrorism in the everyday activities of American companies as they work toward risk mitigation and energy resource control. How terrorism fits into the larger picture of the U.S. war on terror is discussed throughout the foregoing discussion, with four (4) objectives underlying analysis of the historical response to terror: 1) What the current policy is regarding the tracking of potential suspects in the war against terrorism?; 2) How we should weigh the fears of terrorism and desire for national security against civil liberties and individual rights?; 3) What is the just response to terrorism?; and 4) Should those who commit lethal acts of terrorism for political or religious causes receive the death penalty?

The ethical precepts to the discussion are never absent from the minds of military and other government staff assigned to the role of protection. As Ashley aptly proffers on the psychology of terror,

"in an asymmetric world, terrorists look for alternative methods to spread terror. The cyberworld may prove to be the simplest and quickest alternative to traditional physical attacks. The motives of cyberterrorists in this realm likely will be the same as those that incite physical attack. They generally seek financial gain, disruption, decreased military capability, fear/panic, publicity and news impact, decreased confidence in critical infrastructures/psychological operations, great physical damage and even loss of life. The dilemma in the cyberworld is not only to detect attackers but also to understand why they are attacking" (Ashley, 2004).

According to U.S. FEMA's Cyberterrorism Defense Analysis Center (CDAC), training professionals in the field of counter cyberterrorism is urgent. The immediacy of technical infrastructure is in the path of real threat is described as particularly relevant to U.S. interests due to the persistence of aggressive targeting of systems information systems core to national infrastructure.

An increase in severity, frequency, and sophistication each year is noted as the rationale for congressional support of FEMA's Cyberterrorism Defense Initiative (CDI) and training program(s) for personnel involved in critical infrastructure. Without exception, as the U.S. critical infrastructure grows more reliant on information technologies, the danger of exposure to both foreign and domestic hackers stands to disengage our control over various important sectors of the "economy, public works, communication systems, and computer networks" (FEMA, 2010). Critical infrastructure described in the U.S. PATRIOT Act of 2001 are those,

"systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that the incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets would have a debilitating impact on security, national economic security, national public health or safety, or any combination of those matters" (Shea, 2).

Immediately post 9/11, industries subject to rigorous scrutiny were in the sectors such as arms manufacturing, chemicals and other high risk production. Energy infrastructure was also put on the radar after the 2001 Act, and dual risk management strategies were recommended to industrial entities on government contract, and where: 1) Supervisory control related to military compliance and supply; and 2) Data acquisition (SCADA) and distributive controls systems were already in force.

By 2005, the influence on how American business was conducted after the Patriot Act, had important trickle down effects in the global governance regime. International cooperation on worldwide security protocols stemming from business contracts and foreign policy doctrine laid for by the U.S. And other allies had impact on the fiscal oversight of energy infrastructure grid management systems as seen in the Final Report of the Counter-Terrorism International Conference, Riyadh, 2005. The document articulates a framework to working with Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs) in cooperation with private oil and energy industry.

Standardization became the buzz word where it systems architectures employing SCADA technologies were "hot" priorities in emergency response. This is also pertinent to the management of unique legacy systems controlling critical infrastructure, earlier designed with the belief in mind that designated, internal measures of security were optimum to those controlled by taxonomies studied widely. Open source SAP have mitigated some of the risk here, but continued security measures must be worked on if industrial systems are to remain protected. As remote sensing conduits receiving raw data and sending out commands, SCADA control center systems provide software building blocks to critical infrastructure control networks. Sending signals to valves and switches, SCADA regulate the flow, rates and intensity of pressure to refinement and distribution of chemical and natural resources (i.e. oil and water).

SCADA also contributes to multi-scale network analysis, making SCADA systems invaluable, and simultaneously highly vulnerable to implantation of incorrect data by way of remote access. Dial-up modem connections employed for systems maintenance are a typically cited target of would be hackers. In terms of site target, chemical reserves constitute the biggest threat, as reactors once tampered with, may be changed through control rate of mixing, leading to raised temperature of effluent system to the point of explosion level.

Other critical systems targets in the National Strategy for Securing Cyberspace, 2003 include industrial control architecture dedicated to acquisition systems such as Distributed Control Systems (DCS) and Programmable Logic Controllers (PLC). PLC devices provide automated monitoring switches in industrial controls at refinement plants manufacturing facilities. Primarily a software application SAP of internal data control PLC offer networks more flexibility in communication from machine to machine, or to an entire system of manufacturing technologies.

Networked PLC advance control of channel operations in manufacturing for centralized logistics management of all activities in the product chain: processing, holding to distribution. The incorporation of DCS to PLC networks furthers accuracy in the communication of process phases. SCADA systems integration is designed to interpret/control decoupling points; hence maximizing the PLC industrial channel all the way through to end distribution.

The sheer detail at risk within critical infrastructure it systems is daunting. The possibility that one act of cyber-terrorism could cause disaster at a magnitude greater than the 9/11 enforces the relevancy that the work of it professionals and policy makers in this area has to citizens. The fact that industrial control systems may be vulnerable to infiltration by other citizens, or international parties puts laws pertaining to intersection of systems transmission at the forefront of priorities for us all.

At present, telecommunications interference of private citizens holds an up to a five-year prison sentence by U.S. federal law. How cyberterrorism is addressed, when the stakes are heightened, leaves a whole host of opportunities for citizens, and legislators to voice their opinion as new technologies for privacy invasion come on the market.

Every ISP access point imaginable is cited within the literature on cyberterrorism, including direct access networks, maintenance of dial-up modems, and of course the internet, remote systems architectures. Exponential information like SCADA systems create an incredibly vulnerable area for hackers interested in "knowledge sharing" network data toward sabotage of industrial operations and state military interests. DHS strategic responsibilities take care of the broad brush stroke where it professionals leave off, through ongoing development of crisis management, as illustrated in Table 1.

Table 1

Comprehensive national plan for continued security in cyber-systems;

Crisis management in response to attacks on critical information systems;

Technical assistance to private sector and other government entities in regard to urgent recovery plans following emergencies;

Coordination with other agencies in the federal government in design and education on protective countermeasures and warnings at the state, local and NGO organization levels;

Performing and funding research with new scientific developments in security technologies as a goal; and Serving the general public as a federal center for cyber-security.

Table 1. Crisis Management Goals (DHS, 2003).

In 2003, pursuant to section 994(p) of title 28, United States Code, the United States Sentencing Commission published Congressional guidelines to the conviction of parties in violation of Section 225 of the Cyber Security Enhancement Act of the Homeland Security Act, 2002. The amendment stipulates,

"modifies §2B2.3, to which 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(3) (misdemeanor trespass on a government computer) offenses are referenced, and §2B3.2, to which 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(7) (extortionate demand to damage protected computer) offenses are referenced to provide enhancements relating to computer systems used to maintain or operate a critical infrastructure, or by or for a government entity in furtherance of the administration of justice, national defense, or national security. The amendment expands the scope of existing enhancements to ensure that trespasses and extortions involving these types of important computer systems are addressed" (Homeland Security Act, Amendment).

The definition of 'government entity' as any infrastructure having to with state administration extends to relationships where the government is in public-private partnership, including control of energy distribution, where crimes fraud, the major emphasis on enhancements to convictions are stipulated to be in support of sentencing for 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(9).Section 2B3.2(b)(3)(B)(V). The provision also points to critical infrastructure, and violation of the rule as "damage to a computer system used to maintain or operate a critical infrastructure, or by or for a government entity in furtherance of the administration of justice, national defense, or national security" (Homeland Security Act, Amendment 2003).

Domestic Terrorism

The Environmental Liberation Front (ELF) a U.S. based radical advocacy group fulfills the criterion for sentencing under the classification of organised 'terrorism.' Extremist conduct in court record where the group was responsible for a range of ecoterrorist attacks on U.S. interests, the ELF is also the sole responsible party to the most costly environmental disasters in contemporary history; a $12 million arson in Vail, Colorado in 1995 and $50 million arson of a housing construction site in San Diego, California, in 2003. Actions against the group also include violation of the U.S. federal government in a dispute solicited by the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) (ADL 2010). A Brief history of Ecoterrorism is presented in 'jest' on the ELF organization website, illustrated in Figure 1.

Figure 1. A Brief History of Ecoterrorism (ELF 2010).

Destruction of property is the intentional outcome of crimes commissioned by the ELF as a 'terrorist organization.' 'Unlawful use of force' serves as additional criteria to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) filed suit, where the ELF has resorted to,

"the unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives" (Harwood 2008).

Law enforcement efforts in tackling disaggregated networks of organized terrorist cells, most often in communication exclusively by internet, has increased federal and state operations in the area of coordinated security response in an attempt to root out extremist activities by those parties, prior to attack.

With the ecoterrorist tendency to also be highly developed in the area of digitized technology, as those resources are critical to terrorist bombing innovations and of course collaboration on arson, cyberterrorism has proven to be a distinct priority in the monitoring and combat of recognized environmental extremists with prior criminal record in this area. Sentencing domestic terrorists in covered in the next section, but for those victims of their "protectionist" movement, the line between arson and treason is too distant.

Security Solutions

Even though simple solutions to cyberterrorism and other internet crimes cannot be found perhaps anywhere, significant attention to wireless security in recent years has given it professionals insights into mitigation of hacker access to critical infrastructure architecture, SCADA control systems and SAP database information as an outgrowth of the counter terrorism phenomenon. Standard security protections such as alphanumeric passwords, firewalls and SSID broadcast privacy offer some provision, but the unconscionable activities of hackers are not typically deterred by such plastic measures. Legal prohibition to unathorized access to remote administration of security protected data and switches within corporate networks with exception of key staff, does little where cyberterrorists are intent to breach security.

The transformation in security protocols from WEP to WPA, and finally to WPA2 added increased protection to encryption; eliminating risks to company networks. Prevention of hacking is almost a perverse joke, as controls accessible to disgruntled employee users may produce the same effect by way of access from home offices and other public locations. Wireless networks are designed to IEEE 802.11 standards, which provide definition of communication device transmission on radio waves using 2.4 or 5.8 GHz radio bands to broadcast data.

Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA) enhancements with integrity checking for encryption keys and user authentication are made possible with Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) that encrypts user names and passwords. Not surprisingly, there are a number of ethical discussions and also legal matters directed at disagreement over the limits of legal identity on encrypted WPA accounts. Would be cyberterrorists using commercial WiFi connections at third party locations, are less likely to obtain discretionary company infrastructure information, but are also not readily tracked by law enforcement if those activities normally take place on an alternative ISP, or dial up.

Hybrid Public Key Infrastructure (HPKI) solutions are perhaps the most common tool for ensuring registered access to structural administration systems, and identify users with cryptographically strong PKI schemes. In this tech efficient world of authentication codes and transmission of commands, criminals are able to speed up cyberterrorist and other internet-based crimes once accessed.

Conclusion

It has been nearly a decade since the shocking catastrophes of 9/11 rocked the East Coast of the United States. Studies on the ethical meaning of the counter-terrorism dialogue look to governmental, professional and scholarly contributions to policy when the specificity of statute is not adequate to describe or prescribe the parameters to threats to national security. The two most cited threats to national security aside from those fostered by transnational politic-theocratic regimes outside the U.S. And elsewhere such as the UK, are derived from the fields of bio-terrorism and cyber-terrorism. The discussion of key energy grid systems infrastructures points out that if our ethical solutions to terrorism in the last instance are through the mechanisms of law, our security measures are equally bound to rules on industry regulation and risk management of those sites.

In consideration of the topic of cyber-terrorism, is the complexity of information that is stored in it systems networks, so pertinent to national security. The history it systems national infrastructure architecture security in the United States is presented through the summary concern of ethical obligations and responsibilities built into policies and protocols constituting the U.S. federal oversight to emergency systems response. Specialists in the field of it security contribute to the legislative policy dialogue, sharing technological inputs on everything to do with control systems technologies.

Lessons learned from insights on systems operations, and integration of private channel manufacturing and distribution flows avails us to potential human/it solutions involving optimized gatekeeper functions to support retention of unique internal controls. Once worked out to the level of practicality now employed within national systems security architecture; basic upgrades toward standardization of risk control in industrial network systems monitoring capacity becomes the 'ethical' perspective to 'managing' rather than merely chasing terrorism.

As the era of anti-terrorist response converges with a new era of energy alternatives, dependent upon market response, the industry and its infrastructure will require inevitable refinement, as SCADA like logistics controls and data information sharing networks are designed to monitor and manage those systems' capacity. In this context, it is very likely that continued advancement in it systems network options to support anti-terrorist attack will enforce new regimes of interpretation in both ethical and legal practice.

Industrial control systems management of grid network infrastructure promises only to expand. What this will mean for the DHS and other national oversight commissions intent on ridding our nation of terrorism only time will tell. Where ecoterrorism poses a threat is in the intersection between two very strong currents within resource control, and as corporations jump on the energy it bandwagon in response to meeting Kyoto Accord related compliance. It is in this uncanny dialectic within public choice and fringe element decision making, that protection of environmentally responsible corporations offers revision to the U.S. Homeland Security Act's original impetus. Most profound in this direction, however, is the implication of the Cyber-Security Enhancement Act of 2002, and its application to facilities used for the proliferation of nuclear energy on the 'clean energy' market.